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 Abstract
The recent financial and economic crisis, which affected many financial institutions
in the UK, created the need to investigate and understand how the crisis affected these
institutions. Consequently, numerous official reports and academic studies have been
written, particularly on Northern Rock, examining the financial impact on, and business
strategies of, these institutions.  However, comparatively, there has been little empirical
investigation into the board processes that  contributed to  the decisions made by the
management of these affected institutions leading up to the crisis. Of particular interest
to research are the demutualised building societies. They were unlike the large universal
banks,  who engaged heavily  in  investment  banking  and were  trading  on their  own
account; yet their organisational outcomes, in particular receipt of government support,
were similar.
This study focuses on the case of the former Bradford & Bingley Building Society
(B&B), the last building society to demutualise, and investigates its transformation and
decline over the period 1995 – 2010.  The investigation adopts a novel approach by
combining the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle with the Upper Echelons Perspective
to  examine  structural  and  behavioural  changes  of  the  board  and  its  governance
functions, during the transition of Bradford & Bingley, from building society to bank
and  nationalised  institution.  Using  a  variety  of  sources,  including  interviews  with
directors,  official  documents,  financial  records,  and  newspaper  articles,  the
transformation of B&B is examined through a historical lens.
The thesis  argues that life-cycle  stages  should not be seen as periods  with well
defined boundaries, but rather overlapping periods of varying length, where each period
has distinct characteristics that distinguish it from another. Furthermore, the importance
of each corporate governance function changes gradually over time within each stage.
Moreover the  interviews  revealed  that directors considered  there  to  be  a  general
hierarchy of governance functions, where determining strategy was considered to be
their prime responsibility, contrary to what is suggested in agency theory. 
In addition, the context of Top Management Team (TMT) decision-making using
the upper echelons perspective is analysed. The findings suggest that firm culture and
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wider economic environment are important factors impacting the constructs of the upper
echelons  perspective  and  hence  decision-making.  In  particular,  the  corporate
governance functions are central to describing the state of the firm.  Also major external
events, as well as management decision-making, influence the life-cycle progression of
the firm.
In summary, the study reflects different life-cycle stages, ownership patterns and
regulatory  environments  in  its  exploration  of  board  processes  and transformation  at
Bradford & Bingley. This thesis thus contributes to the ongoing debate on the shifting
UK corporate governance code, which recognises that appropriate board structures and
non-executive director independence are not sufficient to have an effective board, but
that board effectiveness depends on TMT behaviour. In this context, boardroom culture
has emerged as the major determinant of the effectiveness of board processes.
ii
Table of Contents
 Abstract..............................................................................................................................i
 Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................x
 Author’s Declaration........................................................................................................xi
1 Introduction....................................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................1
1.2 Scope of Research...................................................................................................5
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives................................................................................6
1.4 Research Questions.................................................................................................6
1.5 Contribution............................................................................................................7
1.6 Structure of the Thesis............................................................................................8
2 History of Building Societies in the UK: The Research Context.................................11
2.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................11
2.2 General History.....................................................................................................11
2.3 Competitive Environment.....................................................................................13
2.3.1 Background...................................................................................................13
2.3.2 Competitive Environment.............................................................................15
2.4 Demutualisation in the United Kingdom..............................................................18
2.4.1 Reasons for Demutualisation........................................................................18
2.4.2 The Effects of Demutualisation.....................................................................22
2.4.3 Governance and Strategy..............................................................................23
2.5 Conclusion............................................................................................................24
3 Literature Review.........................................................................................................26
3.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................26
3.2 Codes of Governance in the UK...........................................................................26
3.3 Case studies of corporate governance failure.......................................................29
3.4 Theories in corporate governance literature..........................................................33
3.4.1 Agency Theory..............................................................................................33
3.4.2 Resource Dependency Theory......................................................................35
iii
3.4.3 Stewardship Theory.......................................................................................37
3.4.4 Summary.......................................................................................................38
3.5 The Corporate Governance Life-Cycle.................................................................38
3.5.1 The Origin of the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle...................................39
3.5.2 Previous Research on the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle.......................41
3.5.3 The Resource Function in the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle................43
3.5.4 Application of the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle to this Research........44
3.6 Upper Echelons Perspective.................................................................................46
3.6.1 Foundations of the Upper Echelons Perspective...........................................47
3.6.2 Refinements of the Upper Echelons Perspective..........................................48
3.6.3 Limitations to the Predictive Strength of the Upper Echelons Perspective. .50
3.6.4 Critique of the Upper Echelons Perspective.................................................51
3.6.5 Implications for Research.............................................................................53
3.7 Complementarity of the theoretical perspectives..................................................55
3.8 Conclusion............................................................................................................56
4 Research Methodology.................................................................................................58
4.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................58
4.2 Research Design and Method...............................................................................58
4.2.1 Single Case Study Approach.........................................................................59
4.2.2 The Choice of Semi-Structured Interviews...................................................60
4.2.3 Interviewing Elites........................................................................................61
4.2.4 Secondary Data and its Use as Empirical Evidence......................................64
4.2.5 Ethical Risks and Ethical Approval...............................................................65
4.3 Data.......................................................................................................................67
4.3.1 Interviews......................................................................................................67
4.3.2 Documents.....................................................................................................70
4.3.3 Data Analysis................................................................................................72
4.4 Problematising Research Approach......................................................................74
4.4.1 The Limitations of Interviews.......................................................................74
iv
4.4.2 The Limitations of Documents......................................................................75
4.4.3 Reliability and Validity of the Research........................................................76
4.5 Summary...............................................................................................................77
5 Bradford & Bingley in the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle....................................78
5.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................78
5.2 Bradford & Bingley's compliance with the UK Corporate Governance Code.....79
5.3 Defining Periods and Events: 1996 – 2010...........................................................80
5.4 Period 1: Performance Enhancement & Demutualisation 1996 – 2004...............83
5.4.1 Strategy.........................................................................................................84
5.4.2 Resource........................................................................................................89
5.4.3 Summary.......................................................................................................95
5.5 Period 2: Strategic Renewal 2004 – 2005.............................................................97
5.5.1 Strategy.........................................................................................................97
5.5.2 Resource........................................................................................................99
5.5.3 Summary.....................................................................................................104
5.6 Period 3: The Final Years 2006 – 2008...............................................................105
5.6.1 Strategy.......................................................................................................105
5.6.2 Resource......................................................................................................108
5.6.3 Summary.....................................................................................................117
5.7 Period 4: Post-Nationalisation 2008 Onwards....................................................119
5.7.1 Strategy.......................................................................................................120
5.7.2 Resource......................................................................................................124
5.7.3 Summary.....................................................................................................129
5.8 Monitoring..........................................................................................................130
5.8.1 The Evolution of Monitoring at Bradford & Bingley.................................131
5.8.2 Summary.....................................................................................................136
5.9 Discussion and Conclusion.................................................................................138
6 Board Processes between 1996 – 2004 and 2008 – 2010...........................................145
6.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................145
v
6.2 Application of the Constructs of the Upper Echelons Perspective.....................145
6.3 Period 1: 1995 – 2004.........................................................................................152
6.3.1 Contextual Factors......................................................................................152
6.3.2 Board Composition.....................................................................................157
6.3.3 Mediating Strategy Processes.....................................................................164
6.3.4 TMT Decision-Making................................................................................170
6.4 Period 4: 2008 – 2010.........................................................................................183
6.4.1 Contextual Factors......................................................................................183
6.4.2 Board Composition.....................................................................................186
6.4.3 Mediating Strategy Processes.....................................................................189
6.4.4 TMT Decision-Making................................................................................192
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion.................................................................................197
7 Conclusion..................................................................................................................203
7.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................203
7.2 Summary of Results............................................................................................204
7.3 Contribution to Knowledge.................................................................................209
7.4 Limitations of this Research...............................................................................211
7.5 Directions for Future Research...........................................................................212
7.6 Personal Reflection on the Research Process.....................................................214
 Appendices....................................................................................................................216
A.1 Time line: Building Societies History................................................................217
A.2 Building Societies Branches..............................................................................221
A.3 Timeline of the Transformation of B&B (1995 – 2005)....................................222
A.4 Timeline of the Decline of B&B (2006 – 2010)................................................224
B UK Code of Governance 1992 – 2010..................................................................226
B.1 Upper Echelons Theory Framework..................................................................231
C Participant Information Sheet................................................................................232
C.1 Reply Slip...........................................................................................................235
C.2 Consent Form.....................................................................................................236
vi
C.3 Interview Topic Guide........................................................................................238
D Appendix Chapter 5..............................................................................................242
Tables...................................................................................................................242
Figures..................................................................................................................251
E Board Ages 1995 – 2010.......................................................................................252
 Abbreviations................................................................................................................253
 Glossary........................................................................................................................255
 Bibliography.................................................................................................................259
References............................................................................................................260
Documentary Sources..........................................................................................274
vii
Index of Tables
Table 2.1: Permissible Services Introduced by the 1986 Building Societies Act............17
Table 4.1: Director Code Names.....................................................................................68
Table 4.2: List of Documentary Sources used in Research.............................................71
Table 5.1: The 4 Periods of Bradford & Bingley since 1996..........................................81
Table 5.2: Lending & Funding: 1995 – 2003..................................................................90
Table 5.3: Departing Non-Executive Directors...............................................................92
Table 5.4: Incoming Executive Directors........................................................................94
Table 5.5: Lending & Funding: 2003 – 2005................................................................100
Table 5.6: Operating Profits 1998 – 2008......................................................................105
Table 5.7: Asset Growth 2005 – June 2008...................................................................107
Table 5.8: Net Interest Income and Profit before Tax 2005 – June 2008......................109
Table 5.9: Recognised Losses & Impairments of Assets & Liabilities..........................125
Table D.1: Third Party Mortgage Transactions.............................................................242
Table D.2: Changes on Board of Directors 1995 – 2010...............................................248
Table D.3: Arrears by Source June 2007 – June 2009...................................................249
Table D.4: Residential Non-Performing Loans 2004 – 2009........................................250
Table D.5: B&B Product Mix 2005 – 2009...................................................................250
viii
Illustration Index
Figure 1.1: Lifespan of Demutualised Building Societies 1986 – 2010............................2
Figure 2.1: Bradford & Bingley Mergers and Acquisitions............................................15
Figure 3.1: A 4 Stage Corporate Governance Life-Cycle Model....................................41
Figure 3.2: Combined Framework of Analysis...............................................................57
Figure 6.1: Objects of Upper Echelons Perspective......................................................147
Figure 6.2: Outgoing Executive Directors (1996 – 2003).............................................160
Figure 6.3: Incoming Non-executive Directors (1995 – 2003).....................................161
Figure 6.4: Board Composition 09/2008 – 12/2010......................................................187
Figure A.2.1: Building Societies and Branches 1910 – 2010........................................221
Figure B.1.1: Upper Echelons Theory Framework.......................................................231
Figure D.1: Board Composition (NEDs) 1992 – 2012..................................................251
Figure D.2: B&B Annual Report 2006..........................................................................251
Figure E.1: Age of Directors: 1995 – 2010...................................................................252
ix
 Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisors Professor Josephine Maltby
and Professor  Philip  Linsley  for  all  their  support,  encouragement  and always being
available to discuss matters, small or big.  Many thanks also to Dr Keith Anderson for
his detailed feedback on various drafts throughout my degree.  Furthermore, I would
like to acknowledge the financial support from The York Management School, which
has enabled me to complete this PhD.  My gratitude again goes to all the interviewees
who gave up their time to participate in this study, as well as Simon Rex at the Building
Societies Association, for the information and documents provided.  Finally, I would
like to thank my examiners Professor Jill Atkins and Dr Giovanna Michelon, for their
insightful comments and discussions.
I am most grateful to my family for all their support over the years, especially my
wife Gloria for her endless support, hours of proofreading, words of encouragement and
her love.  To my parents, my brother and extended family for their love, patience and
understanding throughout the years.  Last but not least, I am indebted to my colleagues
at the York Management School for their kind support during these years, in making our
PhD community better and contributing to all the good times we had together.
It has been a long, insightful, and rewarding journey.  You have all contributed in
making this possible.
Thank you.
x
 Author’s Declaration
I hereby certify that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been taken
from the work of others, save, and to the extent that such work has been cited
and acknowledged in the text of my work.
Matthias Hambach
York, October 2014
xi
Chapter 1
1  Introduction
1.1  Introduction
The ongoing financial and economic crisis has resulted in discussions of the relative
merits of for-profit and mutually-owned financial firms. Indeed the current conservative
government has called for a stronger mutual financial sector to offer true competition to
the established high street banks that played a large part in causing the current problems
(Treasury, 2012a; Treasury, 2012b).
However, the crisis affected both UK mutual and for-profit financial institutions.
Financial  institutions severely affected in  the crisis  include the mutually-owned Co-
operative Bank, a number of small and medium-sized building societies (for example
Scarborough,  Gainsborough,  Dunfermline),  large  commercial  banks  such as  Halifax
Bank of Scotland (HBOS), Lloyds TSB and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), as well as
former building societies such as Northern Rock (NR) and Bradford & Bingley (B&B).
This underlines that failure is not exclusive to either type of organisation. In particular,
the  Co-operative  Bank's  attempted  purchase  of  Lloyds  TSB  branches  would  have
created  a  new  large  mutual  financial  service  provider,  if  not  for  the  problems
encountered by the Co-operative Bank. This serves as a reminder that a firm’s fate is
determined  by  its  internal  governance  functions,  as  much  as  it  is  by  wider  forces
operating in the economy.
Consequently,  the need has arisen for an investigation and understanding of the
causes of failure of these financial institutions.  This is due to the enormous impact of
their actions on government finances, contributing to the ongoing fiscal austerity for the
majority  of  taxpayers.   Of  particular  interest  to  this  thesis  are  the  failures  of  the
converted building societies.  These institutions converted from building society to bank
and  transformed  their  business  model  from  predominantly  savings  and  loans  to
commercial  banks,  offering  a  range  of  services  outside  their  traditional  domain.
However,  they  were  still  unlike  the  large  universal  banks,  who engaged  heavily  in
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investment  banking  and  were  trading  on  their  own  account; yet  the  organisational
outcomes  of  converted  building  societies  and  established  banks  were  similar.
Examining the transformation of converted building societies to banks, therefore, offers
an insight into the changes of governance and composition of the board of directors.
Furthermore, it offers an opportunity to study how their transformation and subsequent
demise is linked to the decision-making of the board of directors.
Demutualisation and failure
Since the 1980s many public services have been privatised in the UK.  Similarly,
mutuality was seen as an outdated form of organisation and thus there was pressure to
be 'en vogue' and jump on the bandwagon of ‘profits and economic well-being’ (He &
Baruch,  2009;  Birchall,  2008).   The  enactment  of  the  1986  Building  Societies  Act
resulted  in  several  building  societies  choosing  to  transform  into  bank  holding
companies.  Ten building societies demutualised between 1989 and 2000  (see Figure
1.1), with Abbey National floating in 1989 and Bradford & Bingley becoming the last
building society to demutualise in 2000. 
It is of note that none of the demutualised building societies is still  independent
today.  All of them are either bankrupt, taken over by a competitor, or both, suggesting
that demutualisation was not successful in the long-run.  Furthermore, in a study by
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Figure 1.1: Lifespan of Demutualised Building Societies 1986 – 2010
Piesse  &  Townsend  (1995),  the  authors  measured  the  productive  efficiency  of  UK
building  societies  and found that,  interestingly,  nine  of  these demutualised societies
were listed as part of the top eleven most efficient societies.  This raises questions with
regards to the success of the demutualisation process and the underlying motivations, as
well as how these building societies managed while being active and independent.
There is no single reason why these newly formed plcs were unable to maintain
their independence.  For one, it could be that they were economically unsuccessful, with
Northern  Rock,  Bradford  & Bingley  and  Halifax  being  all  but  the  most  egregious
examples,  and  hence  mergers  or  nationalisation  were  the  only  possible  solution.
Alternatively, some demutualised building societies, such as Cheltenham & Gloucester,
were taken over by larger high street banks to be added to their product line-up exactly
because they were relatively successful. Mergers between banks and mutuals could then
be  grounded  in  the  economies  of  scale  (Piesse  &  Townsend,  1995) that  would  be
achieved by taking such a course of action.  Thus the reasons for their disappearance are
multiple and complex.
Nevertheless,  demutualised  building  societies  are  not  the  only  ones  to  run  into
financial difficulties1, again illustrating demutualisation itself may not be the cause of
their  demise.  For  example,  the  fate  of  several  building  societies  such  as  the
Dunfermline, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Chelsea or Norwich & Peterborough, which have
all  been taken over by either the Yorkshire or Nationwide Building Societies, raises
questions about the quality of decision-making and corporate governance arrangements
in these institutions.  Thus, the failure of demutualised building societies and building
societies alike, as well as the move into complex financial derivatives by some, does
again not only raise questions about the efficiency and quality of corporate governance
in  the  failed  institutions,  but  also  poses  the  question  as  to  how  others  avoided
catastrophe.
The  board  of  directors,  as  the  main  decision-making body of  the  firm,  plays  a
pivotal role in this context.  It is with them, that the final decision and responsibility
rests and who are accountable to the principals of the firm.  The role of the board of
directors differs with the different organisational form that for-profit and mutual firms
1 for example, see  http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/sep/12/worlds-safest-banks
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adhere to. In for-profit enterprises the board of directors acts as agents of the principal
to further the principal’s interest.  Similarly, in a mutual firm the board acts on behalf of
the principal furthering their interests. However, the differing nature of the principal
fundamentally  alters  the  role  and  responsibility  of  the  agent  in  both  forms  of
organisation. In the for-profit enterprises the disjointed nature of the principal–customer
relationship makes the board of directors accountable to a single objective: to further the
interest  of the principal,  which generally is to increase the value of their  ownership
stake. On the other hand, in a mutual organisation the principal and customer are the
same, hence the objective of the board of directors is to be the steward of the principal,
and thus the customer's wealth.
Since mutual firms do not pay dividends or disperse profits in any other monetary
form, all earnings are retained within the firm. Many mutual firms have accumulated
substantial retained earnings which are also called an intergenerational endowment. As
previously mentioned, one objective of the management of mutual firms is  thus the
stewardship and growth of the endowment so it can be passed on to future generations.
Therefore, agents in a mutual enterprise are required to act as stewards on behalf of all
former, current and future generations of members. The second objective of the board of
directors is to maximise value to customers, which, in the case of building societies,
amounts to a minimisation of the spread between the borrowing and lending interest
rates paid by customers.
Thus, given these differences in corporate form and yet similar outcomes between
demutualised building societies  and other  mutual  financial  firms,  it  is  imperative to
study the  development  of  corporate  governance  and transformation  of  demutualised
building societies prior to their failure as financial institutions.  Demutualised building
societies went through a number of strategic and organisational reorientations during the
period  of  study,  thus  allowing  for  a  longitudinal  study  of  transformation  and
organisational change. In particular, the legal and regulatory framework in which they
operated  changed  significantly,  giving  the  board  of  directors  a  fundamental  role  in
reforming the organisation.  Hence, this research investigates the transformation of the
Bradford & Bingley Building Society, the last building society to demutualise, using a
case study approach.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, a discussion on
the scope of research is presented.  Section  1.3 then discusses the research aims and
objectives.  Section  1.4 presents the research questions with section  1.5 detailing the
contribution of the thesis. Section 1.6 concludes with a structure of the thesis.
1.2  Scope of Research
This study focuses on the case of the former Bradford & Bingley Building Society
and its strategic and organisational transformation between 1995 and 2010. In doing so,
it first analyses the corporate governance of the firm using the corporate governance
life-cycle  theory.  Second,  building  on these  findings,  and using  the  upper  echelons
theory, this thesis examines the perceptions and experiences of the decision-making of
its top management team during periods of transition and transformation.
The  investigation  focuses  on  the  period  1995 to  2010  as  it  captures  a  time  of
significant transformation at Bradford & Bingley, including the arrival of a new chief
executive  in  1996  and  the  ensuing  strategic  and  organisational  changes,  the
demutualisation and conversion to plc status in 2000, and nationalisation in 2008 after a
period of strong business expansion and funding problems.
A case study also allows for the in depth examination of the governance changes as
well as the transition and transformation of a firm over a period of time, with a special
focus on the role of the board of directors and executives (the top management team) in
the decision-making which contributed to these changes.  Even though multiple  case
studies are often considered to be more persuasive  (Herriott & Firestone, 1983), it is
argued  that  a  single  case  study  is  appropriate  when  investigating  previously
unresearched or unique cases, or cases that are revelatory  (Yin, 2009). Furthermore,
issues  of  access  to  key  persons  and  the  relative  rarity  of  demutualisation  and
nationalisation of building societies in the UK inhibits the use of a larger sample of
cases (Hartley, 2004). 
Thus, this research uses a single case study approach as the case of Bradford &
Bingley has unique characteristics that distinguishes it from other demutualised building
societies.  First, Bradford & Bingley is the last society to convert to plc status.  As can
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be seen in Figure 1.1, Bradford & Bingley demutualised three years after the majority of
building societies did, and after most of the public pressure on building societies to do
so had already subsided.  Second, and most significantly, it is the only building society
to date, that has demutualised at the behest of its members, against the expressed wishes
of management.  Hence, this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge as is
explained in Section 1.5.
1.3  Research Aims and Objectives
This  research  has  two  aims,  which  centre  on  the  transformation  of  the  former
Bradford & Bingley Building Society and the composition of its board of directors.  In
particular, this research focuses on the decision-making processes during the transition
from  building  society  to  bank,  as  well  as  during  the  subsequent  decline  and
nationalisation.
The  first  aim  of  this  research  is  to  investigate  the  changes  in  the  governance
functions of Bradford & Bingley during its transformation from building society to bank
and ultimately nationalised institution. In doing so, this research will analyse the process
of change within and across the firm’s life-cycle stages during the Period 1995 – 2010.
The second aim of this research is to examine the board processes of Bradford &
Bingley  between  1995  and  2010  in  the  context  of  organisational  and  governance
changes.  In  particular,  the  effect  of  the  context  of  decision-making  on  board
composition and board processes as well as organisational outcomes, is examined.
1.4  Research Questions
Based on the previous discussion of the research aims and objectives, the following
research questions are examined:
1. How did Bradford & Bingley adapt its governance structures during the different
corporate governance life-cycle stages in the Period 1995 – 2010?
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2. What differences in board processes can be identified across the different life-
cycle phases, with particular reference to:
a. How contextual factors impact on decision-making processes?
b. How board changes impact on decision-making processes?
1.5  Contribution
This research contributes to knowledge in a number of ways.  First, it contributes to
research on the corporate governance life-cycle by adding to our current understanding
of  the  process  of  transition  between  life-cycle  phases.   It  does  so  by  means  of  a
longitudinal investigation of multiple life-cycle transitions.  In particular, it examines
the  transition  from  maturity  to  reinvention  and  from  reinvention  into  decline,  as
suggested by  Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright (2006).  In studying these transitions, the
focus  is  on  the  three  governance  functions  of  strategy,  resource  and  monitoring.
Exploring the changes in strategy and its interactions with board composition highlights
the impact of changes in any of the governance functions on the other functions, adding
to  the  understanding  of  micro-processes  and  causalities  in  organisational  life-cycle
transitions, which were previously under-researched (Filatotchev et al., 2006).
Second, this study contributes to research on the board of directors and their role in
influencing the direction of the firm. Using the upper echelons perspective as a guide,
the governance processes and perceptions of directors is systematically analysed with a
particular focus on the impact of board composition and context on board decision-
making and organisational outcomes. In using a qualitative case study approach, this
research  deviates  from  the  usually  quantitative  nature  of  upper  echelons  research,
adding to the growing body of knowledge in governance built on qualitative research. In
doing so, it adds to existing knowledge by showing how company culture is used and
perceived differently by top management team members across time. Furthermore, the
role of different members of the board is studied with a particular view to board process.
It  is  found  that  certain  directors  acted  as  gate  keepers  to  the  board  and  thus  had
significant impact on setting the agenda. Finally, the role of the chairman and chief
executive are highlighted as key in setting the tone of the board and how personnel
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change in these positions has significant knock-on effects on other governance functions
and the firm as a whole.
Third,  this  research  adopts  a  multi-theoretic  view  by  uniquely  combining  the
corporate  governance  life-cycle  with  the  upper  echelons  perspective.  As  argued  by
Filatotchev et al. (2006), the corporate governance life-cycle theory is inherently multi-
theoretic and can potentially be combined with different theoretical perspectives, such
as  agency  theory,  resource-dependence  theory,  or  theories  in  the  field  of  strategy.
However, the focus of this research is on the micro-processes of transition and change
between and within life-cycle stages, therefore none of the theories above is likely to be
suitable, as these theories are narrowly focused on single aspects of governance, while
not addressing how board processes impact on the organisation’s overall governance.
Hence, this research contributes to knowledge by combining the corporate governance
life-cycle  with the upper echelons perspective to better  explain board processes and
behaviour in different stages of an organisations life.  In doing so, it does not take a
narrow view of theory as a set of strict  procedures to follow, but combines the two
theories,  using them as a guide,  to shed light onto the processes and perceptions of
organisational change at Bradford & Bingley.
1.6  Structure of the Thesis
This  thesis  comprises  of  seven  chapters  with  Chapters  5 and  6 containing  the
empirical results.
Chapter 2 outlines the historic background of building societies in the UK. First,
the history of building societies since their origination in 1775 and their roots in the
friendly  societies  movement  are  highlighted.  Then  the  impact  of  a  succession  of
building societies legislation is discussed. The impact of the 1986 Building Societies
Act  on  the  movement  is  highlighted  with  a  particular  view  to  the  reasons  and
motivations for demutualisation in the sector. Finally, the history of Bradford & Bingley
is briefly summarised.
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical background of this research. In doing so, it first
argues that the corporate governance life-cycle theory and the upper echelons theory are
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appropriate to this research. It then presents an overview of research on the corporate
governance  life-cycle,  highlighting  gaps  in  the  literature.  Finally,  the  origins  and
development of the upper echelons theory are discussed. The discussion also highlights
the  underlying  constructs  of  the  perspective,  as  well  as  potential  pitfalls  and
implications for this research.
Chapter 4 explains the methodology adopted in this research. The research design
and method are presented, arguing why a single case study approach has been chosen.
Furthermore,  the  choice  of  semi-structured  interviews  and  documentary  sources  is
justified.  In  addition,  the realities  and difficulties  of  conducting  elite  interviews are
discussed.  Then  the  process  of  data  collection  and  analysis  are  explained,  before
concluding with a problematisation of the research approach.
Chapter 5 examines the organisational changes of Bradford & Bingley between
1995  and  2010.  Using  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle  theory,  it  highlights  the
interconnectedness  of  the  three  governance  functions  of  strategy,  resource  and
monitoring.  It  further  distinguishes  between  two  resource  functions:  finance  and
knowledge.  This  distinction  is  important  in  analysing  the  changes  in  personnel
(knowledge)  and  finance  and  their  interaction  with  strategy.  The  chapter  finally
discusses the changes in the role and importance of monitoring within the governance of
the firm, between different life-cycle stages of the firm.
Chapter 6 focuses on the board processes and board members perceptions of these
processes during two different periods in the organisations life. It reveals the role and
importance  of  context  in  decision-making  and  adds  company  and  board  culture  as
important  factors  impacting  decision-making.  Furthermore,  the  role  of  board
composition, and within it, the role of key decision-makers, is studied, highlighting the
role of gate keepers in influencing the agenda of the board and thus the future strategy
of the whole firm. Finally, the engagement of top management team members and their
access  to  information  is  viewed  with  an  eye  to  its  impact  on  the  decision-making
process.
Chapter 7 combines the key findings of each empirical chapter showing how the
corporate governance life-cycle theory and the upper echelons perspective inform and
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build on each other in analysing the transformation of Bradford & Bingley. The findings
of this study and the main conclusions of this thesis are then summarised. Finally, the
implications  and limitations  of  the  research  are  discussed,  and directions  for  future
research are given.
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Chapter 2
2  History of Building Societies in the UK: The Research
Context
2.1  Introduction
Building  societies,  for  most  of  their  history,  have  been  specialist  financial
institutions focused on the provision of financing for housing. They draw the majority
of their funding from the personal sector, typically saving accounts, and lend to the
personal sector in the form of mortgages to owner-occupiers. Until the 1980s, building
societies had a  virtual  monopoly on the provision of  housing finance in  the United
Kingdom.  On  top  of  the  non-existent  external  competition,  the  Building  Societies
Association (BSA) also prevented effective internal competition by operating an interest
rate cartel until its abolition in 1983. The enactment of the Building Societies Act 1986
presented a major watershed in the history of the industry and dramatically changed the
size and composition of the industry.
Before providing a more detailed discussion of aspects of building societies relevant
to this work, the general history, competitive as well as regulatory environment of the
movement is  presented.  In addition,  a background on demutualisation in the United
Kingdom as well  as a brief  note on the origins of Bradford & Bingley is  given. A
general time line of the development of building societies in the UK is furthermore
presented in Appendix A.1.
2.2  General History
The first building society, Ketley's, named after the inn keeper of the Golden Cross
Inn,  which  served  as  a  meeting  point,  is  said  to  have  been  founded  in  1775  in
Birmingham  (Boddy, 1980; Buckle & Thompson, 2004; Ashworth,  1980).  The early
societies are rooted in the friendly societies movement and were founded during the
industrial revolution to combat some of the impacts of the upheaval of established social
structures. Labourers moving from farming into the newly industrialising areas in the
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Midlands, Lancashire and Yorkshire found themselves without their traditional support
network in case of illness, injury or general need (Boleat, 1965).
Price (1958) and Boleat (1965) further report that the rapid industrialisation led to a
doubling of the number of inhabitants of major centres such as Manchester, Leeds or
Birmingham in just 30 years. The resulting pressure on the existing housing stock was
thus strong and housing conditions were generally extremely poor. Building societies
were founded to address this need, drawing on the Victorian values of thrift and mutual
self-help. Most of the participants in these societies however were part of the upper
working  class  who  had  a  capacity  for  saving,  such  as  yeomen,  weavers,  spinners,
stonemasons, carpenters and shopkeepers (Ashworth, 1980).
These  early  societies  were  without  exception  small  and  of  terminating  nature
(Terminating  Societies).  Consequently  they  had  a  relatively  modest  impact.  Boddy
(1980) claims that  by 1825,  approximately  250 societies  had  either  built  or  bought
approximately  2000  houses  in  total.  The  limited  impact  can  be  explained  by  the
terminating nature and organisational structure of the movement.
Terminating societies were set up by a group of founding members which would all
contribute to the initial capital and then on a monthly basis. Each member contributed
the same amount of money and consequently had the same rights as any other member.
From within  the  group,  leaders  would  be  chosen to  administer  the  society.  Houses
would be built once a sufficient amount of funds had been accumulated. The order by
which each member of the society would be allocated a house was usually through a
lottery draw. Once all members had been housed and any excess capital distributed, the
society would terminate (Boddy, 1980; Boleat, 1965).
From these working class beginnings, building societies over time graduated to a
middle  class  customer  base.  One  important  facilitator  of  this  transition  was  the
introduction  of  the  ability  to  set  up  a  permanent  building  society,  rather  than  a
terminating,  with  the  1864  Building  Societies  Act.  This  brought  about  significant
changes  in  the relationship  between owners,  borrowers  and investors.  However,  not
only did the customer base change, management also changed. Due to the new long
term horizon and the influx of more funds from the saving public, a permanent and
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skilled  management  board  was  necessary.  Persons  with  the  required  skill  set  and
knowledge had to be recruited from the educated bourgeoisie (Boddy, 1980). In essence
(permanent)  building  societies  moved  up  the  social  ladder  to  become  an  essential
middle class institution. The success of the new permanent form can be judged by the
fact that by 1912 approximately 50 percent of existing societies were constituted as
permanent societies (Buckle & Thompson, 2004).
Over time building societies have evolved into an organisation that is distinct from
commercial banks and companies alike. Many of the functions, the legal framework and
specific features that distinguish building societies from other organisations until today
have been established prior to the first world war. These will be discussed in more detail
in the following sections.
2.3  Competitive Environment
2.3.1  Background
Until the 1894 Building Societies Act, there was no requirement for a society to
adhere to the standards set out in prior parliamentary acts. In fact many of the largest
players  in  the market  were  building societies  only in  name,  but  operated as  banks.
Building societies could be incorporated either under the 1844 Joint Stock Companies
Act or the 1855 Bank Act. Indeed the largest building society at the time, The Liberator,
failed in 1892 (Ashworth, 1980; Robb, 1992) bringing down other societies in its wake
and fundamentally shaking the populations' trust in the movement as a whole. What is
most  striking about  the failure of  The Liberator  is  that  it  was  primarily  a bank.  Its
housing related activities made up less than a quarter of its total balance sheet. Most of
its activities were concentrated in commercial lending. The purpose of being a ‘building
society’ was primarily  to  attract  savings.  While  The Liberator  was in  some ways a
special case1, it was by no means unique in its business model (Boddy, 1980; Ashworth,
1980; Robb, 1992).
1 The Liberator was founded by Jabez Balfour in 1868. It tapped into the evangelical and temperance
movement and used preachers to sell its products and attract  savers. While in the beginning The
Liberator conducted the business of housing finance, it later was used by its owner to finance his
speculative ventures into the property market. The failure of these ventures and its repercussions on
the society caused its demise (Robb, 1992).
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The parallels to the recent history of building societies are striking. Just as at the
end of the 19th century, there was a variety of business models in operation after 1989,
namely  mutual  societies  and  plc  firms.  The  competitive  environment  for  building
societies changed considerably over the years, from being small groups of like-minded
people to being the main providers of housing finance in the United Kingdom. For a
large  part  of  the  20th century,  building  societies  enjoyed a  virtual  monopoly  in  the
housing market due to favourable legislation and credit rationing for commercial banks.
During the 1970s,  building societies had a  market share of over 80 percent of new
mortgages (Buckle & Thompson, 2004). 
Sector concentration has increased within the movement since before the turn of the
last  century.  The  pace  of  consolidation  and  concentration  has  however  markedly
increased since the 1960s. In contrast to this development, the total number of branches
has  steadily  increased  until  its  peak  in  1987  (see  Appendix  A.2). This  fact  can
potentially be explained in two ways. First, the growth in branch network, especially in
the early phase of the concentration process, can be explained by local building societies
branching out of their original communities to larger audiences to attract more capital
for future growth (Buckle & Thompson, 2004). Until wholesale funding was introduced
with the 1986 Building Societies Act, deposits and profits  were the only sources of
funds to make new loans  (Boleat,  1965). As a consequence,  geographical expansion
became a necessity.
Second,  especially  pertaining to  the last  half  of the 20th century,  another factor
fuelling the growth of the branch network could be the desire for empire building and
the accompanying perks. Due to the virtual monopoly in the personal mortgage market
and the BSA interest rate cartel, no active markets for managerial control or take-over
were  in  operation  that  could  limit  the  size  of  operations.  Contradicting  this  point
however is evidence that building societies on average have significantly lower expense
ratios than commercial banks and thus it could be concluded that they work much more
efficiently (Boxall & Gallagher, 1997). Growth for sake of growth would create higher
than optimal cost and thus should be reflected in a higher expense ratio. In order to
illustrate  the  significance  of  the  changes  undergone  and  their  impact  on  building
societies, it is useful to briefly summarise Bradford & Bingley's history until 1995. 
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The Bradford & Bingley Building Society was formed in 1964 as a merger of two
regional, middle-sized building societies, the Bradford Equitable Building Society and
the Bingley Building Society, which date back to 1851. Thus it was a product of the
consolidation process within the mutual financial sector. This merger was driven by Bob
Gardner,  then  General  Manager  of  the  Bradford2.  Over  the  following  decades  the
society would grow into one with a national  presence,  mainly by acquiring smaller
building societies around the country. Figure 2.1 shows how Bradford & Bingley was an
active participant of the consolidation of societies during the 1970 and 1980s, growing
into one of the top 20 largest societies in the UK. As Figure 2.1 further shows, the total
number  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  was  thirty,  with  the  highest  number  occurring
during the year 1983. A time line of events of Bradford & Bingley's recent history is
also presented in Appendix A.3 (Transformation: 1995 – 2005) and A.4 (Decline: 2006
– 2010).
2.3.2  Competitive Environment
The main competition for retail funds comes from retail banks and national savings
institutions. The competition for these increased in the 1980s when retail banks started
emulating the account offerings of building societies. Until 1983 the BSA operated a
cartel of ‘recommended’ interest rates on deposits and mortgages to manage competitive
2 Director D
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Figure 2.1: Bradford & Bingley Mergers and Acquisitions
pressure inside the industry and in relation to external competition for funds. Interest
rate management made these rates ‘sticky’ and bore no relation to market clearing rates
(Buckle & Thompson, 2004; Boleat, 1965). Building societies continued to attract large
amount of savings due to them offering very competitive returns on savings accounts.
The  reasoning  behind  the  interest  rate  cartel  has  mainly  to  do  with  risk
management. The problem faced by building societies is their dual, incompatible, goals
of paying high interest rates on deposits and charging low interest rates for mortgages. It
is thus crucial to maintain a positive margin in order for the society to turn a profit. As
mentioned  before,  profits  and  savings  were  the  only  two  sources  of  funds  and
consequently operating a profitable interest margin is of great importance.
Competition for funds increased in the 1980s by retail banks emulating accounts
previously offered exclusively by building societies such as short-notice accounts and
instant access accounts. Banks have been offering term accounts since the 1970s. At the
same time retail banks increased their market share of first mortgages from 36 percent
in 1983 to 59 percent in 1993. The competitive pressure on the core business of building
societies was so strong that the interest rate cartel could no longer be maintained to stem
the loss  of  deposits  and market  share.  The decision by Abbey National,  the largest
building society at the time, to leave the cartel in 1979 led to its ultimate abandonment
in 1983.
While retail banks entering the mortgage market were one of the main competitors,
a new type of competitor entered the market in 1986. This competitor was imported
from the United States where the process of home finance intermediation changed with
the introduction of centralised mortgage lenders in 1986 (Ranieri, 1996; Lewis, 1989).
These  centralised  mortgage  lenders  relied  on  credit  scoring  to  determine  the  credit
worthiness  of  applicants  in  a  cost-efficient  way.  Their  operational  structure allowed
them to have a very low cost operation enabling them to offer competitive mortgages.
These lenders were very aggressive in competing for a share of the market and offered
what would today be called subprime mortgages to  borrowers with imperfect  credit
records. One problem encountered by these lenders was, unlike in the United States, a
lack of substantial  credit histories that could be statistically analysed to make credit
allocation  decisions.  The  weaknesses  in  credit  allocation  would  come  to  haunt
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centralised lenders during the 1991 – 1992 recession.  The drop in house prices and
increased unemployment proved to be a toxic mix and caused the exit of these lenders
from the UK mortgage market. In 1995, The Kensington Group was the first centralised
lender to re-enter the market for subprime mortgages.
Finally, based on recommendations published in the 1984 BSA Report ‘The future
constitution and powers  of building societies’,  the Building Societies  Act  1986 was
enacted.  One  of  the  new powers  given  to  building  societies  was  the  permission  to
provide additional services to customers. All additional services permitted were related
to the original lines of business offered. The following permissible services were added:
Banking Services Investment Services Insurance Services
• Credit cards
• Unsecured lending 
(subject to limit)
• Foreign currency 
services
• Manage investments
• Establish personal equity
plans
• Operate a stock broking 
service
• Provide investment 
advice
• Underwrite insurance
• Provide insurance
From Buckle & Thompson (2004) 
Table 2.1: Permissible Services Introduced by the 1986 Building Societies Act 
Out of the three services listed above, banking services proved by far to be the most
popular. Nationwide was the first building society to start offering current accounts in
19873.  The  other  large  building  societies  at  the  time  such  as  Halifax,  Alliance  &
Leicester, Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock followed suit in order to compete
with Nationwide and the country's retail banks. Investment and insurance services were
much less popular. At the end of the 1980s, some building societies decided to acquire
estate agents to be able to sell houses and the accompanying mortgages at the same
time. However, the building societies entered the market right at the end of the housing
boom when prices were inflated. Once the bubble burst, the competitive environment in
a declining market turned very tough and as a consequence many began losing money.
3 The Act became effective January 1, 1987
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The ensuing market consolidation saw many agencies merge or exit the market. Most
building  societies  decided to  dispose  of  their  estate  agents  and sold them at  a  loss
(Buckle & Thompson, 2004).
2.4  Demutualisation in the United Kingdom
Demutualisation  in  the  United  Kingdom took  place  between 1989 when Abbey
National became the first building society to demutualise and 2000, when Bradford &
Bingley became the last society to do so to date. In the interim, eight other building
societies lost their mutual status. 
This section reviews the extant literature on demutualisation by first reviewing the
reason  identified  in  academic  literature,  that  underpin  the  demutualisation  process,
before  assessing  the  effects  of  this  process  as  reported  in  literature.  Finally  the
governance and strategy-related literature on demutualisation is reviewed.
2.4.1  Reasons for Demutualisation
 Stephens (2001) aims to identify the causes for demutualisation and sets out to test
three  propositions,  first,  that  mutual  banks  have  inferior  performance,  second,  that
structural changes of the UK mortgage market made the mutual business model not
tenable any longer, and third, that demutualisation was a strategic choice made by the
larger societies.
Stephens  (2001) attempted  to  answer  the  first  question  by  using  a  very  brief
literature review, coming to the conclusion that prior literature does not unequivocally
find in favour of either organisational form. Evidence generated since then has not been
able to provide more clarity on this subject due to inherent limitations. The majority of
literature that measures performance in a European context uses a cross-country sample
to gain a larger sample for statistical purposes (Ayadi et al., 2009; Brunner et al., 2004;
Iannotta et al.,  2007; Lamm-Tennant & Starks, 1993), with all its inherent problems
such as different regulatory regimes and forms of mutual organisation across countries.
Another issue is the use of inadequate tools to measure performance and / or risk of
mutually organised firms (for example, Beck et al., 2009; Valnek, 1999). Furthermore,
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comparing  mutual  and  plc  financial  institutions  is  misleading  due  to  the  different
objectives each form of organisation has. Since both forms of organisation of economic
activities co-exist and have done so for at least 150 years it follows that each form must
confer certain economic advantages that make it viable vis-a-vis their competition.
Failings and Weaknesses of the Mutual Form 
The charge that  mutual  financial  institutions  are  an outdated model  of  financial
intermediation has been made by a number of authors. The argument is build on the
premise that mutuality does not confer the same benefits it did in the past, a point made
by a number of authors ((Boxall & Gallagher, 1997; Cook et al., 2002; Fonteyne, 2007;
Hansmann, 1996). However, the picture is more nuanced as  Cook et al. (2002) noted.
Mutuality thrives in situations where long-term relationships are established between
parties  and  where  fiduciary  duties  are  the  paramount  obligation  carried  out  by  the
principal, for example in the life-insurance market or mortgage finance. Additionally
(Marshall et al., 1997) state that mutual firms typically have a less diversified product
range  which  decreases  the  governance  cost  by  virtue  of  being  a  less  complex
organisation.
Economic Changes in the 1980s 
The conditions that seemingly created a situation in which mutuality seemed not be
the right form of economic organisation were created during the 1980s by change in
regulation that allowed more economic freedom for financial firms. For example until
then,  banks were largely prohibited to enter the mortgage market and compete with
building societies.  This was also the era  of  rising house prices  and financialisation,
which began in all  earnest  with the Big Bang of 1986 that  eradicated many of  the
regulations and restrictions put on banking and later building societies. The ensuing
economic pressure led building societies to adapt their business practices and Marshall
et  al.  (1997) state  that  the acquisition of  new managerial  skills  in  marketing,  sales,
financial management and corporate planning amongst others. The influx of personnel
with a non-mutual background led to a change in attitudes towards mutuality and shift
behaviour from being a primarily social society to being more commercially minded.
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The Introduction of Competition 
Wells (1989) describes the changes in the competitive landscape caused by the 1986
re-regulation of the financial sector with a particular emphasis on the strategic options
facing building societies.  Stephens (2001) and Leyshon & Thrift (1993) provide more
extensive  descriptions  of  the  underlying  changes,  however  with  a  focus  on
diversification  of  income  generating  activities  (Stephens,  2001) and  increased
competition  by  new  market  entrants  and  cost  cutting  within  the  financial  industry
(Leyshon & Thrift,  1993).  The booming housing market  of  the 1980s ended in  the
economic recession of 1992 / 1993 and further increased the desire of larger building
societies to diversify. Stephens (2001) further identified two general strategies. The first
was to offer  life-insurance products  to customers,  the second was general  insurance
products such as contents insurance or third party insurance. While the first was often
done by setting up a new division within the firm and then acquiring a competitor to
gain access to the insurance market, the latter was often provided through joint ventures.
Bradford & Bingley is the only (then) building society to deviate from this pattern by
acting as an agent to distribute third party products through their branches and earning a
commission on successful transactions. Smaller and medium sized building societies
and  demutualised  societies  such  as  Northern  Rock  decided  to  focus  on  their  core
business  and  did  not,  or  only  briefly,  venture  into  these  markets.  Stephens
(2001) interprets  the  collected  evidence  as  not  conclusive  that  demutualisation  was
required  in  order  for  building  societies  to  compete  effectively  as  both  mutual  and
demutualised societies entered the same markets in the same manner.
Strategic Choices of Building Societies 
Stephens  (2001) identifies  five  different  reasons  for  demutualisation  based  on
observing the process between 1989 and 2000. The five reasons are:
1.  Consolidation  through  merger  and acquisition to  achieve  economies  of  scale
(Halifax acquires Leeds Permanent, Abbey National acquires National & Provincial)
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2.  Defensive  conversion to  gain legal  protection from take-over  for  five  years4:
argument put forward by Alliance & Leicester, Woolwich and Northern Rock
3.  Defensive  conversion  to  maintain  operational  independence after  takeover:
Bristol & West was taken over by Bank of Ireland to manage its mortgage business
4. Growth through merger and acquisition: Halifax followed this strategy in order to
become large enough not to be an easy takeover target
5. Member revolt: Bradford & Bingley is the only building society to date to have
been  forced  into  conversion  by  its  members  against  the  expressed  wishes  of
management.  All  other  societies  converted  on  recommendation  of  the  board.
Nationwide avoided demutualisation by member revolt twice.
Consequently, the main theme emerging from these reasons is that they are mostly
about strategic choice. Reason 5, member revolt, is the most relevant in the context of
this  research as it  relates  to  Bradford & Bingley.  The conversion of  Cheltenham &
Gloucester  to  be  taken  over  by  Lloyds  TSB (the  first  demutualisation  since  Abbey
National) created considerable fear in the building societies movement because it set a
precedent, in that any society could be a takeover target by another non-mutual financial
institution. Further, the large windfall gain of £2200 that members received might create
expectations of similar windfalls in future conversions and thus increase pressure to
follow that path. The fears turned out to be without basis however, as the authors show
there was ever only one (unsuccessful) hostile takeover bid for a building society by
Halifax for Birmingham Midshires while it  was in negotiations with Royal Bank of
Scotland in 1998.
Nevertheless,  in  1995 Alliance & Leicester,  Woolwich and Northern Rock were
afraid of hostile bids and saw demutualisation as a path to remaining independent after
conversion, as the law afforded any society a five year protection from takeover. The
1997 Building Societies Act changed the law to remove that protection if a converted
society  acquired  another  financial  firm.  Stephens  (2001) points  out  that,  for  these
4 The Building Societies Act 1986 provided converting societies a five year period of protection from
hostile takeover.
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medium sized firms to remain independent once the protection expires, they would need
to grow in size which can most easily be achieved by acquiring other firms.
2.4.2  The Effects of Demutualisation
Martin  &  Turner  (2000) come  to  many  of  the  same  conclusions  as  Stephens
(2001) in regards to the reasons for demutualisation. However, they go on to investigate
the development of the constitution of share ownership after demutualisation and show
that within two years of conversion,  the ownership of former building societies had
substantially transferred from being a reflection of their customer base (in geographical
terms) to the City of London.  This raises questions regarding the traditionally local
nature  of  building  societies  and  the  effect  conversion  has  on  this  nature  and  its
implications for the future direction and ties to their local communities.
A variety of effects  of demutualisation have been investigated in relation to the
increased competitive pressures introduced by regulation. The pressure to cut cost and
compete  with  banks  on  a  more  equal  footing  led  to  a  drive  for  rationalisation  by
building societies and demutualised societies. While the overall efficiency of building
societies was very high compared to retail banks (Webb et al., 2010), their cost structure
was largely determined by staffing levels and the size of their branch network (Marshall
et al., 2000). Consequently competition led to a rationalisation of the branch network of
banks  and  building  societies  alike,  however  their  strategies  differed  markedly  as
Marshall  et  al.  (2000) demonstrate.  The  converted  societies  followed  a  clear  profit
motive  by  closing  branches  in  unprofitable  areas,  such  as  rural  and  inner  city
neighbourhoods  while  slightly  increasing  their  presence  in  more  affluent  areas  and
locations with a high volume of traffic. Conversely building societies moved into the
areas vacated by the demutualised societies.
Another  aspect  that  garnered  some  interest  post  demutualisation  is  the  pricing
behaviour of the converters.  Heffernan (2005) shows that converted building societies
changed  their  pricing  behaviour  from  benefiting  customers  to  focusing  on  profits.
Finally,  Shiwakoti (2012) investigates how executive remuneration changed in former
building societies and how it compares to building societies and banks. The author finds
that executive remuneration increases dramatically to levels comparable to those seen in
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commercial  banks.  Interestingly  the  increase  in  remuneration  is  not  matched by an
increase  in  performance.  The  findings  further  show  that  for  building  societies,
remuneration  is  based  on  the  size  of  the  firm,  whereas  the  driving  factor  behind
remuneration in the converted building societies is the remuneration levels of peers, that
is, commercial banks.
2.4.3  Governance and Strategy
While  the  literature  discussed  above  investigated  events  happening  around  and
shortly after demutualisation, a different strand of literature looked at the 'other end' of
the process – failure. In particular, the literature sought to explain the failure of former
building societies from a strategic choice perspective (Branston et al., 2009), corporate
governance (Talbot, 2010), or market failure (Hallsworth & Skinner, 2008).
Talbot  (2010),  for  example,  asserts  that  the  demutualising  societies  were  not
prepared for a radical change of their corporate governance framework from being a
member-owned collective to a shareholder-beholden organisation. This inevitably led to
agency problems that ultimately caused the financial difficulties ending the existence of
these firms. Branston et al. (2009) and Hallsworth & Skinner (2008) both attribute the
failure of former building societies to internal problems, though Branston et al. reject
any outside causes that lead to the failure. Hallsworth & Skinner (2008), on the other
hand point to the weaknesses in the business model of the former societies and assert
that what ultimately caused Northern Rocks downfall was not so much a specific market
event, but rather press reports and TV screens showing queues of customers; projecting
a picture of the firm's imminent demise. This triggered a run on the bank, even though
the liquidity situation of the bank was better than what it looked like on TV. Lastly,
Klimecki  &  Willmott  (2009) sought  to  explain  the  demise  of  Northern  Rock  and
Bradford & Bingley in the light of financialisation and the wider neoliberal movement
of which these two banks were ultimately a victim. 
All of the studies above do suffer from shortcomings nevertheless. For example,
Klimecki  &  Willmott  present  a  summary  of  a  number  of  news  reports  and  other
secondary  sources  to  present  a  narrative  story.  They  however  make  no  attempt  to
substantiate  their  claims  beyond summarising  their  sources.  Similarly  Hallsworth  &
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Skinner use a similar  approach to  present their  short  paper.  Branston et  al.'s  (2009)
working paper presents a more extensive analysis of the event but do not support their
claims  with  substantive  evidence.  Finally  Talbot  (2010) uses  agency  theory  as  the
underpinning  theory  of  her  story  and  therefore  focuses  more  on  general  corporate
governance and the differences in organisational aspects of building societies and newly
formed  banks.  While  there  are  papers  on  governance  in  mutuals  such  as  Baker  &
Thompson  (2000),  there  seems  to  be  a  lack  of  literature  investigating  the
demutualisation and subsequent failure of former building societies.
Overall, given the public outcry and severe economic consequences of the failure of
Northern Rock and other former building societies (and banks indeed), it is surprising
not  to  find  more  extensive  research  on  demutualisation  of  building  societies.  One
possible explanation is that the topic does not lend itself to quantitative study due to the
small  number  of  former  building  societies.  Contributions  to  the  research  of
demutualisation in the United Kingdom comes from a variety of fields, most notably
geography, law, corporate governance and finance.
What unifies the studies is the overriding theme of strategic choice and strategic
failure that is mentioned in a large number of studies. As strategy is the domain of top
management, Upper Echelons research should provide a useful framework in which to
analyse executive decisions and outcomes.
2.5  Conclusion
This  chapter  briefly  summarised  the  history  of  building  societies  in  the  United
Kingdom from their origin in 1775. It then focused on the recent development of the
competitive  environment  and  its  impact  on  building  societies  during  the  twentieth
century. Demutualisation, as a result of legislative changes and competitive pressures,
affected  the  movement  through  the  loss  of  most  large  and  medium-sized  societies.
Section  2.4 discussed  demutualisation  in  the  United  Kingdom,  its  effects  on  the
movement as well  as prior studies on the failure of demutualised building societies.
Bradford & Bingley, the topic of this study, was one of the demutualising societies. As
such a brief history of its development since its foundation in 1964, itself a product of
sector consolidation, is provided, highlighting the development of the society movement
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in the twentieth century. This chapter has thus provided a background on the origins of
Bradford & Bingley and the forces  that  shaped the  society  until  demutualisation in
2000. The chapter further argued that competitive pressures were instrumental in the
demutualisation process for many societies, though not Bradford & Bingley, an issue
which is discussed further in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
3  Literature Review
3.1  Introduction
The  aim  of  this  literature  review is  to  discuss  the  two  theoretical  perspectives
employed in this research. In particular, it explores the background and development of
the corporate governance life-cycle theory and the upper echelons perspective, as well
as criticisms levelled against them. This chapter begins with a brief discussion outlining
the development of UK Corporate Governance Codes during the study period in Section
3.2.   Following  on  from  that,  Section  3.3 presents  prior  case  studies  of  corporate
governance failure.  The chapter then continues to discuss theories commonly used in
corporate  governance  research  in  Section  3.4 and  then  discusses  the  corporate
governance life-cycle  (Section  3.5) and upper  echelons  perspective (Section  3.6),  in
each case, outlining their application to this research.  Finally, the conclusion, Section
3.8, summarises the discussion and presents an integrated view of the two theoretical
perspectives.
3.2  Codes of Governance in the UK
As this study investigates the governance, and transformation thereof, of Bradford
& Bingley between 1995 – 2010, it is necessary to summarise the corporate governance
codes  in  existence,  as  well  as  the  changes  to  UK corporate  governance  during that
period. This section therefore highlights the development of corporate governance codes
in  the  UK,  during  the  period  1992  –  2010,  including  a  discussion  on  the
recommendations made within the implemented codes.1
In May 1991, following a number of financial scandals (e.g. Polly Peck, Coloroll)
(Mallin,  2013),  the  Cadbury  Committee  was  established to  codify  the  then  existing
implicit system of governance (Cadbury, 1992, p. 12, para. 1.7). The Cadbury Report
1 Appendix  B, page  226, presents a tabled summary of the corporate governance codes discussed in
this section.
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was  subsequently  published  in  1992.  While  the  report  focused  on  three  areas  of
governance for listed companies: board of directors, auditing and shareholders, only the
first two are applicable to building societies2. Cadbury, made 19 recommendations to
improve transparency and financial accountability of the board, chiefly, the separation
of the position of chairman and chief executive, the requirement to have a minimum of
three  non-executive  directors  on  the  board,  to  establish  an  audit  committee,  and to
establish a system of internal controls. Following Cadbury, and its perceived success in
improving corporate governance in the UK (Jones & Pollitt (2002, 2004) in  Solomon
(2013)), the Combined Code was published in 1998.
The  Combined  Code  (1998)  represents  the  merger  of  the  Cadbury  Report,  the
Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel Report (1998). The Greenbury Report, was in
response  to  concerns  by  the  public  and  shareholders  about  excessive  executive
remuneration. It made recommendations regarding the disclosure of pay packages. The
report  also  focused  on  creating  accountability  through  disclosure  of  remuneration
packages in annual reports, creating remuneration committees, as well as improving the
link between pay and performance. In addition, the Hampel Committee, set up in 1995,
reviewed the implementation of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. It published its
report in 1998, which supported the overwhelming majority of findings of the previous
reports.  The  report,  however,  also  represented  a  further  development  of  corporate
governance in the UK, by shifting the focus of corporate governance to a principles-
based and voluntary, rather than a prescriptive and regulated  code. In a nutshell, the
Combined Code  added that the directors are responsible for maintaining an effective
system of internal controls (financial, operational, compliance, risk management) and
that these should be reviewed at least annually and the outcome reported on (Combined
Code, Part D.2.1).
Following the collapse of Enron and other large corporations in the US and Europe,
the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors was reviewed, as ineffective non-
executive directors contributed to the failures of, for example, Enron and Parmalat. The
Higgs Review (2003) in this regard, set out to review the role and effectiveness of non-
2 To this date the Building Societies Association publishes guidance on the implementation of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code for its members 
(http://www.bsa.org.uk/information/publications/industry-publications/the-uk-corporate-governance-
code-bsa-guidance-for/).
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executive directors. The Review included suggested revisions to the Combined Code
and detailed a number of recommendations to improve the position of non-executives
against executives. Primary among the recommendations is the requirement that, at least
half  the  board  should  consist  of  non-executives,  remuneration  should  be  more
appropriate  and  that  non-executives  should  be  shareholder  champions.  In  addition,
Higgs recommended a large number of other measures to improve transparency on the
performance  and  suitability  of  non-executives,  for  example,  meeting  attendance  .
Resulting from the work of the Higgs Committee, the Tyson Report (2003) looked into
the effect of diversity in the board room on available skills and experience to contribute
to board discussions and better relationships with a range of stakeholders.
Following  this  intensive  period  of  amendments  to  the  existing  UK  corporate
governance framework, the Combined Code received some minor updates in 2006 and
2008. In addition, the guidance audit committees was updated and brought in line with
Audit  Practice's  Board  (APB)  Ethical  Standard.  The  financial  crisis  of  2008  then
triggered further reviews by Turner and Walker, which were published in 2009. Turner
was tasked to  review the causes  of  the financial  crisis  in  order  to improve the UK
system  of  supervision  and  regulation  of  financial  firms.  The  review  identified
remuneration as a key aspect of risk-taking by financial institutions and called for a
better alignment of risk and compensation. Furthermore, firms were called upon to put
more emphasis  on risk,  risk management  and effective  internal  controls  in  order  to
minimise the  probability  of  such a  crisis  reoccurring.  In  addition to  Turner,  Walker
reviewed the governance of banks and other financial institutions and made a total of 39
recommendations  in  the  areas  of  board  composition  and  conduct,  performance
evaluation, the role of institutional shareholders, as well as risk and remuneration.
In  2010,  the  Combined  Code  was  updated  by  the  FRC following  an  extensive
consultation  process.  Besides  incorporating  a  number  of  recommendations  made by
Walker, the Code was renamed UK Corporate Governance Code. The main changes in
the  code focused on improving transparency  and accountability  of  the  firm and its
directors.  In  particular,  more  transparency and accountability  was  introduced  in  the
director recruitment and appointment process, as well as calling for firms to be more
explicit about their business model.
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3.3  Case studies of corporate governance failure
Historically, corporate governance research has focused on quantitative, positivist
theories  and methodologies  (Brennan & Solomon,  2008).   However,  as  Brennan &
Solomon (2008) demonstrate, there is an increasing diversification of theoretical and
methodological approaches in governance research, including the increased use of case
studies (for example  Maitlis  (2004);  Parker  (2007a, 2007b, 2008).   While corporate
governance  case  studies  are  becoming  more  common,  case  studies  of  corporate
governance failure are less prevalent. This is mainly due to obstacles in accessing and
gathering  information  from inside  the  firm,  during  or  due  to  a  critical  time  in  its
existence. A number of researchers however (for example  Matthews (2005); Mellahi
(2005); or Sun et al. (2011)), have been able to access first hand information through a
careful choice of their study setting.
This  section presents  a  range of case studies  that  investigate  cases of  corporate
governance failure. These case studies focus on different companies, such as Enron,
Parmalat and Northern Rock, and feature a variety of theoretical and methodological
angles, for example business history,  resource-based view, or spatial  geography. The
following  paragraphs  thus  present  a  number  of  case  studies  of  governance  failure,
outlining their approach and background.
Well-known subjects of investigation have been the high-profile collapses of Enron
and  Parmalat  in  the  early  2000s.  Cohan  (2002) and  Healy  &  Palepu  (2003) both
investigate Enron, though with a very different focus and approach. Cohan’s (2002)
paper is based on business ethics and focuses on the failures of information transmission
between different managerial levels, that is “information blockage”, and how this is a
result of existing corporate structures and individual behaviour within these structures.
While  the  Enron-case  is  used  in  this  paper  as  an  example  of  such  informational
problems, the majority of discussion is centred on how a variety of unethical behaviours
creates ‘information blockage’ without reference to Enron.
Healy  &  Palepu  (2003)  on  the  other  hand,  focus  on  the  relationship  between
information providers and information users at Enron. Their paper extensively describes
the development of the firm from inception to failure, before discussing six aspects of
governance problems in depth.  In  particular,  the authors  focus on three information
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providers: the audit committee, the remuneration committee and the external auditor. On
the information user side, the role of fund managers, sell-side analysts and accounting
regulation  are  presented.  Though  not  explicitly  stated,  the  paper  adopts  an  agency
perspective  by  focusing  on  the  presentation  and  availability  of  information  from
information  providers  (agents)  to  information  users  (principals).  The  governance
problems are hence reduced to two aspects:  (a)  a lack of information3 and (b) once
information was available that it was not used accordingly. Thus the authors identified
two major problems at Enron: information disclosure and a market failure to use the
available information.
Similar to Enron, Parmalat, dubbed 'Europe’s Enron, also attracted its fair share of
attention.  Buchanan  &  Yang  (2005),  similar  to  Healy  &  Palepu  (2003),  begin  by
describing  the  history  of  Parmalat  at  length,  before  studying  the  ownership  and
organisational structure of the firm, to  show how a dominant owner-family was the
governance  problem that  led  to  the  eventual  demise  of  the  firm.  Based  on  public
information, the authors investigate the agency problems between minority and majority
owners, as well as how the decision-making style of the owner was secretive. In doing
so, they highlight the ineffectiveness of the board and external auditor, who both had
ties to the owning family and how, lacking the appropriate checks and balances, the
majority owner managed to extract funds from the firm through fraudulent accounting
practices, related-party transactions and the extensive use of offshore bank accounts and
shell companies. Thus the owners managed to remain in control of the family firm and
obfuscate the fact that the firm was bankrupt.
Melis (2005) also focuses on the role of senior management, auditors and the role of
the  CEO-Founder-Chair  of  Parmalat.  She  goes  on  the  compare  the  governance
arrangements at Parmalat to the Italian governance code to show that Parmalat was in
violation of several aspects of the code. She also concludes that a lack of transparency
and the role of the majority owner are to blame for the firms bankruptcy.
A  similar  theme  of  unethical  behaviour  by  key  individuals  enabled  by  poor
management structures and corporate culture, also feature in  Drennan's (2004) paper
which  uses  the  cases  of  Baring's  Bank  and  Mirror  Group  to  highlight  how  risk
3  e.g. the use of Special Purpose Entities to hide debt
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management  needs  to  focus  not  only  on  typical  business  risks,  for  example  the
economy, but also on human risk factors. Though both cases are presented only briefly,
the paper discusses the approach to risk management in UK corporate governance codes
between 1992 and 2003, calling for stricter adherence to the existing code by firms, and
the need to focus on hiring ethical individuals to reduce risk within the business. 
Another  case  in  which  the  failure  of  auditors  and  regulatory  oversight  did  not
prevent fraudulent activities by key individuals is the failure of London and County
Securities (L&C).  Matthews (2005) studies the failure of L&C in 1973 using a variety
of sources, including public documents as well as private papers and interviews with
individuals involved with the bank. The author shows how the auditing firm lacked
independence  as  L&C  was  their  most  profitable  client,  and  even  went  as  far  as
removing auditors critical of the accounting practices at  the bank from the audit.  In
addition, the regulatory oversight of the bank was weak, contributing to the eventual
failure  of  the  bank when funding became inaccessible.  The case  of  L&C is  further
illustrative,  as  subsequent  regulatory  reform  in  the  UK  failed  to  prevent  further
company failures in the 1980s and 1990s (for example Baring's, Mirror Group, Polly
Peck,  Coloroll),  as  well  as  in  the  2000s  and  2010s  (for  example  Northern  Rock,
Bradford & Bingley, RBS, Lloyds TSB, The Co-operative Bank).
Within the UK, Northern Rock garnered a lot  of attention.  Most well  known is
perhaps the extensive parliamentary report on the failure of Northern Rock (House of
Commons Treasury Select Committee, 2008) which sought to investigate how the bank
failed, using a variety of sources unavailable to academic researchers, such as directors
who  were  compelled  to  provide  evidence.  While  the  report  is  extensive  and  very
detailed, it is not based on governance theory. A case study of Northern Rock with a
very different angle is  Hallsworth & Skinner (2008), who focus on the behaviour and
language used by regulators in contributing to the run on the bank which forced the
government  into  nationalising  the  institution.  In  particular,  they  highlight  how  the
language used by the Bank of England and Financial Services Authority created the
illusion of scarcity of money when in reality most depositor funds were protected.
Yet  another  example  of  an  investigation  into  bank  failure  is  Sigurjonsson's
(2010) paper on the collapse of the Icelandic banking system. The paper,  while not
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being a single case study, focuses on the privatisation of Icelandic banks and its impact
on the agency relationship between the banks and their owners. The case of Iceland is
insofar interesting in that banks transferred from being publicly owned institutions to
fully privately owned banks. Whilst there were 14 banks initially before deregulation
and liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s, sector consolidation led to the survival of five
banks before the 2008 collapse. Thus there are some parallels between privatisation in
Iceland and demutualisation in the UK and its outcome.
Sigurjonsson further  identifies  a  number  of  factors  that  contributed  to  the  bank
failure, many of which also feature in the failure of UK banks, including Bradford &
Bingley.  In particular,  a  weak regulatory environment  ('light  touch regulation of the
City’) and a reliance on short-term wholesale funding, were influential external factors.
Internally,  seven  governance  problems  were  identified,  such  as  weak  agency
relationships through cross-shareholdings, the prevalence of dominant shareholders and
a unsavvy general public, as well as inexperienced board (many executives were in their
20s and 30s), weak monitoring by non-executive directors (linking back to weak agency
relationships)  and  excessive  performance-based  remuneration.  Overall,  this
environment led to banks taking excessive risks and engaging in irresponsible lending
practices. Many of these factors have also been identified in contributing to the demise
of Northern Rock, such as an inexperienced board (key individuals  had no banking
experience or certifications, for example, Adam Applegarth (CEO)) and irresponsible
lending practices (125% mortgages).
Finally, there are a number of case studies in less conventional settings, that is, not
in the US/UK or Western Europe. First, Mellahi (2005) investigates the failure of HIH,
an Australian insurer. While he uses a combination of publicly available documents,
such as parliamentary inquest records, much like other studies cited above, he focuses
his analysis on the board of directors and the functioning on the board. In investigating
the failure of HIH, he designed a framework of four stages of governance failure and
illustrates how the insurer failed as a result of the behaviours of the chief executive (CE)
and a passive board, which compounded the negative behavioural patterns of the CE.
The study is significant in showing how corporate failure is the result of a string of
decisions and other factors, rather than singular events, which is also highlighted in this
thesis.
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A second case study in a less conventional setting is the failure of Kelon (household
appliances)  in  China.  Studies  of  governance  failure  in  emerging  and  transition
economies are still rare. However,  Sun et al. (2011) investigate the failure of Kelon in
the  context  of  the  role  of  political  resources  in  corporate  governance  and company
failure. Their analysis draws on the resource-based view, rent appropriation and agency
theory to show how the creation of political resources are central to economic success in
transition economies, but also how these resources can later work against the company,
when political officials extract resources from the company.
In summary, case studies of corporate governance failure cover a range of topics
and  approaches,  as  discussed  above.  In  investigating  governance  failure,  academic
literature uses a variety of theories, such as agency theory and resource-based theories,
and  investigates  a  wide  variety  of  governance  mechanisms and  actors,  such as  the
board, the auditors, or external bodies (political institutions, investors).  Consequently,
the  evidence  provided by case  studies  is  useful,  as  it  adds  to  the  understanding of
corporate governance failures and the role of a variety of actors within the governance
of the firm.
3.4  Theories in corporate governance literature
Previous research examining corporate governance within a firm have attempted to
place the empirical investigation of corporate governance into several main theories.
These include agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer
&  Vishny,  1997),  resource  based  theories  (Mizruchi  &  Stearns,  1988;  Toms  &
Filatotchev,  2004) and  stewardship  theory  (Donaldson,  1990;  Donaldson  &  Davis,
1991). 
3.4.1  Agency Theory
Agency theory is based on the assumption that the interests of a firm's owners and
its management, conflict  (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Smith, 1776), and hence the focus is
on  better  aligning  the  interests  of  both  parties  (Fama  &  Jensen,  1983;  Jensen  &
Meckling,  1976;  Fama,  1980).   This  implies  that  a  firm  needs  robust  monitoring
mechanisms  through  the  board  of  directors,  where  the  task  of  representing  owner
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interests falls to non-executive directors.  However, as monitoring is neither free, nor
complete, agency cost arise (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
This research however,  contrasts  with agency theory in that it  views the role of
directors  differently.  In  particular,  the  research  rejects  the  notion  that  the  role  of
directors is  limited to the monitoring of management,  as argued by  Fama & Jensen
(1983) and Jensen & Meckling  (1976).  The role  of  monitoring  has  been central  to
corporate governance research, (Daily et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 1996), however in a
meta-analysis of corporate governance research  Dalton et al. (1998), could not find a
significant  relationship  between  the  independence  of  the  board  and  corporate
performance. They consider two possible explanations as to why this relationship has
not been found. First, prior research overemphasized the importance of the monitoring
role  of  governance  and  second,  that  the  link  between  board  independence  and
performance is not as direct as has been asserted in the literature. This critique reflects
the existence of other roles of the board of directors besides monitoring, as proposed in
the corporate governance life-cycle model (Filatotchev et al., 2006; Zahra & Pearce II,
1989). In addition, this less prominent role of monitoring also has implications for the
governance  of  non-investor  owned  firms,  for  example,  mutuals,  which  have  been
described as having inefficient governance structures, due to a lack of oversight from
the firms owners and board of directors (for example, Fonteyne, 2007).
Furthermore,  Hillman et  al.  (2000) argue that the traditional distinction between
inside and outside directors on the board in governance research and regulation is not
useful, as the distinction of inside and outside directors is derived from the assumptions
of agency theory. The distinction between these two types of directors is logical only if
director  independence  and  the  monitoring  role  are  considered  to  be  paramount.
However,  they argue that the resource and monitoring roles of governance are very
distinct  and that  the  attributes  and roles  of  these  two functions  need  to  be  studied
separately.
Finally,  agency  theory  has  been  criticised  for  being  too  narrowly  focused  on
monitoring and control, while ignoring other activities that are conducted by the board
such as giving advice (Westphal, 1999). This critique of focusing on a single element of
corporate governance has also been asserted by Pfeffer (1972), by arguing that a firm's
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board is a reflection of its external dependencies and that changes in the environment
lead  to  changes  on  the  board.  In  contrast,  this  research  focuses  on  the  interrelated
aspects  of  board  context,  composition  and  process  using  two  lenses:  the  corporate
governance  life-cycle  and  the  upper  echelons  perspective.  It  will  be  argued  that
designations, such as that of the independent director, are less important in explaining
the outcomes of corporate governance than the process of governing within the specific
context of the firm (Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009).
3.4.2  Resource Dependency Theory
At the heart of the resource-dependence theory lies its recognition that organisations
operate in the same space with many other organisations and that the interaction of these
autonomous  entities  creates  external  dependencies  between  them.  Their  individual
actions  can  be  constrained  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  internal  and  external,  such  as
regulation,  or  by  external  dependencies.  A central  goal  of  firms  in  the  resource-
dependency framework is to reduce external dependencies and uncertainty. Central to
this  is  the  concept  of  power  over  vital  resources  and  each  organisation's  desire  to
exercise this power over others while reducing others power over itself  (Johnson et al.,
1996; Ulrich & Barney, 1984; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989).
The focus of the resource-dependence theory is therefore on the role of the board of
directors in providing resources and links to the external environment that benefit the
firm. Hence, as discussed in the previous section, resource-dependence theory contrasts
with agency theory in that it views the role of directors differently and rejects the notion
that the role of directors is limited to the monitoring of management.
Early studies of the resource-dependence theory have examined boards with a focus
on board size and composition as an indicator to provide resources. The underlying idea
is that boards are not a collection of random individuals but that the composition of the
board is based on a rational response to external factors and the environment. Pearce &
Zahra  (1992) however,  criticise  the  view  of  boards  as  resource  providers  as  too
simplistic and narrow and argue that board composition is influenced by other factors as
well,  such  as  firm  size,  strategy  and  financial  performance.  Further,  Boyd
(1990) suggested that not only the number, but also the type of director matters.
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In addition, it is argued in resource-dependence theory that executive turnover can
be attributed to a misalignment of organisational behaviour and the environment, thus
that  the  CEO  is  replaced  with  someone  else  who  is  better  suited  to  aligning  the
organisation with its environment  (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example,  Harrison,
Torres,  & Kukalis  (1988) find that  firms with a  higher  dependence  on the external
environment  experience  a  higher  executive  turnover  rate.  This  higher  rate  of
environmental uncertainty also affects the choice of manager as Guthrie & Olian (1991)
found.  The  authors  found  that  in  a  more  uncertain  environment,  diverse  business
experience and shorter tenure in a particular business unit are seen as an advantage.
This research however does not employ the resource-dependence theory for several
reasons. First the theory has been criticised for being too narrowly focused on a firms
links with the external environment and ignoring other activities that are conducted by
the board such as giving advice (Westphal, 1999) or monitoring (Fama, 1980; Fama &
Jensen,  1983;  Johnson  et  al.,  1996).  This  focus  on  a  single  segment  of  corporate
governance  has  been asserted  by  Pfeffer  (1972) by arguing that  a  firm's  board is  a
reflection  of  its  external  dependencies  and that  changes  in  the  environment  lead  to
changes on the board.
In  addition,  the  resource-dependence  theory  has  been  criticised  through  claims
made  by  many  researchers  on  the  link  between  board  composition  and  financial
performance.  Pettigrew, (1992, p. 171) for example,  remarked that “great inferential
leaps are made from input variables such as board composition to out output variables
such as board performance with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms
which presumably link the inputs to the outputs”. A few years later Forbes & Milliken,
(1999,  p.  490) also  argued  that  ”the  influence  of  board  demography  on  firm
performance may not be as simple and direct, as many past studies presume, but, rather,
complex and indirect. To account for this possibility, researchers must begin to explore
more  precise  ways  of  studying  board  demography  that  account  for  the  role  of
intervening processes”. 
Hence,  as this research does not study the financial  performance of Bradford &
Bingley between 1995 and 2010, but rather investigates intermediary board processes
that link board input and output, the resource dependence theory is not appropriate in
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this  regard.  Consequently,  both,  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle  and  the  upper
echelons  theory,  used  in  this  research,  consider  strategy  to  be  an  important  part  of
governance, thus moving away from focusing on singular aspects of governance, such
as monitoring (agency theory) or resource provision (resource-dependence theory).
3.4.3  Stewardship Theory
Stewardship  theory  contrasts  with  agency  theory  as  managers  are  viewed  as
essentially trustworthy individuals and are thus good stewards of the firm’s resources.
Furthermore  it  is  argued that  directors  who are  familiar  with  the  firm (inside  non-
executive directors, executive directors) are able to make better decisions because of
their  informational  advantage over  outside,  independent  directors  (Donaldson,  1990;
Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994). Hence superior performance should be expected of
firms with a higher degree of inside directors (in contrast to agency theory) which also
implies  that  monitoring  is  not  as  relevant  in  the  context  of  improving  corporate
performance.As managers are generally considered to be trustworthy (Donaldson, 1990;
Donaldson et al., 1995), agency cost are argued to be minimal, because managers will
not  engage  in  opportunistic  and  self-interested  behaviour,  as  it  will  damage  their
reputation  and  future  employment  opportunities  (Donaldson  &  Davis,  1994).
Proponents  of  the stewardship  theory further  argue  that,  even if  agency cost  are  of
concern,  outside independent directors are not in a position to monitor management
effectively due to their lack of knowledge of the firm, as well as a lack of time and
resources (Donaldson & Davis, 1994).
Furthermore,  whilst   there have  been a  number of  studies  showing an apparent
positive relationship between the number of inside directors and, for example, R&D
spending  (Baysinger  et  al.,  1991),  or  a  more  balanced  approach  to  chief  executive
compensation (Boyd, 1994), the overwhelming empirical evidence does not support the
assertion that inside directors and corporate performance are positively linked. Hence,
as stewardship theory is the flip-side of agency theory, it should not come as a surprise
that researchers have not been able to establish a clear link between board composition
and  corporate  performance  (for  example  Dalton  et  al.,  1998,  1999;  Rhoades  et  al.,
2000).
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A further concern is that stewardship theory cannot explain those situations where
management has not been acting as good stewards  (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007) and that
other  benefits  of  outside  directors  are  ignored,  such  as  enabling  access  to  outside
resources  (for  example  Mizruchi,  1992,  1996) as  proposed  by  resource-dependence
theory, or through providing independent advice to management (Charan, 1998). In this
regard, this research does not deem it adequate to use the stewardship theory to explain
decision-making and governance changes in B&B.
3.4.4  Summary
Each  of  the  theories,  as  discussed  above,  concentrate  on  a  single  aspect  of
governance,  that  is  monitoring  (agency  theory),  stewardship,  or  resource  provision
(resource-dependence theory). Thus their usefulness is context dependent and limited to
situations where conditions are reflective of the basic assumptions of each theory. This
explains  why  neither  of  the  theories  have  proven  to  have  general,  significant
explanatory power. The implication of this is that these theories lack explanatory power
in longitudinal studies, as it is unlikely that conditions reflective of the assumptions of
any  of  these  theories  prevail  over  the  time  horizon  of  the  study.  In  particular,  the
demutualisation and nationalisation of Bradford & Bingley fundamentally changes the
governance relationship between the firm, its managements and its ultimate owners and
thereby reduces the explanatory power of each of the above theories. As is argued in the
following sections 3.5 and 3.6 , the corporate governance life-cycle and upper echelons
perspective are more suited to investigate decision-making and governance changes at
Bradford & Bingley, as they are better able to account for the changing circumstances of
the firm between 1995 and 2010.
3.5  The Corporate Governance Life-Cycle
Corporate  governance  life-cycle  theory  provides  an  overarching  framework  in
which to investigate the role of the board of directors in strategising, monitoring and
resource-provision,  by  embedding these  governance  functions  into  an  organisational
context.
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3.5.1  The Origin of the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle
Kimberly & Miles (1980) extensively described an organisational life-cycle model.
Their  work describes a  three stage life-cycle model  of creation,  transformation,  and
decline of a firm. Building on this and others work (for example, Chandler, 1962; Haire,
1959),  Smith,  Mitchell,  &  Summer  (1985) hypothesized  that  in  each  stage  top
management  has  different  priorities,  namely  firm efficiency,  economic  coordination,
and maintaining power and influence. Unlike Kimberly & Miles (1980), they used a
life-cycle model of inception,  high growth, and maturity,  thus excluding the decline
phase.
In  addition,  research  supporting  a  multi  stage  model  of  an  organisations
development has been published by a number of authors (for example, Miller & Friesen,
1980;  1984;  Kazanjian,  1988;  Baird  & Meshoulam,  1988;  Pye  & Pettigrew,  2005).
While a variety of authors use life-cycle models with three (for example, Kimberly &
Miles 1980; Lynall et al. 2003) and four stages (for example, Zahra & Pearce II, 1989;
Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), empirical research by Miller & Friesen (1984) supports
a five stage model (birth, growth, maturity, revival, decline). The conceptual literature
on  the  organisational  life-cycle  tends  to  simplify  the  progression  of  firms  between
phases and often implies a more or less linear progression (for example, Filatotchev et
al., 2006). Miller & Friesen (1984), however do not find empirical support for a linear
progression,  but  rather  find  that  almost  any  combination  of  life-cycle  stages  was
observed, with the exception of birth and growth stages which were joined together.
Zahra  & Pearce's  II  (1989) seminal  paper  on  boards  of  directors  and  financial
performance  provided  an  extensive  review  of  the  extant  literature  and  generated
substantial  directions  for  future  research.  The  authors  introduced  a  model  of  board
attributes  and  roles  based  on the  review of  existing  literature  that  related  company
external  factors  (for  example,  the  industry,  legal  boundaries),  internal  factors  (for
example,  the  life-cycle  stage,  CEO  style,  firm  size,  and  resource  base)  with  the
attributes,  roles  and  structure  of  the  board  of  directors  and  ultimately  company
performance. In this model, the board has three functions: service4, strategy, and control.
Furthermore, board attributes are considered to be an integral input into the model. In
4 Resource role
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this  research  three  attributes  are  considered:  board  composition,  characteristics  and
process. These attributes will be revisited when reviewing the literature on the upper
echelons  perspective in Section  3.6 and in the empirical chapters.  Zahra & Pearce's
(1989)  model  integrates  many  of  the  aspects  that  are  relevant  for  this  research.  A
difference  to  this  current  research  however  is  the  weight  put  on  the  corporate
governance life-cycle which is treated as a secondary factor by the authors.
One important aspect of Zahra & Pearce's research was the connection of board
characteristics  and  corporate  financial  performance.  Lynall,  Golden,  &  Hillman
(2003) find  that  the  existing  research  does  not  provide  conclusive  evidence  on  the
impact  of  the  board  on  financial  performance  and  conclude  that  this  is  due  to  a
misspecification of these studies. The contribution Lynall et al. (2003)  make is to see
that the different stages of the corporate governance life-cycle each require different
corporate governance theories. Because the governance characteristics of a firm differ
fundamentally in each stage of the life-cycle, a single theory is unlikely to be able to
explain  all  the  variations  and changes  seen  during  the  life  of  the  firm.  The logical
conclusion is that each stage requires different analytical tools (Lynall et al., 2003).
With  the  firms  life-cycle  and  the  related  corporate  governance  life-cycle  being
modelled on the product life-cycle, it suggested itself that the existing life-cycle models
had  to  be  extended  with  a  fourth  stage  –  decline  /  reinvention.  Filatotchev  et  al.
(2006) and  Roche  (2008) both  introduce  a  fourth  stage  into  their  model.  A model
combining the firms life-cycle and governance roles is depicted in Figure 3.1:
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Jawahar & McLaughlin (2001) state that the most common differences between the
different stages are the changing resource needs, the changing complexity and structure
of the firm and managerial capabilities. Filatotchev et al. (2006) and Lynall et al. (2003)
also  reflect  the  changes  in  the  nature  of  the  firm.  Figure  3.1 above  illustrates  the
changing monitoring, resource and strategy needs in each of the four stages. Jawahar &
McLaughlin's (2001) categorisations can be mapped onto Filatotchev's et al.'s (2006) in
that it can be argued that the changing complexity and structure of the firm requires
different levels of monitoring,  while different managerial capabilities are required in
each  stage  to  perform the  functions  of  resource  acquisition,  strategic  planning  and
monitoring.
3.5.2  Previous Research on the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle
The corporate governance life-cycle has been used to study a variety of topics such
as  board  composition  (for  example,  Lynall  et  al.,  2003;  Mizruchi  & Stearns,  1988;
Roche, 2008), financial performance (for example, Filatotchev et al., 2006; Thompson,
1999; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989), strategy (for example, Filatotchev & Toms, 2006; Toms
& Filatotchev,  2004) or  governance (for  example,  Uhlaner,  Wright,  & Huse,  2007).
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Source: (Filatotchev et al., 2006)
Figure 3.1: A 4 Stage Corporate Governance Life-Cycle Model
While  there  is  a  number  of  studies  available,  few  address  issues  concerning
demutualisation  or  topics  relevant  to  building  societies.  For  example  Mizruchi  &
Stearns (1988) present a longitudinal study of the formation of interlocking directorates,
however interlocking directorates are not relevant in the context of building societies.
Roche (2008) focuses on the corporate governance life-cycle and the process of director
selection and the effect of regulation (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) thereon.
Filatotchev  et  al.  (2006) extend  existing  research  by  linking  the  firm's  move
between stages with a rebalancing of the firm's wealth creation and wealth protection
functions  and how adapting to  these changes,  or the failure to  do so,  may create  a
disruption  in  the  firm's  development.  This  notion  is  relevant  for  this  research  as
demutualisation could be described as change in  the life-cycle of the firm, and this
change  and  the  change  of  corporate  form,  necessitate  a  rebalancing  of  the  wealth
monitoring and protection functions of corporate governance.  As an outcome of this
rebalancing process, one would expect a corresponding change on the board of directors
to reflect the new priorities on the board. Furthermore, Lynall et al. (2003) argue that the
composition of the board of directors is not only a reflection of the firm's life-cycle
stage, but that the relative power of the CEO and financiers at the time of inception have
a lasting effect on the composition of the board. This path dependence is rejected by
Filatotchev et al. (2006) by pointing out that boards do change and that there is need to
understand why and how they do.
In relation  to  this  research,  this  argument  raises  several  questions  regarding the
board  composition  of  current  and  former  building  societies.  First  of  all,  building
societies  are  old  organisations  with  many  tracing  their  roots  back  over  150  years.
Furthermore, at the time of their foundation there were often no professional managers
or  external  financiers  as  they  originated  from  the  self-help  and  friendly  societies
movement of the 19th century. Building societies have undergone tremendous changes in
their lifetime and thus it would seem unlikely that their governance roots are still having
an impact on the shape of the board today.  The introduction of permanent building
societies with professional managers, as opposed to terminating societies with voluntary
managers, would provide a starting point to investigate Lynall et al.'s (2003) argument.
However, in the light of the long history of building societies and the disruptive events
of the last 30 years, the path dependence theory seems unlikely to be a reflection of
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reality, at least for building societies. Consequently, the composition of the board of
directors will be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
3.5.3  The Resource Function in the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle
In accordance with  Filatotchev et  al.  (2006) and  Zahra & Pearce II  (1989), the
importance of the resource role of governance, changes with the stage of the corporate
governance life-cycle the firm is at. The relevance and strong explanatory power of the
resource function of  governance has  been confirmed by many studies,  for example,
(Daily, 1996; Daily & Dalton, 1993; 1994; 1998; Daily et al., 2002; Gabrielsson, 2007;
Lynall et al., 2003). Resources have the most explanatory power during the early growth
phase and the decline phase of the corporate governance life-cycle. As already pointed
out in this discussion, the predictions of the corporate governance life-cycle model are
not a perfect fit for the event of demutualisation, where a mature firm is exposed to new
competition  and  conducts  its  initial  public  offering.  Deregulation,  acquisitions  and
entering  new markets  all  require  additional  resources  or  different  resources  to  ones
under firms control in the past. Thus it is suggested that the resource role of governance
is relatively more important for building societies and demutualised building societies
than is implied in the standard corporate governance life-cycle model.
Similarly  to  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle  the  resource-dependence  theory
considers more than one function of governance. Using the resource perspective, two
functions  are  usually  put  forward:  monitoring  and  resource  provision.  Both  the
corporate governance life-cycle and the upper echelons theory also consider strategy to
be an important  part  of governance.  The distinction between capital  and knowledge
resources and strategic advice provides a more fine-grained distinction of the different
functions of resource.
While the resource function of the board has been confirmed in the literature, it has
given rise to a push for multi-theoretic approaches to studying corporate governance
that makes up for the shortcomings of any theory, such as agency theory and its focus
on monitoring or resource-dependence theory with its focus on resources (Christopher,
2010;  Lynall  et  al.,  2003;  Zahra  &  Pearce  II,  1989).  Thus,  when  studying  board
composition,  the  researcher  must  account  for  all  governance  functions  that  are
43
performed by the board in relation to the corporate governance life-cycle stage of the
firm, rather than focusing on any particular function. Only then it can be assured that the
role of particular directors and executives can be fully understood.
3.5.4  Application of the Corporate Governance Life-Cycle to this Research
As discussed in Section 2.3, the changes in the competitive environment of the UK
financial markets led to a restructuring of the financial services sector. Existing building
societies faced a new, more competitive landscape and sought ways and means to adapt
to the new environment.  This adaptation created a diverging path for the larger building
societies.  While the smaller societies continued to concentrate on their core business,
many of the largest societies expanded their lines of business by moving to offer estate
agent and insurance services besides a larger menu of financial products such as credit
cards.
Before the liberalisation of financial services with the 1986 'Big Bang', building
societies might be considered to be located in Quadrant 3 (Figure 3.1) of the life-cycle.
They were members of an established industry protected from external competition by
regulation and from internal competition by the BSA interest rate cartel5. Thus in terms
of the three governance functions, the need for strategic expertise and resources was
low.  The  range  of  products  that  could  be  offered  was  very  limited  and  the  major
framework of existing regulation in form of the 1872 Building Societies Act had been in
place  for  over  a  century.  Due to  the  protected  nature  of  the  UK mortgage  market,
building societies enjoyed a virtual monopoly on housing finance and thus there was no
need to acquire or gain access to any more resources. Finally, due to the institutional
set-up of building societies as mutual firms, the management and preservation of the
accumulated intergenerational endowment was one of the primary responsibilities of the
board  of  directors,  which  is  reflected  in  a  high  need  for  effective  monitoring  and
control.  The  protection  of  the  accumulated  wealth  of  the  owners  of  the  firm  was
tantamount.
The  first  change  came  with  the  opening  up  of  the  mortgage  market  and  other
financial  services for more competition.  Suddenly building societies saw themselves
5 The interest rate cartel effectively broke down in 1979 (Fry, 1990)
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faced with increased competition in their core markets and quickly lost market share.
The opening up of new markets however also increased their  opportunities to make
profits elsewhere. Therefore the strategic element of corporate governance became more
important as businesses had to restructure and enter new markets. Expanding into new
markets also required more resources in terms of capital and managerial knowledge.
While building societies had accumulated substantial capital to finance expansion they
were also, for the first time, granted access to wholesale markets for up to 25 percent of
their capital in 1986. In 1997, this limit was increased to 50 percent, however that was
only after the largest building societies had demutualised. While the need for capital
resources was limited as  Stephens (2001) reported, there was a considerable need of
commercial knowledge which led to an influx of non-mutual managerial expertise into
the sector during the 1980s.
In terms of the existing four stage life-cycle model the best match is Quadrant 2,
which represents a growing firm that has high needs in terms of strategic resources to
successfully build the business, while monitoring is relatively less important due to the
not so extensive resource base. In the case of building societies, this does not hold true
as all of the large societies hold a considerable quantity of assets and these do need
monitoring.  With  demutualisation the  protection and growth of  the intergenerational
endowment ceases to be relevant. In its place moves the management and growth of
shareholder wealth, so the case could be made that monitoring is still a highly important
activity,  though not the most important any more.  Hence it  is suggested that a fifth
corporate  governance  life-cycle  stage  needs  to  be  considered  – Revival  –  based  on
Miller & Friesen's (1984) organisational life-cycle model, reflecting the maturity of the
firm as well as changes in its business model and organisation.
In summary,  Lynall  et  al.  (2003) and  Filatotchev et  al.  (2006) call  for  research
investigating multi-stage transitions, that is, to study the transition of a firm across more
than one  life-cycle  stage.  They further  call  for  application  of  the  theory  to  a  more
diverse set of circumstances. For example, life-cycle stages 1, 2 and 4 are relatively
under-researched  (Filatotchev et al., 2006) and a lack of research using theories other
than agency theory has been diagnosed by the same authors. Many of the papers cited
here do not use agency theory as their primary theory, but use others instead such as
resource-based theories  (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Toms & Filatotchev, 2004), or a
45
combination of theories including agency theory (Lynall et al., 2003; Zahra & Pearce II,
1989).
This  research  thus  heeds  the  call  for  multi-stage  life-cycle  research,  as  the
demutualisation  and subsequent  failure  of  the  former  Bradford  & Bingley  Building
Society offers the opportunity to investigate the changes in the role of governance with
each transition to a new phase in the life-cycle. Furthermore, the theoretical focus will
be on the upper echelons  perspective  (Section  3.6) as  it  complements  the corporate
governance life-cycle theory.
3.6  Upper Echelons Perspective
The  upper  echelons  perspective  started  with  a  seminal  article  by  Hambrick  &
Mason (1984) in  which  the  authors  propose  that  executive's  characteristics  have  an
impact on organisational performance. The two basic premises are:
1. “executives act on the basis of their personalized interpretations of the strategic
situations they face”
2. “the  personalized  construals  are  a  function  of  the  executive's  experiences,
values, and personality”.
These two basic premises are founded in the theory of bounded rationality, that is
that executives cannot make objective and rational decisions due to the complexity of
information and the uncertainty of the situation and thus have to interpret, rather than
‘know’, the situation, which will be based on their personal experiences, values and
personality  (Mischel,  1977).  Hambrick  (2007),  in  a  review of  their  original  article,
explained the need to study the upper echelon, or top management:
“if we want to understand why organisations do the things they do, or why
they perform the way they do, we must consider the biases and dispositions of
they most powerful actors – their top executives.”
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The upper echelons perspective is subsequently outlined and its relevance to the
issues  investigated  by  the  thesis  is  discussed.  Section  3.4  is  therefore  organised  as
follows: first the foundations and subsequent extensions of the theory are covered, then
critiques  of  the  theory  are  discussed  and  lastly  issues  relevant  to  the  thesis  are
investigated.  A graphic representation of  the upper  echelons  theory by  Carpenter  &
Reilly (2006) is included as Appendix B.1.
3.6.1  Foundations of the Upper Echelons Perspective
Hambrick & Mason’s (1984) study introduced two ideas that each created research
streams. The first idea is that focusing on the CEO alone is insufficient. Since leadership
of a firm is a joint activity of several executives, it is reasonable to assume that all of the
executives have some impact on the decisions taken and thus the economic outcome.
Therefore it is pertinent to study the top management team (TMT), rather than only the
CEO. The relationship  between the  composition  of  the board of  directors  and their
impact on corporate performance has since been studied by a number of authors, for
example  Bantel  & Jackson (1989),  and  Carpenter  & Fredrickson (2001).  The same
relationship  has  been  established for  the  link  between the  processes  within  the  top
management team and firm performance (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Simons et al.,
1999). Carpenter et al. (2004) though caution that the aggregation of all executives into
one team is  not  always advisable and that  there is  a  need to consider  not  only the
executive directors but also non-executive directors. While each of the two groups have
distinct roles and agendas  (Fama, 1980), they do both have influence on the strategic
and economic performance of the firm. While  Geletkanycz & Hambrick (1997) found
that non-executive directors can have direct influence on the firm through contributing
information,  legitimacy  or  other  resources,  Carpenter  &  Fredrickson  (2001) and
Westphal & Fredrickson (2001) found that they also indirectly exert influence on the
board by providing advice as well  as through the selection or removal of the CEO.
Indeed  the  change  of  executives,  especially  the  CEO,  can  be  a  powerful  tool  to
introduce  strategic  change  and  affect  the  performance  of  the  firm,  for  example  by
contributing critical knowledge (Boeker, 1997) or as a signalling device  (Hambrick &
Cannella, 2004).
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Secondly, the study by Hambrick and Mason (1984) asserted that the demographic
characteristics of executives are valid proxies to predict their behaviour. Even though
these characteristics are necessarily incomplete and imprecise they have been shown to
be  related  to  strategic  and  performance  outcomes  (Boeker,  1997;  D’Aveni,  1990;
Eisenhardt  &  Schoonhoven,  1990).  In  the  absence  of  actual  psychometric  data  on
executives, these proxies have been proven to be useful. Lawrence (1997) described this
as  the  black  box problem of  upper  echelons  research.  Carpenter  et  al.  (2004) also
caution researchers on the use of executive demographics without reflection and argue
that more sophisticated methodologies need to be developed. For example, the literature
does not consider bundles of demographic properties but rather focuses on the effect of
single  variables  such  as  age,  tenure,  education.  However,  individuals  always  carry
bundles  of  attributes  and  their  actions  are  defined  by  the  interaction  of  different
attributes.
3.6.2  Refinements of the Upper Echelons Perspective
Over the years the upper echelons perspective has been refined in various ways.
Two important  moderators affecting the predictive strength of  the theory have been
established.  Hambrick  &  Finkelstein  (1987) introduced  managerial  discretion  as  a
relevant moderator of the predictive strength of the theory. They reconciled until then
opposing  views  held  by  different  theories.  Strategic  management  posits  that  top
executives do greatly influence organisations, while new institutional theory posits that
top executives have very little influence on the performance of the firm and that the firm
is driven by external forces and is constrained by norms and conventions. Hambrick &
Finkelstein (1987)  further argue that both views are conditionally valid and that this
depends on the extent of managerial discretion. Discretion exists when an absence of
constraints on top management exists, for example in form of little regulation, or when
there  is  a  “large  means-ends  ambiguity”  (Hambrick  &  Finkelstein,  1987), that  is,
management  has  to  choose from multiple  plausible  alternatives  to  make a  decision.
Ambiguity  can  be  introduced  by  external  forces,  such  as  operating  in  a  growing
industry, or by internal forces such as a relatively weak board of directors. A further
factor is the executives appetite or tolerance for ambiguity, that is, not every executive is
comfortable and can handle ambiguous situations equally well. Subsequently, it follows
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that  more  discretionary  environments  increase  the  predictive  strength  of  the  upper
echelons theory.
The second important moderator is whether executives operate in a demanding job
environment  or  not.  Executive  job  demands  vary  from  job  to  job  where  a  job  is
classified  as  less  demanding  if  the  firm operates  in  a  secure  strategic  position,  for
example a highly regulated industry, and executives can rely on capable subordinates. In
these situations executives have the benefit of time to reflect before taking decisions and
can gather and weigh the evidence relevant to the decision. In contrast, executives faced
with high job demands, for example in a highly competitive and fast moving industry,
will have to rely on mental short cuts and past experience to make decisions in a timely
manner. Therefore they are more likely to fall back on what is proven to have worked in
the past and their  decisions will  reflect their  personal backgrounds and dispositions,
rather than a careful weighting of available evidence. Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney
(2005) anticipate that measuring job demands empirically to be difficult though they
suggest that situations could be categorised as difficult / easy by factors influencing the
level  of  job  demands.  The  authors  list  three  categories:  task  challenges  (strategic
conditions),  performance  challenges  (for  example  demanding  shareholders),  and
executive  aspirations.  Indeed,  Carpenter  et  al.  (2004) find  that  there  is  a  growing
amount of evidence suggesting that it is not only measurable demographics (the past)
that is influencing management decisions, but also future aspirations and goals.
Further Refinements
Besides  the  two  moderators  of  predictive  strength  of  the  theory,  two  other
refinements have been added: the consideration of intra-TMT power distributions and
behavioural integration.  Finkelstein (1992) finds that the predictive power of strategic
behaviour can be improved when the differing levels of power between TMT members
are accounted for. This implies that depending on the decision at hand, a different set of
executives will be with influence compared to another decision. For example, the set of
relevant executives making a decision on HR related matters might be different than
when a decision on financing an acquisition is  taken. Finkelstein showed that firms
which had more TMT members with a finance background were more likely to, and
more frequently, engaged in acquisitions.
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Behavioural  integration  asserts  that  top  executives  are  not  acting  as  one
homogeneous and integrated team, but can be characterised as a competition of groups
or  alliances  of  executives  for  influence  and  power.  Behavioural  integration  thus
describes  the  degree  to  which  the  top  management  team  engages  in  mutual  and
collective interaction  which is  signified by a  sharing of  information,  resources,  and
decisions  (Hambrick,  2007).  Once  the  relevant  decision-making  body,  or  group  of
executives,  has  been  identified,  the  integration  of  the  group  and  its  impact  on
organisational outcomes can be studied.  A number of studies have shown that more
integrated teams have a positive effect on firm performance (for example  (Hambrick,
1998);  Jackson  (1992);  Li  &  Hambrick  (2005);  Lubatkin,  Simsek,  Ling,  &  Veiga
(2006)).
Similarly,  Jensen & Zajac (2004) found that it  is  crucial  to  distinguish between
subgroups  among  top  management  and  that  the  definition  of  subgroups  used  for
analysis can have an influence on the findings. Specifically they tested the impact of
different definitions of the top management team on strategic implications derived from
the upper echelons theory and found that different definitions of the top management
team, for example with and without the board of directors, lead to different findings.
They conclude that a careful identification and definition of subgroups is important for
the validity of findings.
The difficulty though lies with the correct identification of the relevant decision
makers  which  can  be  problematic.  While  certain  decisions  are  taken  by  board
committees, others are not, or not all relevant executives with power are on the actual
committee.  Hambrick  (2007)  suggests  that  identification  can  be  achieved through a
variety of sources, for example through annual reports (in case of standing committees)
or through interviews with executives, though he points out that this is more challenging
due to the required access to top executives.
3.6.3  Limitations to the Predictive Strength of the Upper Echelons Perspective
The less  homogeneous operating  environment  has  also implications  for  the two
moderators  of  predictive  strength  of  the  upper  echelons  perspective:  managerial
discretion and executive job demands. The pre-1986 building society industry could be
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described  as  an  environment  that  is  characterised  by  easy  job  demands  due  to  the
effective  monopoly  building  societies  had  on  housing  finance,  and  the  Building
Societies  Association  interest  rate  cartel  that  was  in  effect  until  1983.  This  easy
operating environment can be nicely illustrated by a quote from Stephens (2001) who
quotes a building society executive describing his job as: “operating in a 3-6-3 mode:
pay 3% on deposits,  charge  6% on loans and off  to  the  golf  course  at  3pm”.  The
operating  environment  became  much  more  complex  after  1986  (for  a  review  of
demutualisation  see  Section  2.4). Therefore  it  can  be  concluded  that  upper  echelon
perspective has more predictive power in the post-1986 environment.
A similar case can be made for the effect of re-regulation on managerial discretion.
While before 1986 building societies faced many constraints on their business model
and behaviour, these were subsequently reduced in 1986 and 1997. Top management
thus moved from an environment  that  had many constraints  to  an environment  that
provided fewer and fewer constraints on their actions. Demutualised building societies
faced  even  fewer  constraints,  compared  to  pre-1986,  than  their  building  society
competitors.  Thus  the  upper  echelons  perspective  should  be  a  better  predictor  of
organisational outcomes. This however has major implications for the role of the board
of directors in this context. As the board of directors of building societies is considered
to be the steward of the owners wealth, it would appear to be a breach of trust if the
board engaged in hiring executives that are more likely to push for demutualisation and
then  for  the  board  to  propose  demutualisation  to  members.  If  the  initiative  to
demutualise had come from the owners / members of the society itself, as was the case
with Bradford & Bingley, the situation would be different.
3.6.4  Critique of the Upper Echelons Perspective
The upper echelons perspective has been criticised in the past on several grounds.
One important critique is on the claims made by many researchers on the link between
board composition and financial performance. Pettigrew (1992) remarked that 
“great  inferential  leaps  are  made  from  input  variables  such  as  board
composition to  output  variables such as  board performance with no direct
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evidence on the processes and mechanisms which presumably link the inputs
to the outputs”
(p. 171)
A few years later Forbes & Milliken (1999),  argue that 
“the  influence  of  board  demography  on  firm  performance  may  not  be  as
simple and direct,  as many past studies presume, but,  rather,  complex and
indirect.  To  account  for  this  possibility,  researchers  must  begin  to  explore
more precise ways of studying board demography that account for the role of
intervening processes”
(p. 490)
This research however does not study the (financial) performance of Bradford &
Bingley, but rather investigates intermediary board processes such as board composition
and decision-making. Hence, this study is more aligned with Hillman et al. (2000) who
investigate  the  effect  of  deregulation  on  the  board  composition  in  the  US  airline
industry.  Consequently,  the  study  does  not  investigate  the  performance  effects,  but
rather how boards were adapted to the new operating environment.
Some arguments made in the resource-dependence perspective mirror those made
under  upper  echelons  theory.  Early  studies  of  the  resource-dependence  theory  has
examined boards with a focus on board size and composition as an indicator to provide
resources. The underlying idea is that boards are not a collection of random individuals
but that the composition of the board is based on a rational response to external factors
and  the  environment.  Similarly  the  upper  echelons  perspective  considers  the
composition of the top management team and how it effects the organisation.
Pearce & Zahra (1992) criticise the view of boards as resource providers as too
simplistic and narrow and argue that board composition is influenced by other factors as
well,  such  as  firm  size,  strategy  and  financial  performance.  Further,  Boyd
(1990) suggested that not only the number, but also the type of director, matters, again
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mirroring upper echelon arguments about the importance of demographics in individual
executives and groups of executives.
Research on executive turnover is also remarkably similar to findings generated by
researchers employing the upper echelons perspective. For example, it is argued that
executive turnover can be attributed to a misalignment of organisational behaviour and
the environment, thus the CEO is replaced with someone else who is better at aligning
the organisation with its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Also Harrison, Torres,
& Kukalis (1988) find that firms with a higher dependence on the external environment
experience  a  higher  executive  turnover  rate.  This  higher  rate  of  environmental
uncertainty also affects the choice of manager as  Guthrie & Olian (1991) found. The
authors found that in a more uncertain environment, diverse business experience and
shorter tenure in a particular business unit are seen as an advantage. Again, this mirrors
research in the upper echelons perspective, which found that in situations of uncertainty
top executive teams had less industry experience and a relatively shorter tenure at the
helm of the firm (Keck, 1997).
3.6.5  Implications for Research
Though the basic logic of upper echelons perspective has been shown to be sound,
that is, “executives make choices on the basis of personalised construals of situation
they face” (Hambrick, 2007), there are issues that researchers need to be aware of and
need to consider in their study design and methodology. One such problem is that of
reverse causality. In particular, is Top Management Team (TMT) composition the driver
of  the  observed  action,  as  posited  by  the  perspective,  or  is  the  observed  TMT
composition a result of the self-selection of members with specific profiles that leads to
the observed action. In terms of the demutualisation of building societies, this would be
the difference between (a) the pre-existing board taking the decision to demutualise
based on their personal construals, or backgrounds and perceptions of what is best in the
current strategic situation and (b) the board could be taking the decision to demutualise
because executives with a predisposition to demutualisation are entering the board so
that we later observe the outcome of demutualisation.
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Most  upper  echelons  research  is  quantitative  and  therefore  usually  use  cross-
sectional data sets which reduces the ability to identify causality, as any particular case
of reverse causality is drowned out in the data. In qualitative research, like this study,
this problem is not present. In particular, interviews with directors will enable insight
into their thinking and shed light on the causality of events.
Carpenter  et  al.  (2004) add  further  words  of  caution.  First  of  all,  research  has
proven a positive relationship between board heterogeneity and top management team
size and therefore board size needs to be controlled for. Furthermore,  they find that
executives functional background is a better predictor of strategic outcomes during the
early parts of the executives tenure and that the effect reduces with time. They posit that
this is due to the executives becoming more embedded into their setting and adapt to
their particular surroundings. They call for more longitudinal and qualitative research on
this effect. Finally they call for researchers to combine the upper echelons perspective
with  other  theories  in  order  to  make  better  predictions  of  the  impact  of  the  upper
echelons on the firm. Strandholm, Kumar, & Subramanian (2004) is an example of such
an integrated model.
Even though upper  echelons  research  is  mostly  conducted  in  the  United States,
hence  the  strong focus  on  empirical  studies,  it  has  been shown to  be  applicable  in
international contexts as well (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Hoffman & Hegarty, 1993;
Kadushin, 1995; Kwee et al., 2011; Wiersema & Bird, 1993). Other researchers have
successfully applied the upper echelons perspective in different life-cycle stages of the
firm as well in different business and corporate strategy settings (Cannella & Hambrick,
1993; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Hambrick et al., 1996).
Keck (1997) adds another relevant aspect to the use of upper echelons theory. She
investigated the TMT heterogeneity and tenure across industries and found that in stable
industries,  long-tenured  and homogeneous  teams were  most  effective,  whereas  in  a
more complex (competitive) environment short-tenured and heterogeneous teams were
most  effective.  Additionally  she found that  the  most  successful  firms matched their
TMT structure  to  the  environmental  conditions  present  in  their  industry.  This  has
implications for effect of re-regulation of financial markets on building societies. As the
building society industry had been characterised by a very stable environment for most
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of their  recent history,  the BSA Act of 1986 introduced major changes that brought
major competitive changes and created a more complex and competitive environment.
Therefore  it  should  be expected that  successful  building societies  adjusted their  top
management team accordingly and that demutualised building societies followed the
same trend, possibly to an even larger degree.
3.7  Complementarity of the theoretical perspectives
Under the upper echelons perspective, contextual factors describe a broad range of
organisation-level and environment-level characteristics that may impact or moderate
Top Management Team (TMT) Characteristics, Mediating Strategy Processes and TMT
Decision-Making. In that it is not dissimilar to the velocity of the environment under the
corporate  governance life-cycle.  The velocity  of the environment in effect describes
environment-level characteristics, for example the intensity of competition or regulatory
changes.  Furthermore,  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle,  in  its  analysis  of  the
transformation of the firm, provides the framework in which to evaluate the constructs
of the upper echelons theory. TMT Characteristics are complementary to Knowledge
Resource as they describe the same phenomenon, board change and composition, but
from  slightly  different  angles.  Whereas  Knowledge  Resource  focuses  on  broadly
demographic  factors  (for  example,  age,  background,  employment  history),  TMT
Characteristics  focuses  on  ‘softer’  factors  such  as  attitudes,  diversity,  skills  and
knowledge. Also the analysis of the strategic changes of the firm is important to the
upper  echelons  theory.  Strategic  changes  under  the  upper  echelons  perspective  are
generally considered to be caused by executives and thus to understand the strategic
choices made, the experience, knowledge and biases of executives have to be studied.
Hence, the upper echelons perspective and corporate governance life-cycle theory
complement  each other  in  examining the  transformation  of  Bradford  & Bingley  by
focusing on different, but complementary, aspects of the firm, such as strategy, board
composition and the context of the firm. As such, establishing distinct periods or life-
cycle stages provides a framework in which each period can be examined using the
upper  echelons  perspective  to  gain  a  deeper  understanding  of  what  contributed  or
triggered  change  within  and  between  each  period  or  stage.  Finally,  both  theories
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consider  organisational  outcome  to  be  the  final  product  of  decision-making  and
transformation.
3.8  Conclusion
This chapter provides the theoretical background for this research, discussing the
corporate  governance life-cycle  theory and upper  echelons perspective.  It  begins  by
briefly summarising the role of non-executive directors on the board as seen in literature
originating from the field of agency theory and resource-based theories. In doing so, it
sets up the argument that directors have a variety of roles and responsibilities which
they perform within  a  team.  These  roles  and responsibilities  are  represented  in  the
corporate  governance  life-cycle  model  through  the  three  governance  functions  of
strategy, resource and monitoring. Within the upper echelons perspective the focus is on
the attributes and skills of the individual director and their impact on team decision-
making. This focus on team decision-making relates to the three governance functions
in that the board or sub-groups of directors, as a team, develop strategy, decide on the
required  funding  and  board  composition  to  support  the  strategy,  and  finally  non-
executive directors monitor the implementation and adherence or deviation from the
strategy.
Thus the upper echelons perspective is instrumental in providing a richer insight
into the development of a firm within and transition between life-cycle stages by adding
detail to the deliberations and perceptions that led to changes in the three governance
functions. Figure 3.2 below depicts the constructs used in this research and their relation
to one another.
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Figure 3.2: Combined Framework of Analysis
Chapter 4
4  Research Methodology
4.1  Introduction
There is  a plethora of methodology texts that have been published in the social
sciences including accounting, organisational studies and other areas of research. Some
texts focus on general research methodologies, (see for example,  Saunders, Lewis, &
Thornhill,  2012),  specific  research  methodologies,  (see  for  example,  Eriksson  &
Kovalainen,  2008;  Flick,  2006;  Silverman,  2011;  Yin,  2009),  and  research
methodologies  specific  to  a  particular  areas,  for  example,  Bryman  (1989) in
organisational  studies  or  Smith  (2003) in  accounting.  As  with  previous  studies  on
specific  research  methodologies,  this  chapter  seeks  to  further  justify  the  choice  of
research methods and data analysis.
The objectives of this chapter are therefore to discuss the research approach and
methods chosen, as well as the limitations of these choices. This research is qualitative
in  nature  and  relies  on  a  combination  of  semi-structured  interviews  with  top
management  team members  of  Bradford  &  Bingley,  and  documentary  data  from a
variety  of  sources.  Additionally,  this  research  combines  two  theories,  the  corporate
governance life-cycle and the upper echelons theory to investigate the transformation of
Bradford  &  Bingley  between  1995  and  2010.  The  corporate  governance  life-cycle
theory is used to study the strategic and organisational change of the firm, while the
upper echelons theory is used to study how the top management team interacted and
made decisions during key periods of Bradford & Bingley’s transformation.
4.2  Research Design and Method
Qualitative research,  compared to quantitative research, is more subjective in its
nature, in that it relies on the researcher to make inferences and judgements in analysing
the data and in developing a narrative based on the analysis. The value of qualitative
research to this study is in its value in examining and reflecting on the perceptions of
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individuals and groups, to gain an understanding of the social  and human activities,
while placing a greater focus on the socially constructed nature of reality. Furthermore,
social phenomena, such as top management team decision-making can not be measured
objectively,  nor  can  it  be  quantified.  Hence  qualitative  research  emphasises  the
interpretations of individuals and groups of their situation within a given context, thus
attempting to make sense of their perceptions, motivations and actions.
Qualitative  research  is  therefore  the  appropriate  method  to  investigate  the
transformation of Bradford & Bingley, as the focus is not only on the ‘what’, ‘when’
and ‘how’ of organisational change, but also on the ‘why’. In investigating the ‘why’,
the perceptions and motivations of top management team members are considered, as
they  are  central  to  understanding  organisational  change.  However,  perceptions  and
motivations  are  not  quantifiable  and  thus  not  appropriate  for  quantitative  research.
Furthermore, this study not only considers the what, when, how, and why, but also their
context, helping to provide  a deeper understanding of the issues faced by the directors
of  the  society/bank.  Thus,  considering these issues,  qualitative research  using semi-
structured interviews was determined to be the appropriate method of research and data
collection.
4.2.1  Single Case Study Approach
A single  case  study  is  appropriate  for  this  study  due  to  the  lack  of  in  depth
qualitative research in corporate governance life-cycle transitions as well as a bias of
upper echelons and corporate governance research in favour of quantitative methods. A
case study addresses these methodological issues, as well as issues of cross-sectional
qualitative studies (for example, Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005), which trade depth,
detail  and nuances  for  generalisability  and breadth  of  data,  thus  potentially  missing
important  details  that  could  contribute  to  knowledge  of  board  decision-making  and
organisational change. The case study method therefore allows for the exploration and
understanding of a contemporary phenomenon, while allowing for the investigation of
the  ‘why’ and  ‘how’ of  the  case  and  tracing  the  links  between  decision-making,
corporate governance and board composition (Yin, 2009).
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Hence a single case study analysis is appropriate, as this study focuses on capturing
the details of the evolution of Bradford & Bingley between 1996 and 2010 in order to
explore and understand the complex issues and considerations of the society’s / bank’s
top  management,  as  well  as  their  consequent  actions  upon  these  considerations.  A
further factor for focusing on a single case study, was the limited time and resource
available  in  conducting  this  study,  in  particular  considering  the  difficult  nature  of
accessing elites for in depth interviews. Hence, in line with Walsham (1993) it is argued
that:
“From  an  interpretive  position,  the  validity  of  an  extrapolation  from  an
individual case or cases depends not on the representativeness of such cases
in  a  statistical  sense,  but  on  the  plausibility  and  cogency  of  the  logical
reasoning  used  in  describing  the  results  from  the  cases  and  in  drawing
conclusions from them.”
p. 15
Thus, this research seeks to uncover the details and perceptions of organisational
change and transformation at Bradford & Bingley using high quality data in order to
provide a rich description and analysis of the events that led to the firms transformation,
decline and ultimate revival. A single case study approach is therefore adopted.
4.2.2  The Choice of Semi-Structured Interviews
Interviews form a substantial part of the data collected for this research. There are
three  different  ways  to  conduct  an  interview:  structured,  semi-structured  and
unstructured. Structured interviews contain a set of predetermined questions, much like
a  survey,  and  thus  allow  for  very  limited  interaction  between  the  interviewee  and
researcher. In consequence it would limit the possibility of collecting data that is outside
of the, prior to the interview, anticipated issues and themes. Unstructured interviews on
the  other  hand  are  akin  to  a  conversation,  without  a  predetermined  goal  or  set  of
questions, and thus more suitable for more exploratory research. Consequently, semi-
structured interviews were chosen for this research as they impose some structure on the
interview which aids in the analysis of the data. Furthermore, it allows the interviewer
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to  pose  key questions  in  an  open-ended manner,  harnessing the advantages  of  both
structured and unstructured interviews.
Semi-structured  interviews confer  a  number  of  advantages  in  collecting data  on
participant’s perceptions of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of organisational changes at Bradford
& Bingley. These perceptions and participant’s opinions, experiences and sense-making
cannot be obtained through other means. However, because of the involvement of the
researcher in the conversation, the researcher’s behaviour and comments may influence
responses, either by encouraging participants to reveal more or less information than
they otherwise would. In addition, the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the
involvement of potentially confidential or sensitive information, requires adaptability to
the situation of the researcher as well as that of the interview guide, to maximise the
information shared by participants while respecting their confidentiality and anonymity.
Nevertheless,  semi-structured  interviews  allow  for  interaction  between  the
researcher and interviewee and allows  the  researcher  to  ask follow up questions  to
further clarify contexts, or to flexibly adapt the order of questions in response to the
direction of the conversation  (Saunders et al., 2012). Hence, an interview topic guide
(Appendix  C.3), covering four main areas was prepared, each with sub-questions on
various aspects that had been identified as important in the literature.
4.2.3  Interviewing Elites
Interviewing elites, as this study does, begs the question of what an elite is. The
early work in studying elites  (Dexter, 1970), has been criticised for failing to clearly
define who the elite is constituted of  (Richards, 1996), though they are often seen as
minorities at the top of the employment and income scale  (Woods, 1998). However,
position alone is not necessarily an indicator of having elite status, as such a position
can easily be lost. In contrast, individuals that hold strategic positions within a network
and thus act as connectors and bridges can be considered elite members  (Burt, 2009).
Furthermore,  place and time may be important  factors in  assigning elite  status.  For
example  Savage & Williams (2008, p.13) state that the composition of the FTSE100
between the early 1980s and today have changed significantly and thus the composition
of the elite has changed too.
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In the context of this research and following Harvey (2010), elites for the purpose
of  this  study  are  thus  defined  as  members  of  the  key  decision-making  bodies  of
Bradford & Bingley, that is individuals at the apex of the organisation that have the
opportunity to influence the trajectory of the organisation. Hence, the top management
team,  defined  as  all  executive  and  non-executive  board  members,  are  considered
relevant to this study. In breaking down the top management team, persons of interest
would hold positions such as chairman, vice-chairman, chief executive, finance director,
company secretary as well as other executive directors and non-executive directors. As
mentioned above,  belonging to  an elite  can be  temporal  phenomenon and with this
research having a longitudinal aspect, top management team members past and present
are potential interviewees.
Interviewing  elites  can  provide  essential  data  in  a  number  of  situations.  In
particular,  interviews  with  key  players  can  provide  valuable  information  in
reconstructing  events  and the  build  up  to  an  event,  for  example  demutualisation  at
Bradford & Bingley. In addition, this research seeks to establish the perceptions and
opinions of top management team members on decision-making during different periods
of Bradford & Bingley. Hence, interacting with current and former directors provides
direct  access  to  each  individuals  opinions.  Lastly,  elite  interviews  can  be  used  to
corroborate information gained from documentary sources.
Nevertheless, potential pitfalls of elite interviews have to be considered. First, given
that the population of potential interviewees is very limited to begin with, the number of
interviews may not be sufficient to provide a representative sample. Furthermore, access
to key decision-makers is generally not easy due to a number of factors, such as busy
schedules. As such, the data generated from interviews may not be sufficiently robust.
Hence  this  study  is  using  documentary  data  in  addition  to  interviews  in  order  to
triangulate and support the interview data, thus increasing the reliability and validity of
the conclusions.
A second concern is the potential for self-aggrandisement of interviewees. As a key
decision-maker, their reputation and recognition by peers is important in fortifying their
authority. As such they have to be seen to be in control. Given this, there is a risk that
interviewees will project an overly positive image of themselves, showing them to be in
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control of a situation, or claiming to have acted deliberately in order to create a positive
outcome, when other structural factors were more important in determining the given
outcome. Again, in trying to avoid such pitfalls, the interviewer needs to remain aware
of  such  tendencies.  In  seeking  to  minimise  the  negative  impact  of  such behaviour,
triangulation, as well as a critical mind and probing during interviews, is key.
Another concern of elite interviewing are the power dynamics between interviewer
and  interviewee,  especially  when  the  interviewer  is  a  junior  researcher  without
established credentials. Thus it is imperative for the researcher to be well prepared and
knowledgeable  about  the  subject  in  order  to  instil  confidence  in  themselves.
Furthermore,  good  knowledge  of  the  interview  questions  as  well  as  adequate
information about the interviewee is crucial.  The appearance of professionalism thus
acts as a signalling device showing that the researcher has taken the time to prepare and
respects the interviewee’s time and position. Another way of gaining rapport is through
discussing shared interests or something the interviewer has read or seen  (Richards,
1996;  Peabody  et  al.,  1990).  In  addition,  another  source  of  legitimacy  may  be
institutional affiliation. Harvey (2010b) reports that he found that common institutional
affiliation,  for  example,  alumni  of  the  same  university,  made  gaining  access  more
successful. Similarly, in this case it can be surmised that a University of York-based
researcher  studying  a  Yorkshire  building  society  has  more  legitimacy  than  a  non-
Yorkshire-based  researcher.  Also  a  number  of  potential  interviewees  still  live  in
Yorkshire  and  thus  may  be  more  predisposed  to  participating  in  this  research.  In
addition, being located in Yorkshire makes access to interviewees living in the region
easier and allows more flexibility to arrange a suitable interview location.
When arranging an interview with an elite member, flexibility in location, date and
time is essential.  For example,  Harvey (2010b) states that the location will  have an
impact on the type and amount of information an interviewee will be willing to divulge
during  the  interview.  In  citing  McDowell  (1998) the  author  argues  that  having  an
interview in a place where it could be potentially overheard by the interviewee’s co-
workers,  might  make  the  interviewee  more  guarded.  Another  consideration  is  the
ambient noise level of outside locations. As much as an interviewee might be overheard
when the interview is held in an office or conference room, holding an interview in a
public location, such as a café or over lunch, has its own set of problems. In particular,
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the ambient noise level could inhibit a good quality recording. Similarly one could be
overheard  in  a  public  place,  which  again  the  interviewee  might  consider  when
answering questions (Harvey, 2010a). Considering this, interviewees were offered free
choice of location for the interview, as well as time and date, to allow them to choose a
place in which they would be comfortable. In the course of this research, interviews
were conducted in a variety of private and public locations, such as a café (when it
wasn’t busy), on university premises, and in private homes. In all cases interviewees
seemed  comfortable  in  their  chosen  location.  Furthermore,  some  interviewees  were
more busy than others, such that some interviews were time limited, while others were
more flexible in their schedule.
During  the  interview,  it  is  important  to  have  a  conversational  flow  (Harvey,
2010b) and to keep the interviewee engaged. In particular, it is not recommended to ask
closed-ended questions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674), as it does not allow for a
conversational flow to start. Furthermore, it does not allow for interviewees to answer
the  question  as  elaborately  as  they  wish.  Thus,  it  was  found  while  conducting  the
interviews, that open-ended questions often prompted long and detailed answers, as well
as interviewees adding details and information that could not have been anticipated by
the researcher.
In summary, the researcher implemented the techniques discussed above during the
interviews. Given the number and length of interviews that were conducted, it is argued
that  the  problems  and  barriers  discussed  were  overcome  and  that  the  researcher
managed to establish his credentials and built credibility with the interview participants.
4.2.4  Secondary Data and its Use as Empirical Evidence
In addition to collecting data using interviews, this study also relies on data selected
from secondary  literature  and  archival  documents.  First,  evidence  is  gathered  from
building society history written by other  authors  (see for example,  Ashworth,  1980;
Boleat, 1965; Cleary, 1965; Price, 1958). The secondary literature on building society
history is important in understanding the background and origin of Bradford & Bingley
with a particular view to strategy and top management team. Other secondary sources
include  a  wide  range  of  documents  such  as  annual  reports  and  other  documents
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produced  by  Bradford  &  Bingley  for  public  use  (Chairman’s  Statements,  Press
Releases). In addition to documents created by the organisation itself, other documents
originating from third parties are also considered in the analysis, such as news reports,
parliamentary records and regulatory documents. 
These secondary documents enable the researcher to link the different perspectives
of  each of  these  interested parties  to  the  interviews,  in  order  to  develop or  draw a
comprehensive picture of the transformation and decline of Bradford & Bingley.
Of particular interest  to this  study are statements made by key top management
team members throughout the study period, that is, 1995 – 2010. Any public comments
made by representatives of the firm with a view of influencing or projecting a certain
image to important stakeholders were considered. Though this type of information is
systematically biased, it nevertheless is useful in highlighting important issues relating
to the firm. A special role in this context is contained within the Chairman’s Statement
in the annual report. The annual report is the main form of corporate communication in
both qualitative and quantitative form. They are strategic documents in which the firm
accounts for its actions over the past accounting period, but also includes a forward
looking element,  in  particular  through the Chairman’s  Statement.  The statement  not
only contains essential information which complements the quantitative aspects of the
annual report, but also adds information of value to a variety of different users as the
narrative reporting information is useful for decision-making purposes. In particular, the
statement contains non-quantifiable information on trends and factors specific to the
economy and industry, as well as statements on current, future and past strategies and
actions  by  management.  Smith  &  Taffler  (2000),  support  the  assertion  that  the
Chairman’s  statement  are  unaudited  managerial  disclosures  containing  important
information pertaining to  the future of  the  company.  Consequently,  other  secondary
documentary sources originated by the company will be viewed similarly in this study.
4.2.5  Ethical Risks and Ethical Approval 
During the course of this research a number of ethical issues may arise, in particular
during data collection and the use of data in the empirical chapters.  Saunders et  al.
(2012, p.129) define ethics as “the appropriateness of your behaviour in relation to the
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rights of those who become the subject of your work, or affected by it”. Thus key issues
have been identified as: invasion of privacy, lack of informed consent, maintenance of
participant’s  confidentiality  and anonymity,  deception  of  participants,  and misuse of
data (Saunders et al., 2012; Bryman & Bell, 2007). In order to minimise the ethical risks
arising from this project, ethical approval was sought and granted by the Economics,
Law,  Management,  Politics  and  Sociology  Ethics  Committee  (ELMPS)  of  the
University  of  York.  In  following approved ethical  practices,  this  research  sought  to
minimise ethical risks to the participant, research and institution. 
Specifically:
(a) It was ensured that all participants gave their informed consent by signing a
consent  form.  Information  regarding  the  project  together  with  the  invitation  to
participate, and contact details to discuss any queries, in advance of the interview, were
also provided. Finally, information regarding consent was repeated verbally, at the start
of the interview.
(b) The danger of invasion of privacy was reduced by letting participants choose an
interview location of their preference.
(c) Confidentiality  and  anonymity  are  preserved  by  assigning  code  names  and
numbers  to  each  interviewee.  These  code  names  and  numbers  were  used  in  all
documents that are not solely privy to the researcher.
(d) Deception and misuse of data is minimised by all interviewees being offered a
copy of the results. 
In addition, one interviewee requested pre-authorisation of any quotes attributable
to him/her prior to publication. Having taken these steps, ethical risks have thus been
minimised by careful planning of data collection. Subsequently, ethical approval of the
research plan followed.
66
4.3  Data
This  section  describes  the  data  collection  process  for  interviews  as  well  as
documentary evidence. In particular, the interviews, documents used, and the process of
data analysis are discussed.
4.3.1  Interviews
Interview Sample This thesis, being a case study, has a finite population of top
management team members. Top management team members relevant to this work are
defined as all directors working at Bradford & Bingley between 1995 and 2010. The
total number of potential  participants is thus 35. Using the electoral roll,  as well as
directories  of  directors  and  online  searches,  mailing  addresses  for  all  potential
participants  were  sought.  For  five  directors  no  current  mailing  address  could  be
established, while multiple potential addresses could be found for a number of directors.
Thus, using multiple addresses, a total of 47 letters were sent to 30 interviewees in June
2013. All identified individuals were mailed an interview information pack including a
participant  information  sheet,  reply  slip  and  a  pre-stamped  and  pre-labelled  return
envelope, a copy of which is found in Appendix C. In total seven recipients agreed to be
interviewed  for  this  study,  while  four  declined.  The  positive  response  rate  was  23
percent and total response rate was 37 percent. As previously discussed, in order to
preserve confidentiality,  all  interviewees were given code names which are listed in
Table 4.1.
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Director Period
Director A Period 1*
Director B Period 4**
Director C Period 1*
Director D Period 1*
Director X Period 1*
Director Y Period 4**
Director Z Period 1*
* (1995 – 2004) ** (2008 – 2010)
A detailed description of the periods is presented in chapter 5
Table 4.1: Director Code Names
Interview Process and Technique The interviews were conducted between July
and  September  2013.  Prior  to  the  start  of  the  interviews,  the  researcher  briefly
summarised the purpose of the project and sought verbal agreement to proceed with the
next step. Interviewees were asked to date and sign a consent form (seen in Appendix
C.2) prior to starting the interview. The consent form included the permission to audio
record the interview to which all interviewees agreed. Nevertheless agreement to audio
record the interview was also sought verbally prior to starting the recording. None of the
interviewees seemed uncomfortable with being audio recorded, which, the researcher
surmises, might be due to their being accustomed to being questioned as part of their
career. Finally, all participants were reassured of their anonymity and that no personally
identifiable  information  would  be  published  by  the  researcher,  though  absolute
anonymity could not be guaranteed. The seven interviews lasted between one and three
hours. Due to time constraints by the interviewee, one interview had to be postponed
after one hour and was concluded via telephone a few weeks later. The interviews were
transcribed  by  a  reliable  transcription  service  used  by  numerous  academics  of  the
University  of  York.  All  transcriptions,  recordings  and related  materials  are  securely
stored on University of York servers with access limited to the researcher only. Any
recordings, transcripts and derived materials such as notes and coding, that had to be
transferred to a different device for use or transport purpose, have been encrypted prior
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to any transfer, with the decryption key only known to the researcher. Furthermore, any
device  outside  university  premises  that  held  these  files,  utilised  full  hardware
encryption. Hence, even in the event of the loss of a device, the data is inaccessible to
any third party.
To begin the interview, each interviewee was asked to describe their role and the
main  tasks  and responsibilities  they  had/have,  as  well  as  how they  got  to  join  the
organisation. These opening questions were aimed at putting the interviewees at ease,
and,  judging  from  the  often  long  and  detailed  answers  was  successful.  Once
interviewees  were  comfortable  presenting  their  opinion  about  what  happened  at
Bradford & Bingley during their tenure they needed few prompts to speak at length
about their experiences. This  situation aligns with both  Nelson & Bruner (2006) and
White (1989) who observed that story telling about the past is natural to humans. At the
same time the story telling process may also be a sense-making process of the past for
the participants; the role of story telling and sense making will be picked up in Section
4.4.1 when reflecting on the interviews.
Furthermore,  what  was  sought  in  these  interviews  was  the  interviewee’s  own
understanding  and  the  meaning  they  give  to  past  events  (Riessman,  1993);  as  the
participants’ perspective was sought,  there was no,  often single,  objective view that
could be objectively verified using other data. Thus there were often differing accounts
and perspectives presented about the same events by the interviewees, and it is for the
research  to  make  sense  of  the  competing  perspectives  and  present  a  reasoned
interpretation of events.
Again, in the course of the interview, it was important for the researcher to remain
neutral and not to inject any personal interpretation or opinion of events into the debate
so  as  not  to  steer  the  interviewee  in  a  particular  direction.  At  the  same  time,  the
researcher had to be perceptive and sensible to the interviewee’s changing moods and
emotions  in  order  to  support  the  flow  of  the  conversation.  Furthermore,  probing
questions  were  asked  when answers  needed  to  be  clarified  or  elaborated,  or  if  the
interviewee’s answers introduced hitherto unknown information or aspects. Overall the
interview topic guide was used as a check list to ensure that all areas were covered
during the course of the interview, and so not to forget any specific questions that had
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previously been identified as important. Though the interviews focused on interviewee’s
perceptions and experiences, some of the information could be verified with publicly
available documents.
The interview process provided sufficient flexibility and enabled the pursuit of new
information that arose from the interview, offering a great depth of information on the
transformation of Bradford & Bingley. The success of the interview approach chosen is
highlighted by the fact that the majority of interviews lasted two to three hours.
4.3.2  Documents
The majority of documentary data used in this research is available online, as listed
in  Table 4.2. Besides a comprehensive search of the former Bradford & Bingley web
site,  additional  historical  information  was  obtained  through  the  Building  Societies
Association  Archives  which  stores  pre-demutualisation  information  on  Bradford  &
Bingley, including annual reports and news items. Finally, a comprehensive search of
UK newspapers  archives  for  reports  relating  to  Bradford & Bingley  and any of  its
directors during the period of investigation was conducted using Nexis UK. It also has
to  be  noted  that  in  collecting  documentary  evidence  access  to  Bradford  & Bingley
corporate  archives  was  sought,  but  ultimately  not  granted,  with  no  explanation
provided. Given the sensitive nature of the case study, it does not come as a surprise that
access was not granted, especially considering potential legal repercussions should any
damaging  information  be  published,  as  well  as  the  ongoing  legal  and  regulatory
challenge  of  the  Bradford  &  Bingley  Shareholders  Association  (BBSA)  to
nationalisation. 
The purpose of the documentary evidence was to place the data collected from the
interviews into context, but also to clarify and confirm information derived thereof, as
well as to supplement interviews where necessary (Silverman, 1998).
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Document Years Source
Bradford & Bingley 
Annual Reports
1995
-
2013
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website; 
The Building Societies Association website 
(prior to 2002); The UK Asset Resolution 
Limited website.
Interim Financial 
Statements
2002
-
2009
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) 
Records (Chairman’s 
Statement, Proxy 
Figures, Resolutions)
2002
-
2008
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
Extraordinary General 
Meeting (EGM) 
Records (Chairman’s 
Statement, Circulars, 
Q&A Letter)
2008 The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
Mortgage Express 
Confidence Studies
2005
-
2009
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) 
Enforcement against C 
Wilford (Finance 
Director 2005 - 2009)
2013 The Financial Conduct Authority website.
Bradford & Bingley 
Press Releases
2000
-
2009
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
Bradford & Bingley 
Investor Call Transcripts
2007
-
2008
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
Bradford & Bingley 
Investor Presentation 
Slides
2007
-
2008
The Bradford and Bingley Corporate website.
News Reports
1998
-
2008
The LexisNexis® database; The Building 
Societies Association Archive.
Parliamentary Inquiry 
into Failure of Bradford 
& Bingley
2008 Hansard - Parliamentary proceedings.
Table 4.2: List of Documentary Sources used in Research
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4.3.3  Data Analysis
The  data  gathered  from  the  interviews  were  taken  at  face  value,  that  is,  the
researcher generally assumed the honesty and sincerity of the interviewees unless there
was information indicating otherwise. As far as possible, information provided by the
interviewees, was triangulated using the other data gathered or through comparison of
interview transcripts. Furthermore, no qualitative analysis software was used given the
number  of  interviews.  To  analyse  the  data  the  framework  analysis  approach  was
followed (Rapley, 2011). Hence, in familiarising with the data, the researcher read and
reread transcripts multiple times and in the process referred back to the field notes taken
during and after the interview, as well as any statements made off the record. In the
process of reading the transcripts, major themes were identified and recorded. Further
reading  and  comparison  of  thematic  statements  made  by  interviewees  revealed
differences in perception and point of view within each theme. Again, even though the
honesty and sincerity of the participants’ sense-making and perceptions was taken as
given, the researcher  sought to identify any hidden meanings which may be hidden
between the lines.
The two theories employed in this research use different constructs and therefore
the data had to be coded differently for each empirical chapter. For the first empirical
chapter  (Bradford  &  Bingley  in  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle),  using  the
corporate governance life-cycle theory, the three constructs of Strategy, Resource and
Monitoring were initially defined based on the literature. The transcripts were then read
and  reread  in  accordance  with  the  three  themes  and  any  passages  and  particular
statements were recorded. Within each construct, all  recorded statements were again
read and compared and contrasted  to  other  statements  within  the same construct  to
identify similarities  and differences.  In  the  course of  this  process  two constructs  of
Resource emerged: Finance and Knowledge. Financial Resources are thus defined as the
funds the firm requires to implement its chosen strategy, whereas Knowledge Resources
are defined as the skills and intellectual knowledge of its staff that the firm requires
during a given period.  These four themes of Strategy, Financial Resource, Knowledge
Resource, and Monitoring form the basis of discussion in Chapter 5.
This approach also identified particular events and people that had an impact within
these constructs. Consequently the documentary data gathered was also searched for
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these particular events and people for further information or statements with the aim to
add to, contrast and verify the narrative originating from the interviews. The primary
sources of information are the Chairman’s Statement and Chief Executive’s Report of
the Annual Reports 1995 to 2010, as well as press releases and newspaper articles. The
Chairman’s and Chief Executive (CE)'s Statements were chosen for their centrality to
communicating  the  firm's  achievements  and  future  strategy.  Even  though  these
statements are not audited, they are the platform in the annual report to communicate
forward-looking information about the firm.
In order to identify this information on strategic initiatives in the annual reports,
Andrews (1997) definition of strategy is used: “the pattern of decisions in a company
that determines and reveals its objectives, purposes, or goals, produces the principal
policies and plans for achieving those goals,  and defines the range of  business the
company is to pursue” 
For the second empirical chapter (Board Processes between 1996 – 2004 and 2008
– 2010), using the upper echelons theory, the main constructs were identified based on
literature,  in  particular  referring  to  Carpenter  &  Reilly's  (2006) model.  The  five
constructs of Contextual Factors, TMT Characteristics, Mediating Strategy Processes,
Attributes of TMT Decision-Making and Organisational Outcomes were thus defined.
All interviews were also read and reread to identify any statements pertaining to each of
the themes. Once again, after the transcripts were read several times and all statements
belonging to each construct had been recorded, these aforementioned statements were
analysed for common themes within each construct. This process turned up a number of
sub-themes for each construct as well as a hierarchy of codes. Finally, from this process
of repetitive coding and refinement,   a final set of themes and sub-themes emerged
(King, 2004). 
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4.4  Problematising Research Approach
4.4.1  The Limitations of Interviews
As with other research methods, interviews, though they are ‘a dynamic vehicle for
exploring  the  rich  and  complex  body  of  information  possessed  by  an  individual’
Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekeran (2001, p. 150), do have limitations. 
First, the object of this research is the upper echelon of the firm, which is naturally
limited to a select number of directors at  any point in time. Thus, even though this
research used a longitudinal approach, only a limited population of interviewees was
available.  While every effort  was made to recruit  as many interviewees as possible,
there is an inherent selection bias as some potential interviewees are more likely than
others  to  participate.  For  example,  those  directors  which  had  a  vested  interest  in
publicising their  point  of  view or  sought to  protect  their  reputation,  might  be more
willing to come forward. Also, those that are not currently in a demanding role are more
likely  to  be  able  and  interested  in  participating  in  this  research.  In  contrast,  those
directors which considered that they had more to lose from participation that they would
gain are highly unlikely to respond to a request for an interview. Thus there is a self-
selection bias within the interview sample.
Further to the issue of selective information provided by the interviewees, is the
problem of interviewees recalling their memory to relay past events, some of which are
by now 20 years ago. It is possible that their recount of stories is not necessarily the full
account  of  what  happened.  As  the  stories  are  recounted  from  past  events,  some
interviewees may also have forgotten particular details and have, over the years, gone
through a sense-making process. The events recounted could therefore be made through
'rose-tinted glasses' and further are a subjective, and selective, rather than an objective,
and complete, recollection of events. As such, interviewees may have been less than
candid  in  the  opinions  they  expressed  and  may  have  expressed  views  which  are
perceived as socially desirable and representative of what they believe the researcher
wishes to hear (Saunders et al., 2012).
These limitations however can’t be avoided, but need to be taken into account when
analysing the data and can be somewhat addressed through comparing and contrasting
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the views of  interviewees of the same period. Furthermore,  the researcher  is  told a
recollection of memories and interviewees have gone through a sense-making process
of their memories in the past, thus taking these memory fragments to form a coherent
and logical  interpretation of  their  experiences.  These stories  are  then relayed to  the
researcher through the interview process. To the researcher though, the interviews form
story fragments, which he combines to create a coherent and logical story of events.
This repetitive recombination of story fragments into coherent stories creates a situation
where bias, both from the interviewee as well as the researcher, may alter the story in a
way which does not resemble actual events. Nevertheless, these limitations associated
with  interviews  were  lessened  by  conducting  face-to-face  interviews  using  a  semi-
structured  interview  technique.  Face-to-face  interviews  allow for  verbal  cues  to  be
identified  and  help  develop  a  better  rapport  and  trust  between  the  researcher  and
interviewee. In addition, it is important to reach a saturation point with interviews, that
is, the point when interviewee stories resemble each other and thus the researcher can be
confident that the data gathered sufficiently approximates actual events.
4.4.2  The Limitations of Documents
The data sources for this research included the use of previous literature, and annual
reports as well as other documents produced by Bradford & Bingley for public use.
Whilst  documents  produced  by  an  organisation,  for  example  official  company
publications, are known to be an influential and valuable communication medium for
reporting information, it is possible that the information provided in these documents
may contain subjective information in an attempt to convey a message or influence
someone’s point of view. Similarly, newspaper articles are not without bias insofar as
the author of these makes choices on the language and content of the articles. Hence,
Atkinson  &  Coffey  (2011) argue  that  documentary  sources  are  not  transparent
representations  of  organisational  decision-making  processes  or  practices,  with  Platt
(1999), arguing that the authenticity of documents have to be established in order for
them to be fully and correctly understood. Furthermore, another limitation of documents
is the availability of the desired documents and the researcher’s decision of when to stop
searching (Platt, 1999).
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4.4.3  Reliability and Validity of the Research
Reliability and validation of research is an important criteria in establishing and
assessing the quality  of  research.  As reported in  Section  4.3.3 transcripts  were read
several times to pick up any missed quotes or words in the first instance. Moreover, the
findings of some of the interviews were validated by asking follow-up questions to
respective interviewees. In verifying the findings the researcher can be more confident
of their validity. This is known as respondent validation (Silverman, 2011).
Furthermore, in enhancing the reliability and validity of this research, triangulation
was employed. Triangulation is a strategy for improving the validity and reliability of
research  or  evaluation  of  findings.  It  is  defined  as  ‘a  validity  procedure  where
researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information
to form themes or categories in a study’ Cresswell & Miller (2000, p. 126).  Mathison
(1988) further argues that
“Triangulation  has  arisen  as  an  important  methodological  issue  in
naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation [which] have demanded
attention  to  controlling  bias  and  establishing  valid  propositions  because
traditional  scientific  techniques  are  incompatible  with  these  alternate
epistemologies.”
(p. 13)
Hence, in employing the use of triangulation in this research, documentary data was
used in order to corroborate and support the interview data.
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4.5  Summary
This chapter has presented a discussion of the research design and method of this
thesis. The case study approach together with the interviews conducted were discussed
in this chapter. Furthermore, the data sources and data collection methods employed in
this research were presented, as well as the limitations involved in using these sources.
The next chapter,  Chapter  5, is the first of the two empirical chapters in this thesis. It
examines  Bradford  & Bingley  in  the  corporate  governance  life  cycle  in  the  period
between 1996 – 2010.
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Chapter 5
5  Bradford & Bingley in the Corporate Governance Life-
Cycle
5.1  Introduction
This chapter places Bradford & Bingley’s recent history in the organisational life-
cycle  model and explores how its  governance structures  evolved while  transitioning
between the life-cycle stages. It argues that demutualisation was almost inconsequential
in  affecting the major  governance changes  within the firm,  and argues  how, after  a
change in leadership, the firm reset in 1996 and started a new life-cycle stage and then
again entered a new life-cycle stage in 2008 with nationalisation of the bank.  Finally, it
is shown how corporate governance in each of the two life-cycle phases changed in
accordance with strategic and organisational needs.  Of particular interest is how, in the
process of this change, Bradford & Bingley reinvented itself by changing its business
model, thus entering a different life-cycle stage in 1996 and again in 2008.  The account
is based on an alternative analysis of official documents such as annual reports, press
releases,  AGM documents,  news  stories  and  interviews  with  top  management  team
members  with  knowledge of  events.   In  doing so,  research  question  one:  How did
Bradford  & Bingley  adapt  its  governance  structures  during  the  different  corporate
governance life-cycle stages in the Period 1995 – 2010? is answered. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows.  The following Section  5.2
discusses  Bradford  &  Bingley's  compliance  with  UK  corporate  governance  codes
between 1995 and 2010.  Then, Section 5.3 defines the four distinct periods of Bradford
& Bingley's development between 1995 – 2010.  Then, each of the periods is discussed
separately.  Period 1, Section 5.4, addresses governance and strategic changes between
1996 and 2004, that is, during the tenure of Christopher Rodrigues and demutualisation.
Period 2,  Section  5.5,  focuses  on the firm's reorganisation between 2004 and 2006,
following a strategic review by the new management team.  Lastly, Period 3, Section
5.6, briefly discusses the years 2006 to 2008 with Period 4, Section  5.7, dealing with
events  post-nationalisation.  The  four  periods  are  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the
78
governance  function  of  monitoring  at  Bradford  &  Bingley  in  Section  5.8.   The
governance function of monitoring is discussed in a separate section, as it mainly draws
on  interviews  with  directors  and  thus  focuses  on  contrasting  monitoring  between
Periods 1 and 4.  Section 5.9 will then link the findings to existing literature in the field.
Finally, Chapter 6 will complement this chapter by focusing on the informal aspects of
Bradford  &  Bingley’s  governance  structures  using  the  upper  echelons  theory  by
investigating top management team cohesion and decision-making.
5.2  Bradford & Bingley's compliance with the UK Corporate 
Governance Code
In Chapter 3, a discussion on the UK corporate governance codes was presented.  In
showing how Bradford & Bingley complied with these codes, this section presents a
discussion on how the codes were adhered to within the relevant period, in particular
between the years 1995 and 2010.
Until conversion to plc status in 2000,  Bradford & Bingley followed the Building
Societies Commission (BSC) Code of Practice on Governance (BSC Code) which was
issued in 1992 and updated in 1998.  However, in preparation for demutualisation at the
end of 2000, B&B began implementing governance guidance relevant to listed firms,
such  as  the  recommendations  of  the  Turnbull  Report  (1999)  regarding  systems  of
internal control. In this regard, the Society began setting up a number of committees to
deal with issues of risk and internal control.
Thus, while B&B was not subject to corporate governance codes aimed at listed
companies  before  2000  (see Table  B in Appendix,  page  226),  the  Society followed
applicable guidance from the Building Societies Commission instead. In particular, the
BSC  Code  (1992,  1998)  is  an  amended  version  of  the  relevant  UK  Corporate
Governance Code. Thus the Society was required to report  on its  governance in its
annual reports. For example, in the 1999 Annual Report it is stated that: (a) the board
has met at least once a month, (b) the role of the chief executive and chairman is held by
different people, (c) there are more non-executive than executive directors on the board,
(d) the board reviews its constitution regularly and (e) all directors have access to paid-
for, independent, external advice (p. 17).
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With demutualisation in December 2000, Bradford & Bingley now had to apply the
Combined Code, and at  financial  year end 2003 (December 31), the bank was fully
compliant with the Combined Code (1998). The bank was however not fully compliant
with  the  Combined  Code (July  2003),  which  contained the  substance  of  the  Higgs
Review, as well  as the Smith Review of audit  committees, though it  adhered to the
substance of recommendations regarding board composition, as well as having an audit
committee  and  nominated  a  senior  independent  director  (SID).  Furthermore,  with
regards to the Tyson Report, Bradford & Bingley judged that “The five Non-executive
Directors  bring  wide  experience  from  varied  backgrounds  to  the  workings  of  the
Board” (Annual Report 2003, p. 27). Board room diversity, and the directors’ view of
diversity, is discussed in more detail in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4.2.
Thus,  with  nationalisation  and  delisting  the  Combined  Code  on  Corporate
Governance no longer applied to Bradford & Bingley. However, in its annual report
2008 the company stated that it intends to continue to follow the code as far as practical.
The new governance structure is set out in the ‘Framework Document’ agreed between
the company and its sole shareholder, HM Treasury. In following the Combined Code,
the bank continued to operate an audit, nominations and remuneration committee, and
retained the responsibility for maintaining the system of internal controls. Since 2008,
the  Framework  Document  and  governance  arrangements  have  been  updated  in
accordance with changing governance best practice. As such a separate Risk committee
was  set  up as  a  result  of  the  Walker  Review (2009).  Bradford & Bingley  has  also
continued to separate the role of the chairman and chief executive, and has more non-
executive  than  executive  directors  on  the  board.   In  addition,  all  principal  board
committees are fully staffed by non-executive directors and an induction and training
program  for  new  directors  has  been  maintained.  However,  Richard  Pym,  who
previously was chief executive of Bradford & Bingley from August to November 2008
and  executive  chairman  from  November  2008  until  June  2009,  is  listed  as  an
independent non-executive director.
5.3  Defining Periods and Events: 1996 – 2010
In  this  section  distinct  and  identifiable  periods  are  established  to  facilitate  the
discussion of the corporate governance life-cycle of Bradford & Bingley. Using Miller
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& Friesen's (1984) five stage model, Bradford & Bingley's history between 1995 and
2010 is assessed using available documents and interviews.  Establishing events that led
to  transitions  between  life-cycle  stages  facilitates  the  discussion  of  the  corporate
governance changes within and between each stage.  Table 5.1 below summarises the
break-down of the years 1995 – 2010 into life-cycle stages and sub-periods used in the
discussion throughout this chapter.
Life-Cycle
Stage Period Strategic Theme Stakeholders
Strategic
Environment
Stage 3:
Maturity Before 1995 Stability
Current Members
Future Members Low Velocity
Stage 4:
Revival
Change of CEO
Period 1
1995 – 2004
Commercialisation
Professionalisation
Demutualisation
Current Members
Future Members
Shareholders
High Velocity
Change of CEO
Period 2
2004 – 2006 Restructuring Shareholders High Velocity
Restructuring Complete
Period 3
2006 – 2008 ‘Stability’ Shareholders High Velocity
Stage 5:
Decline
Nationalisation
Period 4
2008 – ongoing Decline
Taxpayers
UK Banks
Bond Holders
Low Velocity
Based on: Miller & Friesen (1984), Filatotchev et al. (2006)
Table 5.1: The 4 Periods of Bradford & Bingley since 1996
As seen in Table 5.1, in 1995 the firm was a steady, slow moving business.  Though
the firm had already moved away from only selling prime mortgages by engaging in
commercial lending to small and medium-sized businesses, at its heart is was still  a
Northern-based Building Society.  At this point in time, Bradford & Bingley was firmly
set in Stage 3 of the corporate governance life-cycle.  It was a mature business with a
substantial asset base and an established strategy.
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Period 1
The  changing  competitive  landscape  required  new  skills  and,  realising  that,
Geoffrey Lister took early retirement to enable the Society to reposition itself1.  The
choice fell on Christopher Rodrigues to succeed Lister, who had been CEO for 11 years.
Thus the year 1995/1996 delineates the crossover from one period to another.  Section
5.4 will  discuss  how  Bradford  &  Bingley  evolved  during  this  period  and  how  its
governance functions changed.
Periods 2 & 3
The departure of the incumbent CEO in 2004 provided an opportunity for the bank
to reassess its position and strategy during the previous eight years.  As a consequence
of this review, again sweeping changes in strategy and the top management team were
implemented,  as  discussed  in  Section  5.5 and  Section  5.6.  These  two  periods  are
distinct, even though the same CEO and vision of the firm were in place, in that the
during the  first  period  major  changes  in  the  strategy and size of  the business  were
implemented, while the second phase saw the bank executing their strategy.  As will be
argued in this chapter, the first three periods together form the life-cycle stage 'Revival'
during  which  the  bank  fundamentally  transformed  itself  in  an  attempt  to  revive  its
fortunes and remain competitive in the market place.
Period 4
Finally, external events in 2007/08 led to another watershed moment that would
change the face of the company even more dramatically than at any previous time in its
long history.  Nationalisation in 2008 meant another, even larger reorganisation of the
firm  and  transition  into  a  new  stage  of  its  life-cycle.  Section  5.6 investigates  the
corporate governance changes during this period. Thus the transition into a new life-
cycle stage is marked by a cataclysmic event, that abruptly ends the revival life-cycle
phase, but also has substantially influenced the future direction of the firm.
1 Director Z
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5.4  Period 1: Performance Enhancement & Demutualisation 1996 
– 2004
This  section  investigates  how Bradford  & Bingley's  strategy,  financial  resource
needs and board composition changed during the period 1996 – 2004.  It does so by
discussing, in turn, the three governance functions of strategy, financial and knowledge
resource and their interdependencies.  Again, the governance function of monitoring is
discussed separately in Section  5.8, as its focus is on contrasting monitoring between
Periods 1 and 4.  Thus, first, this section briefly summarises the state of the society prior
to 1996, before exploring how the selection of a new chief executive impacted strategy,
and  consequently  financial  resource  needs,  and  finally  how  the  board  of  directors
changed  during  this  period,  as  a  driver  and  result  of  strategic  and  organisational
changes.
Prior  to  1995 interviewees  describe  the  society  as  “cosy”2 with  an  “autocratic
leadership style”3 and an emphasis on customer care and care for employees.  Although
its top management team would primarily consist of  “the good and the great of the
area”4, though with growth of the national branch network5 and increasing competition
in the 1980s and 1990s this would begin to change.  During the late 1980s and early
1990s competition in the market place increased substantially (see Chapter 2 for a brief
history of building societies) which prompted the society to hire its first board member
with financial expertise in the person of J Lindsay Mackinlay.  Lindsay Mackinlay was
Director of Finance at Rowntrees plc until 1989 and subsequently joined the board of
Bradford & Bingley in 1990 and replaced Donald Hanson as Chairman in 1995.
2 Director D
3 Director A
4 Director D
5 See Figure 2.1 on page 15 for a chart of mergers of Bradford & Bingley Building Society between
1964 – 2000
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The Board further realised that, in order to compete, the Society had to become
more  commercial  and professional,  that  is,  to  move away from its  existing  “cosy”
environment.  This sentiment was conveyed strongly in several interviews6.
In order to study the nature of changes and how they impacted on the governance
functions,  a  closer  investigation  of  these  governance  functions  is  necessary.   The
following paragraphs explore, in further detail, how strategy and resource needs adapted
during this period 1996 – 2004.
5.4.1  Strategy
“Looking ahead, it is certain that the shape of our industry and the markets in
which  we  operate  will  continue  to  change.   A  small  number  of  building
societies may decide to pursue their business in different ways … Bradford &
Bingley's  position remains firm.  Our future is  as an independent  building
society providing the best possible service to all our members.”
J Lindsay Mackinlay, Annual Report 1995, Chairman’s Statement
Christopher  Rodrigues,  appointed  CEO in  1996,  reviewed  the  existing  strategy,
products and personnel.  In the course of this review it became clear to the Board that,
in order to survive, the Society would need to adapt its strategy, that is, to reduce cost
and find a market niche which generates good returns at acceptable risk.  Furthermore,
the  existing  product  portfolio  was  uncompetitive,  as  explained by one  interviewee7.
Lastly, personnel had to adapt to the new situation, which led to a reduction in staff
count through early retirement and incentive packages.  As one Board Member put it:
“25% of the people [are] waiting for the change and feeling liberated,  25% of the
people … resisting change and they have to move on because … you and they are not
fitting any more and then 50% of people on the fence and they have to be pushed over
the  fence  to  come  down  on  the  side  for  change,  so  getting  that  going  is  a  real
challenge”8.   However,  changes  in  staff  were  not  limited  to  the  lower  ranks,  some
6 Director D, X, Z
7 Director X
8 Director X
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members  of  the  senior  management  and  executive  also  did  struggle  with  the  new
direction and consequently left the company9. The following paragraphs will investigate
how Bradford & Bingley's strategy changed between 1996 and 2004 driven by internal
and external events.
Strategy as a Building Society
Initially in 1996 when Christopher Rodrigues joined the board as chief executive,
he announces that the firm will “cut cost, simplify processes, upgrade systems, invest in
staff, reduce overheads”10 over the next years.  The year 1997 then saw the first major
impact of the new CEO when Mortgage Express was purchased from Lloyds TSB in
May for a consideration of £64m11.  The acquisition pushed the firm into new markets
and enabled it to reach a new customer base.
“the reason we migrated  into Mortgage Express,  which  had the buy-to-let
portfolio,  was  twofold.   Firstly  because  you  could  still  make  money  and,
although we were a mutual, we have to have a surplus.  Secondly because,
contrary  to  what  people  wrote,  for  the  most  part  buy-to-let  lending  is  a
perfectly manageable risk.”
Director X
“the strategic thinking was we were never going to be the biggest Lender and
therefore we had to be ..., selective, we had to be ... a more important player in
certain sections of the overall market”
Director Z
“we  had  quite  a  lot  of  branches  but  we  were  heavily  northern  based,
Mortgage Express redressed that”
9 For example, John Wrigglesworth, John Smith; The chief executive with a taste for the unpredictable,
The Independent, November 1, 2000; Andrew Garfield
10 Annual Report 1996, Chief Executive’s Statement
11 Mortgage Express  was a lender specialised in  the provision of  specialist  mortgages for  the self-
employed and buy-to-let landlords.
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Director Z
Acquisitions  coupled  with  the  set  goal  of  growing  Bradford  &  Bingley  by  50
percent over the next four years signals the end of the old Bradford & Bingley Building
Society business model.  This  shift in strategic emphasis  is further underlined by the
changing description of the company’s core business activities over time reflecting the
evolution of its strategy.  This is clearly set out in the annual reports which evidences
the  evolution  of  Bradford  &  Bingley’s  business  model  from  “providing  mortgage
finance” (1995,  1999) to  “selective lending on residential  & commercial  property”
(2000) and “lending on residential & commercial property” (2003).  Over the course of
four  years  (1999-2003)  the  firm  moved  from  providing  mainly  prime  residential
mortgage  products  to  mainly  offering  selective  residential  lending  (buy-to-let,  self-
certified).   Finally in 2003, the  'selective' attribute of its  residential  and commercial
lending is dropped; buy-to-let and self-certified lending are the new normal.
Demutualisation
While  the  management  board  was  very  aware  and  supportive  of  the  strategic
changes required to maintain the competitiveness of the organisation,  they were not
supportive of demutualisation.  As one interviewee put it: “this is not what I signed up
for.” However, board members recognised that the transition to plc status was inevitable
as reflected in this quotation:
“about a week after the vote to demutualise, one of the big questions was the
culture, the whole organisation was defending Mutuality.  And we lost.  And so
we had to get the organisation to turn round, so [we] had to … explain to
[staff] that the goalposts were now in the other direction.”
Director X
Further to the external drivers forcing strategic change onto Bradford & Bingley,
the indirect impact of external events (pressures) was felt through the changing stance
of members on mutuality.  In the year 1998 a resolution at the AGM led to members
voting in favour of demutualisation.  The Board had no choice but accept the members’
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verdict12.  Board members had advocated mutuality but “had to … explain to staff that
the  goalposts  were  now  in  the  other  direction”13.  This  added  further  pressure  to
accelerate  the  strategic  changes  being  introduced  to  the  organisation.   Bradford  &
Bingley was set to float on December 4th 2000.
These changes brought into the Society are reflected in the firm's strategy as stated
in  the  Annual  Report  2000:  “[a]  key  part  of  our  strategy  is  to  develop  alliances,
partnerships and joint ventures”, for example, distribution agreements with Tesco and
Freeserve14, as well as the outsourcing of mortgage application processing15 to Alltel.
Furthermore, management was also focusing attention to remodel the Society as a plc.
More specifically it was introducing  “a more selective approach to lending, effective
cost  control  …  and  widening  interest  margins  in  preparation  of  paying  our  first
dividend to shareholders.”  And  “[everything is  in  place to  evolve]  from a mutual
manufacturer of lending and savings products into an innovative, growing distributor …
of financial services manufactured by many different suppliers.” These statements made
in 2000 are fundamentally different from those made in 1996 when the focus was on
cutting costs and process improvements.
As the  board  of  directors  implemented  the  strategic  change to  transform to  plc
status, they still retained some of the ethos of mutuality, in particular customer focus.
One interviewee recounted something a colleague had told him after demutualisation:
“there [is] very little difference between a commercial mutual and a customer oriented
public  company”16.  Furthermore,  several  interviewees  remarked  that  even  though
shareholders were the new owners and the firm was now run for their benefit17, it would
12 Director Z
13 Director X
14 Former UK internet service provider
15 Not to confuse with credit scoring applicants
16 Director X
17 “The  board  believes  that  profitability,  the  shareholders'  ultimate  concern,  is  best  served  by
continuing to satisfy customers' needs. To meet these twin goals we need to deliver sound financial
performance and continue the transformation of our business from tied manufacturer to independent
retailer of financial services. At the same time, we will continue to focus our Lending & Savings
business on delivering profitability rather than market share.” (Annual Report, 2000, p. 5)
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be futile to not put customers first.  Only a successful firm that satisfies customer needs
ultimately serves its shareholders.
Strategy as a plc
The years 2001 – 2003 saw less activity in acquisitions, disposals and joint ventures
with the focus moving to  consolidating the strategic and operational changes  of the
preceding years.  Statements in the annual reports between 2001 – 2003 clearly show
the aims of the bank in this period were to “become the UK’s leading specialist lender
and an innovative retailer of property and financial services” (2002), to “continue the
transformation of its main mortgage lending business“ (2003), and to  “replace high
margin traditional mortgage lending, ..., with a portfolio of selective secured lending.
The margins on selective lending are lower than those achieved on the old building
society back book but above margins on new mainstream mortgage lending.” (2003)
In  summary,  at  the  beginning of  this  period  in  the  early  1990s  external  events
pushed the need for change.  The board of directors first step to adapt the firm to the
changing competitive and regulatory environment was to appoint a chief executive of
whom they believed to possess the desired skills.  The decisions the board took during
the  years  1996  –  2003  transformed  the  company  from  what  was  substantially  a
mortgage and savings business into a financial retailer and specialist lending institution.
Demutualisation made the focus on change implementation more pressing while fierce
competition  in  the  primary  mortgage  market  made  Bradford  &  Bingley  rethink  its
strategic options.
This discussion, though, reveal another truth about the strategic options of Bradford
& Bingley.  While its traditional building society book was still generating substantial,
albeit diminishing, returns for the bank due to historically higher interest rates, these
mortgages were expiring and/or refinanced and consequently profitability was suffering.
As illustrated above, the firm moved its primary lending activities to selective lending.
The implication of this strategic decision is that the bank needed to replace every £1 of
legacy  lending  with  more  than  £1  of  new  specialist  lending  to  at  least  maintain
profitability.  Thus the announcement in 1997 of an intention to grow the business by 50
percent over the next four years should also be viewed in light of this strategic necessity.
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A further implication of this strategic necessity is the impact on the risk profile of the
loan  book  where  specialist  lending  is  inherently  more  risky  than  prime  mortgage
lending.  In summary, the bank had to replace safe prime mortgages with a high rate of
return with less safe specialist mortgages with a lower rate of return.
5.4.2  Resource
This  section  examines  how the  resource  needs  of  the  firm,  driven  by  strategy,
evolved during the period 1996 – 2004.  It has been noted that prior to 1996 Bradford &
Bingley was a mature, stable business, firmly rooted in its mature phase of the life-
cycle.   The  arrival  of  the  new chief  executive  resulted  in  a  change  of  strategy  as
discussed above.  As a result of this strategic repositioning, a new set of resource needs
arose with a different profile.  In this section the financial resource needs of the firm are
discussed first and then the knowledge resource needs are examined.
Finance
In  1996  Bradford  &  Bingley  is  Britain's  5th largest  Building  Society  with  a
substantial asset base and a large number of customers.  Its financial resource needs are
low  as  it  generates  sufficient  returns  to  finance  its  current  business.   This  section
explores how the financial resource needs of the firm have evolved as a result of the
strategic changes introduced.
As a Building Society, Bradford & Bingley was required by the Building Societies
Act  to  finance  its  lending  almost  exclusively  through deposits18.   This  requirement
changed  with  demutualisation,  and  consequently  Total  Loans  and  Advances  to
Customers began to diverge from Total Customer Deposits.  Furthermore, the ceasing of
lending in the prime mortgage market created two opposing forces driving Total Loans:
(a)  the  run down of  the  prime mortgage  book and (b)  the  growth of  the  specialist
mortgage  book  through  Mortgage  Express  and  purchases  of  third-party  originated
mortgages.  Table 5.2 summarises the financial position of the firm during this period.
18 The limit of non-deposit funding was set to 25% in the 1986 Building Societies Act and subsequently
raised to 50% in 1997 (after the majority of societies had demutualised/taken steps to demutualise).
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A further influence on Total Deposits is demutualisation and the speculation thereof
prior to the year 2000.  Carpetbaggers invested substantially in Bradford & Bingley
prior to demutualisation, and especially prior to the vote to demutualise.  The size of the
inflow of  speculative  savings  balances  was  revealed  in  2001  after  demutualisation,
when Total Deposits recorded an outflow of almost £1.5bn.
The  increased  flexibility  in  financing  its  lending  after  conversion,  especially  in
respect to securitisation and debt gearing is actively exploited by the firm.  Thus the
years 1996 to 2001 saw a doubling of debt; however deposits increased in line with
lending.  Then, during the years 2002 and 2003 the resource needs seemingly increased
again with another doubling of debt.  Further, during 2003 the firm acquired a large
portfolio of loans from GMAC for a consideration of £1.4bn and originated loans worth
£3.9bn.  These transactions were largely financed by £3bn of new short term debt, as
well as  £1.5bn of medium term debt.  However, in its annual reports the firm did not
openly speak about the need to attract more funding to grow, though its desire to grow
its  assets  was  articulated  on  several  occasions,  as  discussed  above  in  the  Strategy
section.
In  summary,  the  years  1996 – 2001 were a  period  of  consolidation  rather  than
expansion.  With the abatement of the dotcom crisis  the years 2002 and 2003 were
marked by a substantial expansion of loan advances to customers financed through short
and medium term debt.
90
Table 5.2: Lending & Funding: 1995 – 2003
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total Loans £12,507 £13,753 £16,123 £17,322 £18,450 £19,694 £18,737 £20,506 £24,792
Funding:
Total Deposits £11,990 £12,733 £14,155 £16,124 £17,487 £17,584 £16,105 £16,615 £17,171
Debt: £2,379 £2,934 £2,990 £3,061 £4,021 £4,348 £4,762 £5,768 £10,323
Repayable  in:
<=1 year £972 £1,053 £935 £1,186 £1,787 £1,546 £1,856 £2,055 £5,021
1-2 ye ars £156 £148 £575
£1,836
£478 £685 £555 £1,040 £1,558
2-5 ye ars £1,025 £1,392 £1,335 £1,756 £2,112 £1,621 £2,414 £3,666
>= 5  ye ars £200 £313 £110 £5 £729 £260 £78
Equity £110 £110 £110 £110 £110 £174 £174 £174 £174
Reserves £844 £900 £966 £1,049 £1,144 £1,026 £1,101 £1,087 £1,127
Other Liabilities £200 £172 £238 £350 £350 £580 £580 £677 £1,122
Building Society
Notes
plc
*All numbers in £m | *Based on Group Accounts
Knowledge
Under the corporate governance life-cycle, the resource, strategy, and governance
needs of  the firm change throughout  each life-cycle  stage and therefore have to  be
adjusted from time to time.  One implication of this is that it is important to examine
board turnover19.  Therefore this section considers the main structural changes in respect
of the board of directors20.
Two  key  factors  impacting  strategy  change  were  examined  above;  increasing
competition, resulting in the commercialisation and professionalisation of the firm after
1996,  and  demutualisation.   These  two  factors  impact  on  changes  on  the  board  of
directors, but a third impact factor for non-executive directors needs to be considered:
natural turnover through age and tenure.
Non-Executive Board Members
The first driver of board turnover for non-executive directors at Bradford & Bingley
is age and tenure, as described by one interviewee:
“It  was  a natural  process,  as  people  retired  they  were  replaced with  new
people who had the appropriate skills that were desired at the time”
Director A
19 Table D.2 in the Appendix (starting at page  248) lists details of all outgoing and incoming board
members.
20 It should be noted that in the next chapter the upper echelons theory is used to provide a framework
to further consider the experience of the outgoing and incoming board members and its impact on
board dynamics
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Thus  in  the  process  of  replacing  retiring  non-executive  board  members  an
opportunity arose to hire new members on the board with skills deemed to be required
by the firm.  Demutualisation, as the second driver of board turnover, has an impact on
board structure insofar as the requirements of the board of a plc by the regulator are
very different from those of a building society.  One interviewee, Director X, expressed
this as:
“The Building Society Commission ... thought the Board were nice people but
they weren't sure they knew enough.”
As the same interviewee continued, demutualisation further enhanced the pressure
to adapt the board to a plc environment:
“When you become a public company the FSA [ Financial Services Authority]
says  to  you  ...  your  Board  has  to  be  capable  of  governing  this  public
Company.  We are still your supervisor and regulator but don't expect us to do
the difficult stuff.”
In  the  late  1990s  it  is  striking  that  the  board  shifted  from being  composed  of
members with experience often in a field outside banking or the traditional building
society  business  to  a  board  with  significant  experience  in  finance,  accounting,  and
banking  (see  D.1,  page  251),  for  example  chairman  Mackinlay  was  the  first  board
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Table 5.3: Departing Non-Executive Directors
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Sir Neil McFarlane Age at retirement: 63   Tenure: 11 years
Lindsay Mackinlay Age: 66   Tenure: 12 years
Peter Flesher Age: 66   Tenure: 7 years
Diana Courtney Age: 63   Tenure: 10 years
Mark Smith Age: 63   Tenure: 9 years
Trevor Lewis Age: 66   Tenure: 13 years
member to join with significant experience in finance as the former Director of Finance
at Rowntrees21.
On the other hand, board members leaving were predominantly ‘Building Society
stalwarts’, non-financial, or “the good and the great of the area”22 such as Peter Flesher
(Yorkshire Water, Allied Colloids), Sir Neal McFarlane (former minister and MP), or
Geoffrey Lister (worked at Bradford & Bingley since 1963).  They were replaced by
directors with significant experience in the City, such as Rod Kent (Chairman, Close
Brothers), Nicholas Cosh, George Cox (later Director of IoD), Louise Patten (Marks &
Spencer, Bain & Co), or Ian Cheshire (Kingfisher).
Executive Board Members
Unlike for non-executive directors, where turnover was concentrated in the years
2002 and 2003 after the transition to plc status, turnover of executive directors happened
throughout the years.  Christopher Rodrigues engineered board turnover to introduce
executive board members with financial, strategic, and operational expertise to support
the new strategy23.  This saw the likes of Rosemary Thorne (Head of Retail Finance,
Sainsburys)  or  Keith  Greenough  (NatWest,  Lloyds  and Mortgage  Express)  join  the
executive team. 
As one interviewee put it:
“[Christopher Rodrigues] certainly didn’t surround himself with yes men but
he surrounded himself with people who he could trust and had either worked
with or knew of who could ... help his vision of developing the business”.
Director Z
During the early 2000s more changes could be witnessed.  Steven Crawshaw, who
had been with Bradford & Bingley for a number of years, initially as Flotation Director,
21 Director Z
22 Director D
23 Director Z
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prior to which he worked for Lloyds TSB, joined the board as director.  There was a
clear switch from a mix of occupational backgrounds to one that was heavily focused on
finance, investment banking, and financial services in general, which aligned with the
strategic repositioning of the bank.
In conclusion, a number of drivers existed that shaped the composition of the board.
These can be divided into internal and external factors24.  Internally, two factors were
most relevant: age and occupational experience.  The natural turnover process allowed
for the recruitment of new non-executive board members with the skills and experience
deemed necessary to move the firm forward.  This process was driven by the chairman
and his vision.  However, it also implied a time lag between the point in time when a
need to change is identified and the point when this need could be acted upon. (Lynall et
al., 2003)
The  impact  of  board  changes  on  strategy  and  resource  in  this  period  supports
Golden & Zajac (2001) who find that the board’s attention to strategy and its inclination
for  strategic  change is  positively  related  to  the  success  of  this  change.  The board's
inclination for change and its attention to strategy in the case of Bradford & Bingley is
manifested  in  its  decision  to  hire  Christopher  Rodrigues  for  strategic  reasons  and
increasing profitability (Table 5.6, page 105).
24 Based on Tichy (1980, p.169), in (Kimberly & Miles, 1980)
94
Table 5.4: Incoming Executive Directors
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Christopher Rodrigues Age when joining: 45   Background: Finance, Travel
David Woodcock Age: 59   Background: Mortgage Express
Kevin McGuinness Age: 51   Background: Bradford & Bingley
Rosemary Thorne Age: 47   Background: Retail Finance
Keith Greenough Age: 50   Background: Banking
Steven Crawshaw Age: 40   Background: Banking, Legal
Ian Darby Age: 40   Background: Mortgage, Finance
Robert Dickie Age: 44   Background: Banking
5.4.3  Summary
The  importance  of  resource,  especially  knowledge  resource  (in  the  form  of
directors’ skills and knowledge), during this period has been explored in this section.
The firm focused on operational improvements and product development, subsequently
introducing new products and business lines.  By establishing a competitive advantage
in specialist lending through these new products B&B successfully operated in a niche
of the competitive UK mortgage market.
The strategic change in the form of focusing on a particular section of the mortgage
market  is  linked to  the elevation of Lindsay Mackinlay to Chairman as well  as the
subsequent shift in agreement amongst board members that a new strategic direction is
necessary in order for the Society to continue trading successfully.  The agreement then
opened the door for the hiring of Christopher Rodrigues, a business outsider, as CEO.
Subsequently new executive and non-executive board members were recruited to adapt
the top management team to the needs of the firm.  The point of transition from the life-
cycle stage of Maturity to Revival is thus the introduction of a new CEO, which can not
be underestimated due to its impact on the firm's future.
Again  the  years  1996  –  2001  are  seen  as  a  period  of  consolidation  and
organisational change by directors rather than expansion.  In contrast, the years 2001 –
2003 saw Bradford & Bingley benefiting from this period of consolidation through their
aggressive expansion of their lending activities.
Based on the evidence presented in the sections above, it is reasonable to conclude
that  the  foundations  of  the  revival  of  the  firm  were  laid  through  a  change  in  the
knowledge resource, with knowledge resource being argued to be the primary driver in
the interplay of the governance functions of strategy, resource, and monitoring in the
organisational life-cycle.  Hence this period accords with the Revival stage as strategy
and resource  are  highly  important  during  this  period.  While  knowledge resource  is
relatively  more  important  in  the  beginning  of  the  period,  finance  resource  gains  in
importance towards the end. In terms of the relative importance of the three governance
functions this period is similar to Quadrant 1 of the four stage corporate governance
life-cycle model presented by Filatotchev et al. (2006). However, it also differs in that
Bradford & Bingley is a mature firm with a substantial asset base, brand name and large
95
network of branches, not a start-up. It also necessarily differs in terms of the importance
of monitoring due to being a financial institution, which is discussed in Section 5.8.
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5.5  Period 2: Strategic Renewal 2004 – 2005
This section discusses how Strategy and Resources changed in the period 2004 to
2005.  This  period,  although  relatively  short,  is  very  significant  for  the  future
development  of  the  business,  in  that  after  Steven Crawshaw succeeded  Christopher
Rodrigues  to  become CEO,  his  first  initiative  upon  succession  was  to  begin  a  full
strategic  review  of  the  Group.  Subsequently,  the  results  of  this  strategic  review,
published in May 2004, determined the reorganisation of the firm over the ensuing 18
months.
5.5.1  Strategy
The period 2004 – 2005, as stated in the introduction, is very important as it is
during this time that Bradford & Bingley fully transforms its operations into its final
form, prior to nationalisation.  In March 2004, Christopher Rodrigues resigns as CEO of
the bank.  Steven Crawshaw is then appointed as his successor with effect from March
31st.   In  the  press  release  announcing  the  change  of  board  composition  Steven
Crawshaw is quoted as saying:
“I am clear about our priorities in both the short and medium term and I am
confident in our strategy. My immediate emphasis is to continue to achieve
our growth objectives whilst improving our operational efficiency.”
Bradford & Bingley Press Release, 02/03/2004
However,  he  immediately  instigated  a  strategic  review  of  all  operations  which
concluded in May 2004, when the Board decided, as an overarching aim, to simplify the
business. To achieve this it would:
• Dispose of five non-core businesses
• Continue the emphasis on specialist lending
• Cut cost in the core business, and
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• Refocus and simplify its retail business.
In  order  to  achieve  this  aim,  all  non-core  businesses  were  disposed of,  that  is,
property  and  independent  financial  advice,  which  employed  approximately  half  of
Bradford & Bingley's workforce.  These lines of business, in the eyes of the board, had
a high cost gearing, high earnings volatility, insufficient scalability, insufficient synergy
with the rest of the Group, as well as consuming management time in excess of its profit
contribution25.
Again, in implementing this strategic review, there was a refocus and simplification
of the retail business.  This not only involved the reorganisation of branch management
structures,  simplification of  the  sales  process,  and performance management  of  low
productivity  advisers,  but  also  saw the  end  to  independent  financial  advice  (2004),
insurance  broking  (2004),  and  mortgage  broking  (2006).   An  agreement  was  also
reached with Legal & General at the end of 2004 to sell insurance products through
Bradford & Bingley branches26.  In effect, the firm continued to put more emphasis on
the performance of its  core lending business at  the expense of other business units,
which were disposed of.
Consequently,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  reorganisation 18  months  on,  the  chief
executive concluded that
“we went through substantial change and saw many challenges … the actions
we  undertook  to  simplify  and  reinvigorate  Bradford  &  Bingley  [were
successful].  We  have  become  a  stronger,  healthier  organisation  and  have
driven profit growth off that improved platform.”
Annual Report 2005, Group Chief Executive’s Review, p. 6
Indeed, this language of simplicity, health, strength, and reinvigoration can be found
in many documents and publications published by the bank during this time period (for
example, Preliminary Results 2005, Pre-Close Briefing June 22, 2006, Annual Report
25 Bradford & Bingley Annual Report 2004, p.4
26 Bradford & Bingley Press Release, 01/11/2004
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2006).  It further creates the impression that the firm was considered to be sick, slow,
and  unhealthy  prior  to  the  appointment  of  Steven  Crawshaw.   The  parallels  to  the
description of the firm found at the beginning of the previous period, that is, being cosy
as  well  as  in  need  of  professionalisation  and  commercialisation,  are  striking  (for
example, page 83)
5.5.2  Resource
The resource function is discussed next, focusing on the financial aspects and on the
changes on the board of directors and their impact on the future direction of the firm.
Finance
Funding The board sought to change the funding mix of the firm,  alongside the
operational changes, ostensibly to “significantly enhance our ability to source funding
from new and highly liquid financial markets”27 in effect to balance the funding needs
between wholesale, retail and secured funding.  This deliberate move to broaden the
sources of funding away from wholesale debt, however reduced the spreads the bank
was generating.   The reduction in  spreads  was due to  the higher  cost  of  retail  and
secured funding, as compared to wholesale.  The relatively stable debt levels shown in
Table 5.5 below underline this argument.
Prior to demutualisation, retail deposits were the main source of finance, while debt
became increasingly more important after conversion to plc status28.  Thus, to enter the
secured funding market, the firm set up a securitisation master trust with a  £9 billion
pool  of  mortgages  as  well  as  establishing  a  €2  billion  covered  Eurobond program.
However, the emphasis on securing retail funding was also strengthened.  Nevertheless
the focus seemed to have shifted from wholesale and retail funding to funding through
securitised, covered bond and wholesale markets “with an important contribution from
Savings” 29.  Therefore it is reasonable to state that these changes in funding, together
27 Annual Report 2004, Chairman’s Statement, p. 2
28 See also Table 5.2: Lending & Funding: 1995 – 2003, page 90
29 Annual Report 2005, Chairman’s Statement, p. 5
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with the strategic changes discussed above, imply that strong asset growth is highly
desired in the future.
Lending Bradford & Bingley considerably expanded its lending activities during
the period 2004 – 2005 growing loans by 20 per cent. (Table 5.5)  Lending primarily
focused  on  buy-to-let  and  self-certified  mortgages,  however  purchasing  third  party
mortgages played an increasingly significant part in expanding loan balances.  In effect,
over the course of the two years, Bradford & Bingley took  £2.5 billion of third party
mortgages on its books, constituting almost half of the increase in lending balances30.
Arrears The mortgage market, during this period, was not stable as increases in the
Bank of England interest rates, led to a partially difficult 2004 and first half of 2005.
However,  in  spite  of  these  unfavourable  conditions,  the  bank  claimed  to  have
maintained its  margins and credit  quality.   This claim was also made in spite of an
increasing level of arrears.  Arrears in the buy-to-let book, had increased from 0.25% in
2003 to  1.06% in  2005,  while  the  firm’s  total  loan  book exhibited  a  similar  trend,
30 For a summary of acquired third party mortgages see Table D.1, Appendix, page 242
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Table 5.5: Lending & Funding: 2003 – 2005
2003 2004 2005
Total Loans £25,855 £28,868 £31,127
Funding:
Total Deposits £17,171 £18,954 £21,050
Debt: £11,359 £14,939 £14,578
Repayable  in:
<=1 year £5,412 £5,629 £4,492
1-2 years £1,724 £2,398 £2,203
2-5 years £4,104 £6,314 £4,898
>= 5  ye ars £119 £598 £2,985
Equity £174 £187 £211
Reserves £1,127 £1,010 £1,130
Other Liabilities £1,122 £1,123 £1,165
Notes
*All numbers in £m | *Based on Group Accounts
* To enable comparability of results between 2003 
and 2004 Loans and Debt  in 2003 have been adjusted 
to include Loans and Advances to Customers subject  
to non-recourse funding and Non-recourse funding 
respect ively. Furthermore the breakdown of recourse 
funding by maturity has been est imated.
increasing arrears from 0.47% to 1.19%, with management stressing that the upward
trend was within its expectations.
Consequently, the bank remained confident in the health of its chosen markets (buy-
to-let,  self-certified)  and  was  looking  to  outperform  the  general  market  against  a
backdrop of record levels of employment in 2004 and rising interest rates.  It justified
its confidence by citing the structure of the mortgage market and, in particular, the still
high demand and low stock of available housing as reasons to be:
“confident that our arrears and bad debts will remain low as a direct result of
our conservative underwriting process and lending policies ensuring that the
quality of our loan books is maintained.”
Bradford & Bingley Annual Report 2005, Chief Executive's Review, p. 7
In summary, despite the increase in arrears and the first signs that the economy had
hit its peak, the bank nevertheless continued lending aggressively, albeit at a lower rate
than 2003, and was very active in securing funding.  At the same time management
pressed ahead with the simplification of  the business  model  with a  single focus on
specialist lending, that is, a higher risk strategy that promises better returns.  In addition,
it increased its efforts to attract more retail funding and took on debt in 2004.  However,
the first warning signs of what the future hold become apparent at this stage.  According
to  Mellahi (2005) organisational failure is a process involving four stages where the
eventual causes of failure are not apparent at their conception stage, but become more
so over time.  Thus, management’s reaction to the quadrupling of arrears in the buy-to-
let loan book could be interpreted in this light as an ignorance, or underestimation of, of
initial warning signs of possible problems ahead.
Knowledge
During  the  period  2004  –  2005  there  were  three  outgoing  and  two  incoming
directors.   Without  a  doubt  the  most  important  change  was  the  resignation  of
Christopher Rodrigues who left in order to become President and Chief Executive of
Visa International.  The departure of the incumbent CEO was unexpected at the time
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and  Bradford  &  Bingley  reportedly  could  not  match  the  salary  offered  by  Visa31.
However, the firm had succession plans in place32 and promoted Steven Crawshaw to
CEO.
Crawshaw's  knowledge of  the  bank and successful  running of  the  Lending and
Savings Division (2003 – 2004) gave him a full overview of all aspects of the business.
Prior  to  being  responsible  for  Lending  and  Savings,  Crawshaw  held  positions  as
Flotation Director (1999), as well as Director of Strategy, HR, and IT (2000 – 2002).
Especially as Director of Strategy, he exerted influence and was instrumental in shaping
the current strategy of the firm.  On his appointment he stated:
“This is very much a message of business as usual. The strategy emerged as
part of the flotation process and I have been working alongside Christopher
Rodrigues on that.” 33
“I am beginning at a time when a lot of regulatory fog is beginning to lift, that
is  the  time  when  you  can  accelerate  the  strategy  rather  than  continue  to
struggle with it.” 34
Interviewees described Steven Crawshaw as a “nice guy” and “well liked” and as a
“natural choice”35 as successor to Christopher Rodrigues.  However, it was also said
that he was not too fond of the retail-side of the business, something he had in common
with Chairman Rod Kent36. While his statements announcing an acceleration of strategy
can  be  understood  as  an  increased  emphasis  on  growth  of  lending,  which  will  be
witnessed between 2006 and 2008, the departure from the previous strategy of being a
31 Bradford & Bingley chief gains US visa; Rodrigues has a nice day after being poached on huge
salary, The Herald, March 3, 2004, p. 25, Karl West
32 Visa swipes Bradford & Bingley chief for the top job, The Guardian, March 3, 2004, p. 18, Heather
Tomlinson
33 Rodrigues quits B&B for Visa's golden gate 'Humongous' pay deal lures Bradford chief to head credit
card network, The Daily Telegraph, March 3, 2004, p. 38, Andrew Cave
34 Visa swipes Bradford & Bingley chief for the top job, The Guardian, March 3, 2004, p. 18, Heather
Tomlinson
35 Director X
36 Director X
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financial retailer, in spite of public comments to the contrary, indicates that Crawshaw
was looking to pursue his own vision of the firm.
Additionally, during the period 2004 – 2005, two other senior executive directors,
Ian Darby (Marketing – 2004) and Rosemary Thorne (Finance – 2005), left the board.
Both are said to have had an appetite for the top job themselves and were in contention,
but ultimately not successful37.
Thorne, the last board member remaining from the pre-demutualisation era, left the
firm in 2005 to be replaced by Christopher Willford.  While her failure to have been
chosen for the top job may have played a part in her leaving the business, other factors
most  likely  contributed,  especially  the  changing  strategy  of  the  firm.   Specifically,
Thorne's background in retail finance with Sainsbury's is not as relevant any longer with
a shift to becoming a specialist lender without other retail operations.  In interviews, it
was suggested that her conservative attitude, especially towards the treasury division,
may  not  have  been  in  favour  with  other  decision  makers  on  the  board.   As  one
interviewee put it:  “Rosemary was pretty tough on what she would let the Treasury
people do.  I think Treasury got a bit more excited after … she left”38.  Also, Christopher
Willford, her successor, had previously worked at  Abbey National and Barclays and
thus had a background in commercial banking and finance.
These departures are insofar significant, as they signal the end of the strategy of
being  a  financial  retailer.   Both  executives  were  supporters  of  Rodrigues  and  his
strategy.   Furthermore,  they  were  instrumental  in  shaping  and  executing  the  retail
strategy of the firm.  As already mentioned in Period 1 (page  87), a Chief Executive
seeks  to  surround  himself  with  executives  who  share  and  support  his  vision,  and
Crawshaw's  vision  and  strategy  of  the  firm  were  fundamentally  different  from  his
predecessor.
37 It's California here I come as Rodrigues hangs up bowler, Daily Mail, March 3, 2004, p. 83, Ruth
Sunderland
38 Director X
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5.5.3  Summary
Section 2 reviewed the changes to the governance functions of Bradford & Bingley
for the years 2004 – 2005, which were marked by a strategic reorientation after the
change of its chief executive. As discussed, the multi-level nature of changes on the
board, as well as the role of the CEO and Chairman, support the conclusions of Period
1, 1996 – 2004, that  Bradford & Bingley are in  the Revival  stage of  the corporate
governance life-cycle, signified by a high importance of strategy, continuing financial
resource needs and high profile changes on the board.
However, the lack of substantial interview data for this period creates difficulty in
assessing the internal changes and discussions that took place.  For example, who was
the driver of the new strategy and who opposed it?  How did the competition for the
CEO  post  affect  board  climate?  Anecdotal  evidence  from  interviews  suggests  that
Steven Crawshaw and Rod Kent were looking to streamline the business and focus on
specialist  mortgage  lending,  not  retail  finance.   As  these  changes  were  introduced
shortly after the incumbent CEO left, it then raises questions as to whether there were
underlying tensions on the board about the strategic direction prior to his departure.
Thus, does it then imply that Rodrigues was a very dominant figure?  Again, available
interview data does not support this, although there might be a variety of reasons as to
why, for example interviewees not willing to admit this as it would show a form of
weakness on their part.  Similarly, a battle for succession would seriously destabilise the
board, especially if senior executives such as the Finance Director are applying for the
position of CEO, but are in the end are left out in favour of a more junior executive
director.  Nevertheless, the changes that occurred during this period laid the ground for
Period 3, 2006 – 2008, which is discussed in the next section.
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5.6  Period 3: The Final Years 2006 – 2008
The period 2006 – 2008 marks Bradford & Bingley’s final years as an independent
bank, that is, after finalisation of its restructuring.  As with the previous section, the
majority of the discussion is based on official company publications and news reports.
The  main  objective  of  this  section  is  thus  to  illustrate  the  events  preceding
nationalisation, in particular, how the strategy of the firm affected its performance and
how its management was unable to act in response to the developing financial situation.
5.6.1  Strategy
Bradford & Bingley’s best ever year in terms of profits before taxation was 2005 as
can be  seen  in  Table  5.7.  Since  then  its  ability  to  convert  asset  growth  into  profit
steadily diminished.  The bank's business model during this and the previous period was
built on growing its market share in a selected number of specialist mortgage markets, a
direction  that  was  chosen  and  pursued  aggressively  as  an  outcome of  the  strategic
review undertaken in March/April 2004 and announced in May 200439 40. As previously
discussed, the strategic review led to a reorganisation and refocusing of the business
with 2006 being the first full fiscal year as a restructured organisation.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
£128.5 £154.7 £154.5 £237.1 £243.2 £257.1 £228.5 £263.5 £246.7 £126 £134.3
Building Society PLC Nationalised
Table 5.6: Operating Profits 1998 – 2008
The period 2006 until nationalisation in 2008, was when the firm executed the new
strategy.  During this period the firm described itself for the first time as “a UK based
financial  services  business,  focused  on  providing  specialist  mortgages  and  savings
products” (D.2, Appendix, page 251) whilst acknowledging its transformation from its
building society roots.  With the completion of its transformation the bank underwent no
39 New B&B chief looks for savings  The Guardian (London), April 28, 2004, City; Pg. 16, 329 words,
Heather Tomlinson
40 Bradford & Bingley conference call  Fair Disclosure Wire, May 19, 2004, Transcript; 6679 words
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further strategic changes, for example, entering new markets or acquiring or disposing
of business units, during the years 2006 to 2008.  Thus the primary areas of decision-
making for management therefore were lending strategy, discussed below, and funding,
discussed in the subsequent Finance Section.
Lending Strategy
After  a relative slowdown of asset  growth in 2004 and 2005, mortgage lending
accelerated until mid-2007, reaching a peak growth rate of 20.2 percent before slowing
down again in the latter part of the year, due to the impact of the financial crisis (see
Table 5.7 below for annual growth rates).  Steven Crawshaw, the CEO, commented at
the publication of interim results:
“Bradford & Bingley has delivered another strong performance in the first
half  and … we’ve  grown profits  by  10%. We’ve  achieved record  levels  of
lending and solid savings growth. Our pipeline of new business is at all-time
high levels … The drivers of the specialist markets and credit quality remain
robust.  We  continue  to  be  comfortable  with  the  market’s  expectations  of
underlying profit for the full year.”
Steven Crawshaw, July 26, 2007
At this point in time the firm firmly believed in continuing its growth through its
traditional channels, that is,  selling mortgages through its branch network, telephone
and internet, as well as by continuing to purchase mortgage portfolios from GMAC-
RFC and Kensington Group.  In this context a closer look at the net advances (gross
mortgages less redemptions,  Table 5.7) adds further detail to the strategic moves the
bank was undertaking in the run up to nationalisation.
In 2006 mortgage redemptions in the standard portfolio exceeded new mortgages by
£730 million.  However, in 2007, especially during the second half of the year, the firm
moves  back  into  originating  more  standard  mortgages  (as  opposed  to  specialist
mortgages), which is underlined by management comments relating to de-risking the
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business41.   At  the  same time the origination  of  self-certified  mortgages  is  reduced,
while buy-to-let mortgages are experiencing stable growth throughout 2006 and 2007.
Though less than in previous periods, Bradford & Bingley nevertheless added £2 billion
of mortgages in the second half of 2007 alone, at a time when the subprime mortgage
crisis was already well under way42.
At the beginning of 2008 we can observe a further slowdown in the origination of
mortgages  as  underlined  by  management  comments  made  in  April  and  May  that
“business  levels  [are]  lower  than  last  year  … but  in  line  with  our  plan” and  that
“supply has clearly become more constrained” 43.  Arrears were however reported to
have  continued  to  rise44,  albeit  “within  expectations”;  while  strong growth  of  £1.9
billion in savings deposits had provided fresh capital to the bank and reduced the need
for  a  capital  injection.   For  the  time  being,  there  were  no  fundamental  questions
regarding the bank’s strategy or position.  One analyst even commented: “As the mist
clears over the balance sheet, we do expect focus to return to the underlying business,
where the picture is resilient” (James Eden, Exane BNP Paribas)45.
41 Preliminary 2007 Bradford & Bingley plc earnings presentation  Fair Disclosure Wire, February 13,
2008; 13404 words
42 The financial crisis: a timeline of events and policy action  Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2009;
url: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf (accessed: 08/03/13)
43 Interim Management Statement, April 22, 2008
44 B&B says funding is secure despite rise in bad debt  The Independent (London), April 23, 2008,
Business; Pg. 36, 535 words, Sean Farrell (Financial Editor)
45 Bradford  &  Bingley:  We  are  not  in  financial  trouble,  lender  tells  shareholders  The  Guardian
(London), April 23, 2008, Financial Pages; Pg. 22, 496 words, David Teather & Graeme Wearden
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Table 5.7: Asset Growth 2005 – June 2008
In £bn 2005 2006 2007 2008 Interim
Total mortgage assets 31.1 36.1 40.4 42.2
12 month Change 7.45% 16.08% 11.94% 4.03%
Organic 1.3 2.6 4.1 1.7
+ Acquired 1.4 2.5 4.2 0.2
Net advances 2.7 5.1 8.3 1.9
+ Redemptions 4.5 5.2 5.8 2.5
Gross Advances 7.2 10.3 14 4.4
Note
* Table based on Interim Financial Statements
Continuing with the theme of lending, purchases of acquired mortgage books were
significantly scaled up during 2007 (Table 5.7).  Standard and other specialist mortgages
as well as self-certified mortgages were predominantly added in the first half of 2007,
whereas buy-to-let mortgages were mostly acquired in the latter half of 2007.  This is
insofar interesting as it shows that the bank considered these mortgages to be of lower
risk than self-certified, as underlined by management comments and the quarterly buy-
to-let confidence studies46.  It is evident that the bank's management was slow to react to
the slowdown of the economy and stress in the financial system.  Additionally, they only
attempted to reverse the lending strategy in 2008, long after Northern Rock's failure,
only changing strategy after arrears levels became alarming in May 200847.
Moreover, doubts regarding the viability of the bank's lending strategy had been
raised ever since the bank started investing in  buy-to-let  mortgages48.   Management
continued to pursue this strategy though, believing in the underlying quality of their
lending and acquired third party mortgages, as well as continuing market opportunities
in the buy-to-let market.  The bank continued following their strategy even at the end of
2007 and early 2008 despite the turmoil in world financial markets.
5.6.2  Resource
Finance
The financial situation of the firm started deteriorating in earnest in the second half
of 2007, but the seeds were sown much earlier.  At the core of Bradford & Bingley's
problems were investments  into  treasury and mortgage assets  that  were  made since
200249.
In terms of income and profitability the financial results  (Table 5.8 below)  reflect
how the new strategy was a positive driver of income in 2006 and part of 2007.  Net
46 For example, Myths about the Buy-to-let market, Bradford & Bingley, February 2007
47 The six days that almost broke the bank  The Sunday Times, June 8, 2008, Business; p. 11, John
Waples
48 See for example,  Notebook: B&B boss goes west, but what does he leave behind?  The Guardian,
March 3, 2004, p. 19
49 See Table D.1: Third Party Mortgage Transactions, page 242
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interest income kept increasing until the end of 2007, partially driven by increases in
interest rates and partially by still increasing volumes of lending.   However, reduced
net interest income is reported in the Interim Financial Statement 2008, which, despite
an increase in mortgage assets of £1.6 billion, strongly points at difficulties in collecting
on the mortgage advances made.  This is further underlined by the substantial increase
of loan impairment losses from £5.3 million in June 2007, to £22.5 million at the end of
2007 and £74.6 million by half-year 2008.
Arrears Arrears had been steadily increasing as a proportion of total lending as of
2004 (Table D.4, Appendix, page 250), largely due to successive interest rate rises and
an economic slowdown in the  middle  of  the  last  decade50.   The rapid  asset  growth
experienced by the bank at the end of 2006 and early 2007 resulted in a 15.5 percent
increase of arrears in the six months to June 2007.  Bradford & Bingley presented the
increase of arrears to be “expected and reflects the increase in the cost of borrowing [by
the Bank of England]”51.
Consequently  during  the  first  half  of  2008,  arrears  cases  increased  by  57%
representing 2.87% of outstanding loan assets.  A more dramatic picture emerges when
comparing organic (Panel A,  Table D.3, Appendix, page 249) and acquired mortgages
(Panel B).  As is presented in Table D.3, arrears in the organic mortgage book doubled
between mid-2007 and mid-2008.  The best performers here were 'standard and other
specialist  mortgages',  while  'buy-to-let',  which  represented  the  bulk  of  outstanding
lending, was a close runner up as the value of arrears almost doubled from 1.02% to
1.99%.  However, 'self-certified mortgages' were by far the worst performer, increasing
from an already high level of 2.41% in June 2007 to over 3% of outstanding mortgages
by June 2008.
50 The Bank of England increased interest rates in 2006 and 2007 from 4.5% to 5.75%.
51 Bradford & Bingley Annual Report 2007, Director's Report, page 13
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Table 5.8: Net Interest Income and Profit before Tax 2005 – June 2008
In £m 2005 2006 2007 2008 Interim
Net interest Income 469.3 510.2 547.7 246.7
Profit before taxation 263.5 246.7 126 -26.7
Again,  while  the  numbers  reported  in  the  organic  loan  book  were  poor,  their
performance  was  much  better  than  the  mortgages  acquired  through  forward  sales
agreements, even though management always maintained that acquired mortgages were
carefully  screened  and  adhered  to  the  same  underwriting  standards  as  organic
mortgages52.  Yet arrears for buy-to-let loans shot up from 1.64% to 5.06% and self-
certified loans increased from a high 3.02% to 5.16% between June 2007 and 2008.
Other mortgages performed even worse, shooting up from 3.32% to 7.07% (Panel B,
Table D.3, Appendix, page 249).
In  short,  the  full  scale  of  the  quality  of  lending  only  became  apparent  after
nationalisation when Bradford & Bingley incurred loan impairment losses of over £1.2
billion between 2008 and 2010.  Arrears levels also rose into the double digits (Panel B,
Table D.3, Appendix, page  249). Indeed interviewees with knowledge of the financial
and operational situation of the firm stated that the strategic focus was on sales and
volume, with credit quality secondary.
...what seemed to have happened is [that] before government ownership [the
focus] was on sales...
Director Y
Funding Even though the bank had always claimed to be fully funded into 2009,
doubts about its funding position had existed since 2007 with the trend of increasing
arrears.  Especially  the  bank’s  decision  to  sell  its  commercial  loan  and  housing
association book at loss53 54 raised questions about its liquidity and capital position55.
Though these were strongly denied by the bank, the fact that the two loan books, which
52 Interim Report 2007 (p.5): “Loans acquired via the forward sales agreements [from GMAC-RFC and
Kensington Mortgage Group Ltd] are similar in profitability and credit quality to those we originate
through our own channels.”
53 Bradford & Bingley moves to allay fears  Yorkshire Post, November 29, 2007, 243 words
54 4.2bn loan sale boosts B&B funds  Bradford Telegraph and Argus, November 21, 2007, Business,
343 words, Mark Casci
55 Paragon and B&B tackle the damage  Evening Standard (London), November 20, 2007, B; Pg. 29,
504 words, Nick Goodway, Hugo Duncan
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were amongst the bank’s best books, were sold at a book loss strongly pointed at the
need for liquidity56.
Two  factors  contributed  to  B&B's  funding  problems.  First,  wholesale  and
securitisation markets remained closed for all  banks and very few transactions were
actually completed.  The second factor was arrears levels which increased sharply in the
first quarter of 200857.  Additionally,  during mid-2008 the inadequacy of Bradford &
Bingley's  management  information  systems  was  exposed  when  the  Chairman  Kent
admitted that management was not aware of a change of the trading climate until  one
month after  the  end of  the  quarter58.  One report59 even insinuated  that  management
information systems hadn't  been updated since the days of demutualisation in 2000,
though  this  was  not  supported  by  interviewees  who  insisted  that  management
information had always been timely during their tenure.
“... we had sufficient management information of the quality to give us up-to-
date information on where our P&L [Profit and Loss] was, where our default
rates were … by the time it got to Board meetings ... that information was
there. I can never remember a time when they said ... ‘we don't know what's
going on here’.”
Director D
56 Bradford & Bingley sells mortgage books for 4.2 billion  Citywire, November 20, 2007, 363 words
57 Interim Report 2008 (p.4-5): 
“Arrears  have  continued  to  increase  as  expected  reflecting  tough economic  conditions,  and  we
anticipate this trend will continue throughout the second half.” 
“The credit impairment charge for the first half of the year was £74.6m (1H 2007: £5.3m). [...] £18m
relates to a number of organised mortgage frauds.” 
58 Kent said: “These facts did not show in the January or February accounts, and had scarcely showed
in the March figures, but by April it was far more pronounced. But we didn’t see these accounts until
the end of May.”
The new figures showed the bank had stumbled into an 8m loss for the first four months of the year,
compared with a 108m profit for the previous year.
The six days that almost broke the bank  The Sunday Times, June 8, 2008, Business; Pg. 11, John
Waples
59 Why the floating building societies’ shares went down: The wise pocketed their windfalls. But most
of those account holders who held on to their free shares have lost out  The Observer (London), June
8, 2008, Business; Pg. 4, 776 words, Heather Connon
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However,  that  management  information  systems were not  fully  adequate  at  this
point in time, is documented by Rod Kent explaining in an investor call that:
“I will commit … to improve our management game, particularly in the area
of  management  information  and  the  speed  of  financial  information  in  the
whole area of our communications.
B&B is an organisation used to a less dynamic environment in the past … I
see it as my job to bring a greater dose of realism and a real sense of urgency
to this company.”
Rod Kent, Investor Call, 02.06.2008, pp 1-2
Again, information regarding an imminent rights issue was published in the Sunday
Telegraph on April 13, 2008, stating that the bank had asked Citigroup for support in
raising capital, though no formal decision had been taken by the board at that time60.  In
response to the revelation, management released a statement the following day denying
any imminent rights issue:
“Contrary to press speculation, Bradford & Bingley announces that it is not
intending  to  issue  equity  capital  by  way  of  a  rights  issue  or  otherwise.
Bradford & Bingley has a strong capital base … and as a result of the Board's
conservative approach, has funded its business activities through 2008 and
into  2009.  In  the  current  market  environment,  the  Board  will  naturally
continue to monitor closely the balance sheet strength of the business and its
funding plans.” 
(Press Release, 14/04/2008, Statement re. Press Comment)
However, a month after the rumours were originally published, the bank announced
a £300 million rights issue, in order to “strengthen the Group's capital position and …
mitigate the impact of the previously announced reductions in the value of certain of the
60 Brown orders  crucial  bank summit  downing street  meeting comes  as  Bradford  & Bingley,  UK's
biggest buy-to-let lender, plots emergency rights issue to boost ailing balance sheet  The Sunday
Telegraph (London),  April 13, 2008 Sunday, City; pg. 1, 668 words,  Mark Kleinman and Louise
Armitstead, additional reporting by James Hall and Helen Powe 
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Group's  treasury investments”61, an  admission  by management  that  the firm was in
more difficulties than admitted so far and that the denial of any imminent rights issue
was not truthful62 63 64.  Consequently newspapers increased their criticism of “Bradford
& Bungle”65,  with The Telegraph and The Times being especially vicious after first
breaking the news on the rights issue in April, running eight separate stories in eight
days, including analyst comments such as:
“… the  real  reason for  B&B's  rights  issue  is  because  its  bad debts  have
increased  and  are  set  to  get  worse.  …  B&B  … refused  to  give  earnings
guidance for this year or next, … it believes its outlook is bleak.66
“It has been suggested to us that the B&B chief executive is 'out of his depth'
and we wouldn't disagree.” 67
At this point events took a turn for the worse.  Following the  £300 million rights
issue announced on May 14 priced at 82p per share, the share price approached 82p at
the end of May, before shareholders were scheduled to vote on the proposal.  The rights
issue was thus postponed to be restructured.  At the same time as the rights issue was
suspended, Crawshaw resigned as Chief Executive due to ill health68 69.  Then a deal to
sell a 23 percent stake of the bank to TPG Investments was announced on June 2 after a
61 Proposed 300m rights issue, Bradford & Bingley Press Release, 14/05/2008
62 Bradford & Bingley in 300m cash call to shareholders  Yorkshire Post, May 14, 2008, 383 words
63 Bradford and Bingley forced to ask shareholders for 300m  Yorkshire Evening Post, May 14, 2008,
381 words
64 Bradford & Bingley under fire over rights issue  The Guardian, May 14, 2008, 546 words
65 Viewpoint:  An  absurd  tale  from  Bradford  &  Bungle  The  Guardian  (London),  May  15,  2008,
Guardian Financial Pages; Pg. 29, 780 words, Nils Pratley
66 Crawshaw has nowhere left to U-turn  The B&B chief is under pressure to stand down over his rights
issue U-turn and his failure to diversify the bank's mortgage book  The Sunday Telegraph (London),
May 18, 2008, City; Pg. 6, 1033 words, Kathrine Griffiths
67 Crawshaw steers B&B into rights issue u-turn, Bank jumps on cash call bandwagon with greatly
discounted offering after denying plans to do so  Daily Telegraph, May 15, 2008, City; Pg. 5, 1103
words, Helen Power
68 Bradford & Bingley Press Release, 02/06/2014
69 Crawshaw's departure leads to reshuffle, Financial Adviser, June 5, 2008
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weekend of frantic negotiations70.  The deal included a revised rights issue priced at 55p
per share in addition to a £279 million investment by TPG. However, yet again the deal
did  not  finalise  as  Bradford  &  Bingley's  debt  rating  was  downgraded  by  Moody's
ratings agency on July 3rd, activating escape clauses for TPG.  This second failed rights
issue seriously damaged the reputation of the bank and its management71 72.
A third attempt to raise capital was announced on July 4 when the bank's largest
shareholders as well as other major UK banks agree to support a rights issue.  The new
rights issue, valued at 55p a share, was enlarged to £400 million to compensate for the
withdrawal of TPG.  The rights issue was finally approved on July 17, 2008.  As a
further sign of mistrust of the firm's management, it emerged that the rights issue was
subscribed by only 28 percent of shareholders73, due to UK banks taking up their agreed
share, and that the remainder was left with the underwriters74 75.  Retail investors did not
subscribe to the share offering.
Overall, these events left management in a very bad light.  With continuing rising
arrears and the outflow of savings funds from the firm of £300 million over two days
prior  to  nationalisation76,  regulators  finally  decided  to  nationalise  the  bank  on
September 27th 2008.
Knowledge
During 2006 and 2007 two board members left the firm, namely: Sales Director
Christopher Gillespie and Non-Executive Director Sir George Cox.  In their place Roger
Hattam (Operations  Director),  Mark Stevens  (Sales  Director),  and Michael  Buckley
70 The six days that almost broke the bank  The Sunday Times, June 8, 2008; Business, p. 11, John
Waples
71 The awful moment when B&B knew it faced potential panic  The Times, June 3, 2008; Business, p.
42, Patrick Kosking, Siobhan Kennedy, Christine Seib
72 In business there are lies, damned lies, and the art of misspeaking  The Daily Telegraph, June 4,
2008; City, p. 7, Jeff Randall
73 B&B rights issue 27.8% subscribed, Daily Deal, August 19, 2008, Neil Sen
74 Underwriters left with 72pc of rights issue, The Independent, August 19, 2008,  p. 42, Nick Clark
75 B&B debacle leaves backers with overhang, EuroWeek, August 22, 2008
76 Former B&B chief 'massively sorry' for demise of lender  The Independent, November 19, 2008;
Business, p. 44, Mathieu Robbins
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(Non-Executive Director)  joined the Board.  While the incoming executive directors
were very young, 38 and 39 respectively, the incoming non-executive director Michael
Buckley  had  substantial  experience  in  finance  having  previously  worked  in  senior
positions at Allied Irish Banks and also at the Irish Mission to the EU.  Thus, while Cox
was  replaced  by  another  experienced  and  well-networked  non-executive  director,
questions must be asked about the experience and suitability of the incoming executive
directors, especially given their young age.
Furthermore, the year 2008 proved to be more turbulent in terms of board turnover
with  Mark  Stevens  resigning  in  September  as  Director  of  Sales  due  to  the  bank
curtailing its lending activities77. Robert Dickie (Operations) also left the bank in May
after the announcement of a first quarter loss78 79.  The most significant board change
prior to nationalisation however was the resignation of Steven Crawshaw at the end of
May due to acute health problems80, at the time when the bank was ready to announce
its second attempt at a rights issue.  This sudden departure of Crawshaw prompted Rod
Kent to take over the role of Executive Chairman until a new Chief Executive could be
recruited.
Chief Executive Turnover The relationship of the Chief Executive and Chairman
is  at  the  core  of  governance  and decision-making for  any plc  (Roberts,  2002).   As
already discussed in Period 2, Chairman Rod Kent and CEO Steven Crawshaw had a
similar vision of the firm, that is, not operating as a retail business but focussing on
specialist lending.  Kent's closeness to the planning and decision-making processes of
the executive board is illustrated by the fact that he was making much use of his office
at the bank’s headquarters.  According to an interviewee81 Kent spent a lot of time at the
London headquarters during his chairmanship.  This closeness to executive decision-
making and his experience as CEO of Close Bros might have been useful to Steven
77 Key  B&B  executive  quits  as  lender  prepares  to  focus  on  cutting  costs  The  Daily  Telegraph,
September 2, 2008; City, p. 3, Philip Aldrick
78 Bradford & Bingley hit by extra 125m blow  Daily Mail, April 23, 2008; p. 74
79 B&B says funding is secure despite rise in bad debt  The Independent, April 23, 2008; Business, p.
36, Sean Farrell
80 Pym offers B&B the hope of stability  The Daily Telegraph, August 18, 2008; p. 3, Peter Taylor
81 Director C
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Crawshaw,  but  on  the  other  hand,  might  have  compromised  his  judgement  and  his
monitoring function by being invested in the decisions taken.
Consequently,  following the resignation of Crawshaw, Kent assumed the role of
Executive Chairman, giving him even more power than before.  Now in absolute control
of the full board, discussion of problematic issues, or even dissent, could have become
even more difficult. In particular, his leadership styles was described as more decisive
and less tolerant of longer discussions on the board, especially once he had made up his
mind about an item of discussion82.
Rod Kent remained in that position for three months during which he successfully
executed the rights issue and recruited a new Chief Executive.  On August 18, 2008
Richard Pym was announced as the new chief executive.  He is reported to bring with
him substantial  experience in mortgage banking and savings, having led Alliance &
Leicester between June 2002 and July 2007.
According to interviewees83, Richard Pym was similar in leadership style to Lindsay
Mackinlay.   He  is  described  as  inclusive,  a  good  listener  and  encouraging  board
members to share their point of view.  His experience and profile thus suggest that the
bank sought to hire an experienced chief executive that has the knowledge and ability to
'steady the ship' and guide the firm into 'calmer waters', that is, to change the strategy of
being a specialist mortgage lender.  This view is supported by a strategic announcement
made by the  bank on September  2584 in  which  the  new chief  executive  announced
measures to reduce the risk of the bank and to transform it into a savings bank.  In the
end Pym did not get the time to implement the new strategy as the bank was taken into
state ownership four days later.
Of interest in this context is also the choice of Pym as Chief Executive due to his
background being different from that of Crawshaw or Kent.  Pym’s reign at Alliance &
Leicester  was  described  as  “having  played  a  good  hand  with  the  cards  he’d  been
82 Director C
83 Directors A & Y
84 Bradford & Bingley Press Release: Bradford & Bingley streamlines operations, 25/09/2008
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dealt”85. Pym’s announcement of converting Bradford & Bingley back into a savings
bank thus illustrates his different strategic vision.
Additionally, as part of the Nominations Committee Rod Kent was very involved in
recruiting the new CEO and it implies that the committee was looking for a personality
to fundamentally transform the organisation, much like the appointment of Christopher
Rodrigues.   This  is  further  supported  by  comments  made  by Alex  Potter  (Analyst,
Collins Stewart) claiming that “The way Rod Kent tried to distance himself from the
previous management was shocking, when he has been the chairman for five years.”86 
This then suggests that the Chairman either (a) reconsidered the previous strategy in
the light of recent developments, or (b) was not as powerful as his position suggests, or
(c) was not fully convinced of the previous strategy. Recalling Director X's statement
that strategic change can only be implemented when the chairman and chief executive
agree  on  the  direction  of  change,  suggests  that  option  (a),  which  is  a  favourable
interpretation of his role, is the most likely interpretation. However, (b) and (c) would
suggest  that  the  executive  board  members  had  captured  the  board  and  that  Steven
Crawshaw was the dominant figure in the board room.  Hence, based on the evidence
presented so far in Period 2 and 3, it is reasonable to state here that Rod Kent, was, if
not co-opted by the new CEO, a fundamental supporter of his strategy as he shared a
similar vision.
5.6.3  Summary
The period 2006 – 2008 marks the end of the Revival life-cycle phase and, with
nationalisation, the firms transition into the Decline phase of its life-cycle.  While it
could be argued that the firm entered another Revival phase with the appointment and
planned strategic reorientation, this revival never materialised due to the nationalisation
of  the  bank.   Nationalisation  and  the  subsequent  transfer  of  Bradford  &  Bingley's
mortgage assets  into the Bad Bank (UKAR -  The UK Asset  Resolution Trust)  thus
marks the start of a new life-cycle phase – Decline.
85 Bradford & Bingley appoints new boss, Investors Chronicle, August 18, 2008
86 Bradford & Bingley: arrears are not the biggest problem Citywire, June 10, 2008
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The events of the period again raises questions about the quality of decision-making
in the top echelon of the firm.  In particular, doubts whether the board was functioning
properly exist.  The struggle to successfully complete the rights issue is just a case in
point.
For example the bank continued to pursue its strategy and growth until May 2008,
after the failure of Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and mounting subprime losses for many
banks.  Why did the bank continue lending strongly despite market conditions?  Another
example is the funding situation of the bank, where in early 2008 the bank insisted to be
funded well into 2009, when only a short time later it finds itself in need of a capital
injection.   While it is easy to analyse these decisions with hindsight, it  nevertheless
raises questions about the quality of executive directors, as well as lending standards
and monitoring and oversight by non-executive directors.
On a management level, questions such as whether the bank did sufficient stress
testing  of  its  assets,  or  considered  a  number  of  possible  scenarios  and  made  plans
accordingly, or even monitored the external environment adequately have to be asked.
There is also the possibility that there was disagreement between executive members on
the board about the correct course of action, with the resignation of Robert Dickie and
Mark Stevens being interpreted as such.
Questions have not only to be asked of the executive board members, but also of
non-executive  board  members  and  their  role.   Did  they  execute  their  oversight
responsibilities well enough or were they in some form co-opted or controlled by the
executive management?  A number of non-executive directors had substantial outside
demands, such as Ian Cheshire (CEO – Kingfisher) and might have found themselves
under  time  constraints  while  executing  their  role.   Alternatively,  did  they  trust  the
assertions of executive board members too much and didn’t challenge them sufficiently?
Was there a problem of group think, where alternatives to the set course of action were
not  considered?   The role  of  the  Chairman is  at  best  ambiguous,  but  based  on the
evidence presented, a more negative view of his role could be taken.
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5.7  Period 4: Post-Nationalisation 2008 Onwards
Bradford & Bingley was nationalised on September 29, 2008.  By determination of
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) the bank did no longer satisfy the conditions for
operating as a deposit-taking institution as of September 27th 200887.
In its Annual Report 2008, the bank credits external market events for its collapse,
in particular the effect the HBOS collapse had on public confidence and the subsequent
outflow of customer deposits.  Furthermore, it states that from the third quarter of 2007
onwards the bank was affected by:
• A material and rapid reduction of the availability of wholesale funding,
• The increase of the cost of retail and wholesale funding,
• The substantial deterioration of the market value of some treasury assets,
• The increase of mortgage arrears, and 
• Reduced redemptions increasing the need for funding.
Annual Report 2008, Director's Report, p. 3
However, while the bank was severely affected by the financial crisis and the break-
down of financial  markets,  it  was at  no point in time insolvent88.   In fact,  the non-
forthcoming liquidity support from the Bank of England as well as B&B's failure to
appropriately model the liquidity stress it was finding was seen as the major reason for
its collapse.  Furthermore, though the bank admitted in the Annual Report 2008 and in
interviews that it had internal problems, like poor lending standards and poor credit risk
measures  in  the  run  up  to  the  crisis89,  as  well  as  fraud  problems  in  the  buy-to-let
87 Annual Report 2008, Director’s Report, p. 3
88 Director B
89 Director Y
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portfolio90, it was acknowledged that these problems were not enough to bring the bank
down.  However, profitability was damaged91.
At the time of nationalisation Bradford & Bingley had Total Assets of £52.5 billion,
including Loans and Advances to Customers of £42.2 billion.  These assets were funded
by £28.4 billion of wholesale funding and £20.4 billion of customer deposits.  Due to
EU State Aid Regulation, prohibiting the bank from accepting new deposits or making
new loans, the deposit-taking side as well as the sales operations had to be separated
from the remainder of the business.  Thus the deposit-taking side and sales operations
were sold to Abbey National (Banco Santander Group) which saw the transfer of  £19
billion of net liabilities, as well as all branches and approximately 1500 members of
staff, for a consideration of £600 million.  The retail funding was then replaced by £18.4
billion of statutory debt borrowed from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme
(FSCS)  and  provided  by  HM  Treasury.   The  next  section  focuses  on  the  strategic
transformation the company underwent after nationalisation and how these challenges
were overcome.
5.7.1  Strategy
The  most  significant  strategic  changes  happened  during  the  early  parts  of  this
period,  whereas  in  latter  years  the  firm settled  down after  significant  restructuring.
These strategic changes, as part of the new business plan, are discussed next.
The New Business Plan
Following  nationalisation,  the  new  primary  business  objective  was  the  orderly
winding down and repayment of the loan by the FSCS and the working capital facility
provided  by  HM  Treasury.   In  doing  so,  Bradford  &  Bingley  transformed  into  a
mortgage servicing company.  The main task of the board at the end of 2008 and during
2009 was thus 'to steady the ship' and honour the ongoing obligations in the wholesale
90 Annual Report 2009/2010
91 Director B
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market  and to  creditors.   One interviewee described the situation  as  'rather  static'92.
Besides repaying its creditors, Bradford & Bingley also defined its objectives as:
• Running down the balance sheet,
• Minimising impairments and losses, and
• Restructuring and realigning the business.
Annual Report 2008, Director’s Report Business Review, p. 5
The Annual Report 2008 contained a further objective of the firm, beyond what was
published in March: to find a future purpose for the company.  This new purpose may
include being an outsourced service provider to the mortgage industry.  Again, finding a
purpose beyond clearing the inherited liabilities of the previous management is setting
the firm up for  a  new, future  purpose that  goes  beyond its  current  one.   This  new
objective lays the foundation for the firm to exit the Decline stage and enter a new life-
cycle stage at some point in the future.  Further, in the business plan published in March
2009, the board defined the primary strategy to achieve these objectives as93:
• Ceasing new lending,
• Running  down  the  mortgage  book  by  stimulating  redemptions  and  sales  of
loans,
• Running down or selling the commercial loan book, and
• Running down or selling other wholesale assets (for example, MBS).
Bradford & Bingley Business Plan March 2009, pp. 6-7
In short, this fundamental change in business objectives and strategy had an impact
on the resource needs on the firm.  It is also suffice to say that the new strategy is a
92 Director B
93 Annual Report 2008
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complete opposite to that of the previous life-cycle stage.  Whereas the old strategy
focused  on  growing  mortgage  balances  aggressively,  the  new  strategy  focused  on
maximising returns to the taxpayer by winding down the mortgage book with minimal
losses.
The Creation of UKAR – A new Purpose
On July 1, 2010, the government created UKAR (The UK Asset Resolution Trust)
to combine the remnants of Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock Asset Management
(NRAM), the entity that houses all the bad debts of Northern Rock.  On October 1 of
the same year, all shares, assets and liabilities of B&B and NRAM were transferred to
the new entity, UKAR.  As explained by Director B, UKAR reports to United Kingdom
Financial  Investments  (UKFI)  which manages  all  HM Treasury holdings of the UK
banking sector94.  While NRAM and Bradford & Bingley remained separate entities for
reporting purposes, their management and operations were integrated.  This included
closing  NRAM  offices  in  Gosforth  and  decommissioning  the  old  IT  systems  and
moving  to  new  single  systems  for  various  business  functions.   The  scale  of  the
undertaking was considerable with UKAR managing  £112 billion of mortgage assets
and financial instruments at that point.
Wealth Protection vs Wealth Creation
“we now have the level of data that if you want to know [the arrears] for a
particular  geography,  or  customer  segment,  or  mortgage  type,  you  can
actually – whereas before it’s just arrears.”
Director Y
Furthermore,  the  improvement  in  credit  risk  measurement  and  analysis  had  a
positive impact on the firm:
“we have become experts in risk management, that is what we do, so everyone
is now looking to us, so we have actually almost accidentally generated a skill
set”
94 For example, RBS, Lloyds TSB, UKAR
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Director Y
These risk management skills also allowed UKAR to identify customers most likely
to run into arrears and pro-actively target those.  The acquisition of new skills in debt
management thus provided Bradford & Bingley with a way forward past the full run
down of the mortgage book.  In a nutshell,  it  reinvented the company.  Part of this
reinvention  was  also  the  right  to  administer  the  government's  Mortgage  Guarantee
Scheme (MGS), another opportunity for the firm to build and improve its skills, and, to
generate wealth95.
The post-nationalisation period also witnessed a tension between the governance
functions of wealth protection and wealth creation, an observation which emerged from
the  interview  evidence.   While  interviewees  stressed  the  importance  of  wealth
protection, that is, protecting the tax payer by repaying the state support in full, they
recognised that it is important for the firm to create wealth as well, not only to speed up
the repayment of debt, but also to remain an attractive place to work and attract skilled
employees:
“If you can create something else that keeps [employees] interested you would
actually do more wealth protection because you keep those people, so there is
a slight potential wealth generation on the side.”
“Wealth creation is actually really interesting to us because there is wealth
creation in terms of giving extra money to the taxpayer, but also keeping the
resources that allow us to do wealth protection.”
Director Y
These  statements  again  show that  even  during  this  phase  of  reinvention  where
wealth protection is very important to the firm, wealth creation activities are planting
the seeds for the future and contributing to maintaining the firm.
In  general,  the  strategic  decisions  the  board  can  make  are  limited  to  mainly
operational  decisions,  such as  whether  to  sell  part  of  a  loan  book or  infrastructure
95 Director B
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decisions.  However, these wealth creation activities, such as employing the new skills
in the administration of the Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, provides opportunities for the
board to make strategic decisions outside the legal limits imposed on the business in
run-off.  However, as is illustrated by this quote, the board is aware of the growing
potential for wealth creation in the future:
“the reason we can't lend money is not because we do not think there are very
good lending opportunities  … it  is  just  because the European Commission
doesn't allow banks [in receipt of State Aid] to lend money [and compete with
other banks].  [However strategy] will become more important as the book
declines.”
Director B
In summary, this section on strategy showed how strategy implemented by the bank
changed fundamentally after nationalisation.  The discussion further showed how, after
the  amalgamation  of  Bradford  &  Bingley  and  NRAM into  UKAR,  new skills  and
opportunities were created and how these contribute to the tension between the wealth
protection and wealth creation functions of governance.  Overall, strategy during this
period is  a factor that is of some importance for the board.  For example, the board
actively, but not purposefully, created new strategic opportunities and a future purpose
for the firm, yet the strategy of the firm was still constrained by state aid regulation.  In
the next section, Resource, the impact of the new strategy on the resource needs of the
firm is discussed.
5.7.2  Resource
The resource needs of the firm, driven by strategy, evolved from 2008 onwards.
During  the  previous  life-cycle  stage  (Period  1  and  2),  Bradford  &  Bingley  was  a
business which had undergone a transformation of its business model as a consequence
of  the  strategic  and operational  changes  implemented  under  the  previous  two chief
executives.  In spite of the initial revival of its fortunes and growing profits until 2005
however, the business model proved unsustainable over time.  Consequently, the bank’s
collapse and subsequent nationalisation moved the bank into the Decline stage of the
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organisational  life-cycle.   As  a  result  of  these  events  a  new  set  of  financial  and
knowledge resource needs arose with a different profile.
Finance
After nationalisation, the years 2008 and 2009 were difficult for the company.  After
the sale of the deposit-taking part of the business to Abbey National, the £19 billion of
retail deposits were replaced by a loan of £18.4 billion from the FSCS.  The FSCS in
turn received the money from HM Treasury to pass on to Bradford & Bingley.  As the
money was received as a loan, the bank must pay interest to its creditors.  In addition to
the debt funding, HM Treasury also provided a working capital facility (WCF) with a
maximum credit line of £11.5 billion.
Due  to  the  difficult  economic  and  financial  conditions  of  the  economy,  and
therefore many of its mortgage customers, as well as problems with fraud in the buy-to-
let business, the bank had to recognise substantial losses on its portfolio of assets for the
years 2008 and 2009.  Table 5.9 below provides an overview of losses recognised on
Bradford & Bingley’s financial statements:
In £m 2008 2009 2010
Realised Gains & Losses on Financial 
Instruments
120.3
Loan Impairment (Loss) -507.7 -593.7 -276.6
Investment Impairment (Loss) -191.6 -93.3 14.5
Gain (Loss) on Sale of Assets & Liabilities -216.3 -8.5 46.9
Table 5.9: Recognised Losses & Impairments of Assets & Liabilities
As can be seen in  Table 5.9,  the company started to stabilise  in 2010 and thus
needed no further funding from the FSCS or HM Treasury to continue operating.  In
fact, the redemptions and sale of loan books generated sufficient capital to start repaying
the WCF, as well as repurchasing outstanding debt at a discount.  Furthermore, most
financial  assets,  the  commercial  loan  book,  and  the  insurance  business  have  been
disposed off.
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However, redemptions were held back by the poor quality of the loans as those
borrowers found it difficult to refinance through other mortgage providers96.  Thus the
firm was faced by a worsening quality of the loan book as higher quality borrowers
redeemed their loans and refinanced elsewhere.
Overall, the company's financial needs were satisfied through its current operations
and it began to repay the loans.  New ventures such as the administration of the MGS
will generate additional income in the future, however the company was in no need to
attract additional capital to finance any restructuring. As a result, the financial resource
needs of the firm were low.
Knowledge
Bradford & Bingley's time since 2008 can be split into three distinct segments in
terms of skills requirements: Phase 1, 2 and 3.  Phase 1 started from demutualisation
until  the  resignation  of  Christopher  Willford  and Roger  Hattam in  mid-2009.   This
phase was mainly marked by the transition of the business into government ownership
and financial stabilisation.  Phase 2 started with the appointment of Richard Banks in
mid-2009 and lasted until  the October  1,  2010, when the new governance structure
under UKAR was introduced.  Phase 3, the final phase to date, covers the integration of
operations  of Bradford & Bingley and NRAM under the umbrella of UKAR.  This
subsection will, in turn, discuss the knowledge and skills needs of the board for each of
the phases.
Phase 1 (End-2008 – Mid-2009)
Initially after nationalisation at the end of September 2008, the full board stayed on
for a short while to facilitate the transition into state ownership.  Most non-executive
board members resigned on November 14, 2008 with the exception of Louise Patten
and Michael Buckley.  Additionally Christopher Willford (Finance Director) and Roger
Hattam (Operations Director) continued to provide their services during this transitional
phase.  Richard Pym, who had joined Bradford & Bingley shortly before nationalisation
however continued to serve the firm as executive chairman after the resignation of Rod
96 See for example, UKAR Annual Report 2012, Chief Executive Officer's Review, p. 6-8
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Kent97.  The primary goal during this period was to stabilise the business and prepare
the handover to a new management.  Thus the knowledge and skills, in particular of
Christopher Willford and Roger Hattam would seem to be of high importance during
this time.
Christopher  Willford's  knowledge  of  the  financial  position  of  the  firm  and  the
details of its financial dealings, as well as Roger Hattam's knowledge of the operational
side of the business, will have been critical during the handover to a new team.  Both of
them retired  from the  board  in  2009 when Richard  Banks,  formerly  of  Alliance  &
Leicester, joined the board as Managing Director.  Generally, during Phase 1 the firm's
knowledge needs were limited.  It did not require new skills but rather needed existing
knowledge to facilitate the handover into government ownership.
Phase 2 (Mid-2009 – October 2010)
With the appointment of Richard Banks as Managing Director and Richard Pym's
new role as Non-executive Chairman, a new direction was taken.  The primary objective
during this time was to make progress on improving business operations and to build a
new management team suited to the new circumstances.  As the business was in wind
down,  it  only needed a skeleton board to  operate.   Thus the top management  team
consisted of only four members, two non-executive directors as well as Richard Pym
and Richard Banks.  Other roles normally exercised by board members, such as finance
or operations, were exercised by senior executives instead.  Overall, during this second
transitional phase, the knowledge requirements remained low.
Phase 3 (from October 2010)
The  beginning  of  Phase  3  is  marked  by  the  establishment  of  UKAR  and  the
amalgamation of the operations of NRAM and B&B under one umbrella.  The UKAR
top management team was now responsible for running both businesses and as such the
management teams of both entities were merged98.  All the board members of Bradford
97 The Times, November 15, Kent stands down as B&B chief, Patrick Hosking, Business and Finance
Editor, Business pg. 64, 256 words.
98 UKAR Press Release: Northern Rock (Asset Management) plc confirms integration with Bradford &
Bingley plc under a new holding company, 01.10.2010
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& Bingley joined UKAR in their respective positions and were joined by three non-
executive directors from NRAM, namely: Kent Atkinson, Bob Davies, and Sue Langley.
The  three  of  them  had  extensive  experience  in  banking,  risk,  finance,  accounting,
insurance  and  operations.   Furthermore,  an  additional  non-executive  director  was
recruited by Bradford & Bingley in the person of John Tattersall, who joined in October
2010.   He  was  formerly  a  partner  at  PriceWaterhouseCoopers  responsible  for  the
financial  regulatory  practice.   Additionally,  Keith  Morgan,  Head  of  Wholly-owned
Investments at UKFI, joined the board as representative of the majority shareholder.
Jim O'Neil later joined UKAR in 2011 as a second representative of UKFI.
While the executive team remained very small, fitting with the diminished scope
and objectives of the company, it retained a very experienced non-executive board.  This
could be interpreted as a signal of the importance of strategic advice for the firm as well
as possibly providing a stronger oversight regime than what was in place before.  This
interpretation is supported by comments made such as:
“So I brought all the knowledge, but one doesn't come onto the board to teach
the executive, one comes on the board to challenge the executive, to ask the
right questions.”
Certainly  at  B&B and  Northern  Rock  the  non-executive  directors  are  not
introducing context … it is challenging people when they really don't know
what they're doing or seem to be going off the rails.
Director B
Two undertakings during Phase 3 required specific skills and expertise that was
brought onto the board.  The first undertaking was the merging of operations of NRAM
and Bradford & Bingley onto one management information system.  Sue Langley, with
a strong background in operations, was instrumental in this:
“[She] was seconded onto the Risk Committee for those decisions to be made
[moving onto a single system] because of [her] operational experience.”
Director Y
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A second project, as stated by interviewees, was the redesign of risk measures.  This
was necessitated by the deficient nature of NRAM's and Bradford & Bingley's board
packs, as well as the operational merging of the two firms.  All interviewees who were
active within this period from 2008 onwards emphasized the improvements of credit
risk and mortgage arrears measures made, which helped to significantly improve the
arrears performance of UKAR.
“The way it was done [measuring arrears] pre-nationalisation … we wanted
to be far more rigorous … then we introduced these new risk measures and the
introduction  of  those  …  has  allowed  us  to  pro-actively  target  the  right
customers to try and help.”
Director Y
“our arrears percentage is high across the market because we have a book
[that] was badly underwritten in the past, but if you look at the [before and
after] we have much better stats [now]”
Director B
Overall,  the new board contributed significantly to  the operational  and strategic
changes the firm underwent in Phase 3.  While most of the directors were hired prior to
the  creation  of  UKAR,  their  experience  undoubtedly  contributed  to  the  changes
undergone.  Overall, the significant nature of the challenges of merging the two firms
operationally, created high knowledge resource requirements during this phase.
5.7.3  Summary
This section has explored the changes Bradford & Bingley's governance functions
underwent after nationalisation.  It showed that strategy and knowledge resource needs
became  necessarily  more  important  with  a  changed  business  model  and  company
structure, while financial resource needs remained low as a result of the new strategic
direction.
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5.8  Monitoring
It is undisputed in literature that monitoring is a fundamental function of the board.
The owners and creditors of the firm have a vital interest in maintaining an element of
oversight to ensure that no resources are misappropriated or extracted by management
and that decisions are taken with the benefit of the owners in mind.  While it is not the
goal  of  this  section  to  deny  the  importance  of  monitoring  within  the  corporate
governance framework, it adds to existing evidence  (for example, Zahra & Pearce II
1989; Lynall  et  al.  2003) that monitoring is neither the sole nor the most important
aspect  of  corporate  governance  for  non-executive  directors  in  many  stages  of  the
organisational life-cycle.
Generally,  monitoring  and its  importance  as  a  governance  function  is  based  on
agency theory  (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and its underlying
assumptions  of  the  behaviour  of  principals  and agents.   Many studies  have  already
argued that agency theory as a corporate governance model is applicable only to mature
firms (for example, Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Lynall et al., 2003; Smith, Mitchell,
& Summer, 1985). Corporate governance life-cycle theory contends that the degree of
monitoring is dependent on the amount of assets a company owns. Thus, the need for
monitoring increases with the size of the firm, peaking at maturity when the firm is at its
largest. In this the theory supports agency theory in that monitoring is important for
mature firms. However, as is argued by the above authors, as well as by the theory,
monitoring in other life-cycle stages is of lesser importance relative to other governance
functions.
While the above discussion is applicable to firms in general, monitoring in financial
institutions  is  a  vital  function  as  financial  institutions  act  as  deposit  takers  and are
handling large quantities of clients' funds.  As expressed by Director X: “it is the prime
responsibility as a Director … to protect the funds”.  Therefore the collapse of financial
firms due to fraud or excessive risk taking, and by extension a problem of monitoring, is
often  prime  news  (for  example,  Bernie  Maddoff  and  Section  2.2,  page  11).
Consequently, monitoring as a governance function should not be expected to vary to a
great extent across the different life-cycle stages of financial institutions.
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The purpose of this section is to further demonstrate how the view on monitoring
evolved between the late 1990s and late 2000s and to show that monitoring has moved
from a focus on strategy and informal structures to a more formal systems based on
structures and legal requirements.  Furthermore, this section explores how monitoring is
seen as only one of a number of governance responsibilities.  The remainder of the
section will therefore juxtapose the nature and perception of monitoring evident during
Periods 1 and 4 (see Table 5.1, page 81).
5.8.1  The Evolution of Monitoring at Bradford & Bingley
The account given here of the evolution of monitoring at Bradford & Bingley over
time is based on concrete evidence provided by interviews.  The emphasis of monitoring
during Period 1 was very much on strategic advice as illustrated by this quote:
… the determination of strategy is the most important thing for the Board to
do …
Director Z
In this regard monitoring was considered secondary, that is,  “the determination of
strategy,  and monitoring  the  implementation of  that,  in  that  order,  is  the right  way
round" 99.  Thus monitoring is seen as a function of the strategic choices made.
Again, in the context of governance and monitoring, strategy was considered to be
an  integral  part  of  the  position  of  non-executive  director  throughout  the  periods.
However,  due  to  the  changed  scope of  the  firm after  nationalisation,  the  nature  of
strategic advice is different, that is, directors do not have to decide on new products, but
are limited to for example selling bits of the book, property acquisitions and disposals,
and key appointments.  This limitation might therefore affect the way directors in Period
4 view their role.  Nevertheless they still see their key role to
“support the executive team, but ... also ... to challenge them and ask difficult
questions”
99 Director Z
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Director Y
and
“participating in decisions, discussion of issues, challenging management …
and contributing to the decisions”.
Director B
The language is therefore very different from Period 1 and the word ‘challenge’ in
particular stands out.   The notion of challenging management is  also noticeably not
present in interviews conducted with the directors of Period 1.  With these directors, the
focus is more on providing strategic advice and supporting the executive team as well as
ensuring that the strategy is being implemented properly100.
Monitoring as a Compliance Function
“the compliance obligations hopefully are being observed and clearly if they
weren't you would want to know”
Director A (Period 1)
The awareness of regulatory compliance and other legal duties are described very
differently in Period 4.  Respondents emphasize their role as monitors to a much larger
extent  and,  in  particular  the  changed  external  drivers  of  monitoring.   In  that  vein,
monitoring is described as  “a safety comfort blanket”101 and “almost like the hygiene
thing”102.  This notion of protection is further extended due to legal demands, which
have substantially increased and continue to change as corporate governance evolves in
response to recent crisis.
100 "it is the Board who must determine what decisions on strategy should be made and then for the
executives to go away and implement it" – Director Z
101 Director Y
102 Director Y
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Furthermore, these increasing demands and legal duties are seen as very important,
as failure to perform the director’s role adequately is now a criminal offence.  This legal
approach to oversight is supported by internal systems of control that are designed to
reduce the likelihood of governance problems.  However, in the light of these demands,
the directors’ responsibility to ensure the satisfactory working of these controls is seen
as problematic:
“We have to rely on the executive team that [the fix] has been implemented
because we are not in business [and if] something goes wrong [after it has
been  fixed]  I  am  criminally  liable  for  that.   It's  very  difficult  as  a  non-
executive when you are doing only 12 meetings a year … to actually … test
that it is implemented.”
Director Y
The  increasing  demands  on  non-executives  are  not  new  though.   Rod  Kent
(Chairman 2002 – 2008)  noted in the 2004 Annual Report that:
“[t]he increasingly complex regulatory landscape is an inescapable part of
life as a financial organisation. … Regulatory requirements will continue to
put pressure on costs and absorb[s] management time.”
Annual Report 2004, page 3
An  extrapolation  of  this  argument  is  that  at  some  point  these  regulatory
requirements will impede the performance of non-executive directors, by limiting the
time spent on other issues, such as strategic advice, that are perhaps less encumbered by
legal  penalties.   In  particular  those  non-executive  directors  that  are  in  full-time
employment elsewhere might struggle to perform their duties:
“one of the problems I think is that as non-executives are now recruited to a
great extent from people who are in an executive role in another company. ... it
has lots of benefits but it does mean that their time is somewhat precious. …
there  isn't  really  the  time  to  perhaps  get  a  little  more  involved  with  the
business on which they are a non-executive"
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Director A
For one of the interviewees these time commitments amount to approximately 30
days  per  year103.   This  is  a  considerable  amount  of  time  for  directors  in  full  time
employment, such as former non-executive directors Ian Cheshire (CEO – Kingfisher)
and Stephen Webster (Finance Director – Wolseley) who had demanding primary jobs.
Therefore their time commitment and capacity to sufficiently engage in their directorial
duties, with corresponding negative implications for the quality of their contribution to
board discussion is questionable.
Monitoring through Informal Channels In opposition to these formal governance
requirements, stand more informal approaches to oversight such as visiting branches or
back office operations.  These visits would then inform non-executive directors and help
them to perform their role:
“I think you learned on occasions when the policy being pursued from the top
were leading to problems and were not perhaps as good as it was believed by
management … it gave me the opportunity from time to time to realise about
those problems.”
Director A
“I would always meet with him [the CEO] at least every couple of months just
on a one to one basis and I would talk about … reactions which I found on
visits and talking to people; and I always tried from time to time to meet on a
one-to-one basis with other members of the executive team”
Director A
It  is  seen  that  these  visits  were  clearly  important  to  the  non-executive  board
members in Period 1, they do not feature as prominently in Period 4.  Indeed, Director B
expressed this as:
103 Director B
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“Part of it is taking time to go and do site visits, ..., we are encouraged to do
that and there are no restrictions on us doing that”
Director B
In addition, monitoring in Period 4 includes activities such as employee satisfaction
surveys  to  measure  employee  contentment,  an  item  that  did  not  feature  during
interviews with respondents active in Period 1.  Overall, there is a distinct impression
that the quality of monitoring has changed over time away from the more informal and
engaged site visits towards fulfilling legal requirements imposed by the regulator and
perhaps a more ‘tick box’ like approach:
“… the PRA [Prudential Regulation Authority]  and FSA are looking to be
whiter  than white  and they have a tick  box and they say  if  [the  financial
institution] have implemented this [internal control], then we are happy …”
Director Y
Monitoring in Financial Institutions As discussed above, monitoring is a critical
activity for financial institutions.  Furthermore, the extension of the organisational life-
cycle, the corporate governance life-cycle, postulates that monitoring is related to the
amount of assets owned by the firm.  Thus a large resource base and complex operations
require more efforts in monitoring.  However, based on the interview data collected, a
different observation can be made on this assertion of the corporate governance life-
cycle theory.  Rather than monitoring being solely tied to assets, it was considered to be
related as much to strategy as to financial complexity:
“if you are doing new things, monitoring … a new direction may require you
are a little bit more attentive that monitoring an existing course.”
Director Z
“if the business is being properly run, the strategy is right, then all you are
ensuring is that it is being implemented through process of monitoring”
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Director Z
Having said that, monitoring in financial institutions is core to their activities and as
such levels of monitoring should not be expected to differ significantly between life-
cycle stages, as argued by the corporate governance life-cycle theory.
“I would say monitoring is an important ingredient throughout; I don't think it
lessens or increases really.”
Director A
5.8.2  Summary
“corporate governance is not about text books.  There is best practice which
is at the heart of it, but it is about the people you have around the Board, the
motivations of the CEO and Chairman … and the mix of personalities and
skills you have around the table affect that governance.”
Director Y
For a financial institution monitoring is a nexus of legal requirements, for example,
maintenance of Tier I capital, protection of depositor funds and strategic needs.  It can
therefore be argued that the board does not only need to monitor whether all relevant
regulations have been adhered to, but also to provide advice and challenge management
on its plans and the implementation of these plans.  Furthermore, what has emerged
from the above discussion is that the satisfaction of legal requirements is taking up more
time as a result of changed regulatory requirements and as such may put pressure on
non-executive directors.  Thus, in the post-financial crisis world, monitoring is much
less seen as an integral part of doing business, than as a legal requirement.  This is
further reflected in the language used which is much more based on a legalistic and
rigid terminology, compared to the late 1990s and early 2000s.
In addition, the interview evidence suggests that the increasing time commitment
required  of  non-executive  directors  may  impact  on  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the
monitoring  process  and  that  the  increasing  reliance  on  systems  of  internal  control
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creates a false sense of security, while non-executive directors rely on management to
maintain these controls.  Thus, while the responsibility and personal liability of non-
executive  directors  has  increased,  their  control  function  is  compromised  by  outside
commitments, in particular of full-time executives, and an increasing reliance on the
executive management team on the implementation of control systems.
Following  the  above  discussion  which  investigated  Bradford  &  Bingley's  two
transitions  between  life-cycle  stages  since  1995  as  well  as  the  evolution  of  its
monitoring  function  during  the  same period  of  time,  the  next  section  discusses  the
findings of the whole chapter, including situating this research and its contribution to
literature.
137
5.9  Discussion and Conclusion
This  chapter  set  out  to  analyse  multi-period  transitions  of  Bradford  &  Bingley
between  1996 and 2010 using  the  organisational  life-cycle  theory.   In  particular,  it
viewed  these  transitions  through  the  lens  of  the  three  main  functions  of  corporate
governance: strategic advice, resource, and monitoring (Filatotchev et al. 2006).
Organisational Life-Cycle Stages 
The organisational life-cycle and its extension, the corporate governance life-cycle,
offer  a  way  to  think  about  an  organisation's  development.   Yet  research  into  the
processes preceding and following the move from one life-cycle phase to another is
scarce (Filatotchev et al. 2006).  This research therefore contributes to the literature by
investigating  how  strategy,  financial  resources,  the  board,  and  monitoring  adjusted
around the time of transition between life-cycle stages.  As was proposed in the Section
5.3,  the  bank  moved  from  Stage  3:  Maturity  to  Stage  4:  Revival,  ending  in
nationalisation in 2008 and the start of Stage 5: Decline. 
The arrival of Christopher Rodrigues in 1996 and the ensuing corporate changes
marked the beginning of a new life-cycle stage.  The decision to engage him to become
Chief Executive was a deliberate, strategic decision by the board in an attempt to revive
the  Society  and  ensure  its  continued  economic  existence,  as  argued  in  Period  1.
However,  Period  1  witnesses  a  second  major  event  –  demutualisation.  The
demutualisation of the Society in 2000 fundamentally changed how the firm related to
its customers and other stakeholders, as well as moving it into a different regulatory
regime.  Interestingly though, this event did not trigger a new life-cycle stage as the firm
continued  its  strategy.  This  assessment  is  further  supported  by  interviews,  which
revealed that board members did not consider the change to plc status to have had an
impact comparable to the arrival of Christopher Rodrigues104.
Again, the arrival of Christopher Rodrigues (Period 1), though significant, did not
change the company over night, but started a gradual process of transition.  In this sense
104 For example, Director A, Director X
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life-cycle phases should not be seen as periods with well defined boundaries, but rather
overlapping periods of varying length, where each period has distinct characteristics that
distinguish it from another.  This implies that the passage from one life-cycle stage into
another is a fuzzy event, and stages may indeed overlap (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001),
as  the  firm  adapts  to  the  strategic  and  governance  requirements  of  the  new stage.
Furthermore, the determination whether a firm has transited into a new stage can only
be made ex post, unless a clear marker, such as a very significant disruptive event (for
example, nationalisation) has occurred.
It is also important to note that any categorisation of events into organisational and
corporate governance life-cycle stages is only an approximation of actual events.  What
should  have  become  clear  during  the  discussions  in  this  chapter  is  that  there  are
variations of governance functions within each life-cycle stage, not only between life-
cycle  stages.   The  differences  between  life-cycle  stages  are  naturally  significant,
however  change  is  a  continuous  process,  rather  than  an  abrupt  one  and  transitions
between stages are thus fuzzy, as argued above.  Overall, fitting dynamic developments
into  a  static  model  is  suboptimal,  however  it  can  nevertheless  be  instructive  in
evaluating how Bradford & Bingley changed between 1995 and 2013.
In 2008 Bradford & Bingley was nationalised by the FSA, and while the bank was
in financial difficulty at the time – though not insolvent105, nationalisation was a sudden
and abrupt event that moved Bradford & Bingley into a new stage of its life – decline.
Nevertheless  even in  this  case,  a  fuzzy transition  period  can  be observed.   For
example,  when  Bradford  &  Bingley  moved  into  Stage  5:  Decline,  the  date  of
nationalisation marks the transition.  However, the process of change is not an abrupt
one,  but  gradual.   The  board of  Bradford & Bingley resigned only six weeks after
nationalisation, with select board members staying on beyond that time.  As previously
discussed, the transition of Bradford & Bingley in Stage 5 had so far three phases of
adaptation to the new circumstances of its existence: stabilisation, the appointment of a
new management team and the creation of UKAR.
105 Director B
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Thus  it  can  be  concluded  that  major  external  events  as  well  as  management
decision-making influence the life-cycle  progression of the firm.   The way the firm
copes with these events, or which strategy it seeks to pursue, are then determined by the
top management team and its mix of skills, expertise, and personalities.
Corporate Governance Functions
The focus of this study is not only on organisational life-cycle transitions in general,
but especially on the accompanying corporate governance life-cycle transitions and the
role of the board and board turnover during this process.  What has emerged from the
evidence presented in this chapter is a ranking of the relative importance of the three
corporate governance functions identified in the corporate governance life-cycle theory,
that is, strategic advice, resource, and monitoring.  Strategic advice and determination of
strategy were overwhelmingly seen by interviewees as the most important contribution
that non-executive board members make, with all other functions dependent on these
strategic decisions.  That is, strategy drives the financial resource needs of the firm and
monitoring  is  a  function  of  not  only  legal  compliance,  but  also  oversight  over  the
implementation of the strategy.
Strategy Over the time horizon of this study Periods 1 and 2 are marked by a large
amount of strategic change, for example, the purchase of Mortgage Express (Period 1)
or the sale of non-core businesses (Period 2). Periods 3 and 4 are marked by relatively
low strategic change, the only exception being the sale of the deposit-taking business.
This  change  was  imposed  on  the  firm  by  external  forces.  In  particular
nationalisation, as a 'black swan event' 106, drove other internal and external contextual
changes.  For example, the shift in the objective of the organisation is driven foremost
by EU State Aid regulation and only then determined by the owners of the firm, HM
Treasury.  This shift in the agreement of the direction of the firm contrasts with Period 1
1996  –  2004,  where  the  shift  in  agreement  is  driven  by  internal  evaluation  of  the
external environment.  Furthermore, the turnover of top management team members is
of less importance in Period 4 as their influence, in particular on the strategic direction,
is  limited.   Nevertheless,  the  board  had  an  impact  on  operational  issues,  such  as
106 Director X
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improvements of credit risk measures, and, as noted in Period 4, would be ready to
operate in a different context, that is, to change the strategy of the firm.  This is further
highlighted by the tensions between wealth creation and wealth protection expressed by
board members.
A further aspect that warrants discussion in this regard is the role of the external
environment.  As shown in Table 5.1 (page 81) each period is marked by high or low
complexity of the environment.  For example, Periods 1, 2 and 3 are marked by high
velocity due to the impact of the economic environment on the firm.  In particular, the
demutualisation and privatisation wave, as well as stock market boom of the late 1990s
and early 2000s created an environment  in which there was significant  pressure on
management to 'comply or explain', that is, Bradford & Bingley had to change in order
to  have  an  argument  to  continue  as  a  mutual.   In  the  end  this  argument  was  lost,
however it prompted the firm to change.  Similarly, Period 2 is marked by high velocity
as the economy recovered after the dot com crisis and Bradford & Bingley sought to
refocus its business model following a negative evaluation of the old model.  Also in
Period 3, with the increasing confidence in the economy and booming housing market,
the  argument  for  a  more  cautious  approach  to  lending  was  a  difficult  to  make  to
investors.  Period 4 on the other hand is marked by a lower environmental velocity as
the  business  has  been  removed  from  competition  through  nationalisation  and  thus
external pressure, with the exception of repaying HM Treasury and the FSCS by the
time the business is finally wound up.
What is important to note in this discussion is, that for Periods 1, 2 and 4 strategy
and  environmental  velocity  are  matched,  for  example,  Period  1  is  marked  by high
strategy and high velocity.  The only period with a mismatch is Period 3, where high
environmental velocity is matched by low strategic activity.  The general strategy during
this period is two-pronged: cutting cost and increasing sales. Any strategic consideration
beyond that is not evident from the documents available.  Based on the discussion of
strategy in Period 3 it is reasonable to conclude that the top management's assessment of
the situation was flawed, helped by poor management information systems, and further
that it did not recognise the severity of problems until summer 2008.
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Resource The resource function, which aggregates all kinds of resources the firm
requires (financial, knowledge, intellectual property, etc) is disaggregated into financial
and knowledge.  Distinguishing these two resource types adds granularity to the model
and enables a better understanding of how resource is impacted by strategic changes.
As  previously  discussed,  knowledge  resources  have  been  defined  as  intangible
resources,  such  as  skills,  experience,  and  education  of  the  top  management  team,
whereas financial resources are the funds the firm requires to fulfil its objectives.
What  has  emerged  is  the  dual  role  played  by  knowledge  resource.   First,  it  is
dependent on the strategic direction of the firm insofar as board turnover can be used to
add skills and expertise to the board to support the chosen strategy, yet board turnover
may also be disruptive by introducing new board members that fundamentally alter the
strategic vision of the board and, through their impact, necessitate future knowledge
resource  changes.   Period  1  is  an  example  of  the  latter,  where  the  addition  and
promotion of Lindsay Mackinlay to Chairman influenced the choice of the next Chief
Executive.   Once  the  fundamental  decision  about  leadership  and strategy  had been
made, the rest of the top management team members were exchanged subsequently as
deemed necessary.
On the  one  hand,  as  discussed  in  Period  1,  the  Chief  Executive  is  particularly
influential  when  choosing  his  or  her  executive  team  and  will  seek  to  hire  board
members  that  will  help  him/her  to  implement  the strategy.   On the other  hand,  the
choice  of  non-executive  board  members  is  not  only  influenced  by  regulatory
requirements,  for  example,  the  requirement  to  have  a  board  member  with  financial
expertise on the Audit Committee, but also by the needs of the firm, that is, what kind of
expertise or skill is required to support decision-making and oversight of the executive
management team.  Exemplary of this process are the appointment of Rosemary Thorne
as Finance Director in 1999 and Ian Cheshire as Non-executive Director in 2003.  Both
appointments were made as the skills and experience in retail of both appointees was
commensurate with the strategy of the firm of being a financial retailer.
This questions the path dependence of the composition of the board (Lynall et al.,
2003).  Lynall  et  al.  argue that board composition is path dependent and thus more
likely to reflect past requirements rather than future requirements.  The authors further
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argue that  board composition is  fundamentally  influenced by the  power distribution
between the CEO and external financiers at the foundation of the board.  However, the
board of Bradford & Bingley underwent dramatic changes since the 1980s, when it was
dominated by “the good and the great”107 of the area, and became a professional board,
even  before  demutualisation,  but  most  certainly  after.   Furthermore,  the  expressed
forward-looking  nature  of  key  appointments  is  not  supporting  path  dependence  for
Bradford & Bingley's board.  At best it can be said that secondary board members are
lagging behind key appointments while  the CEO/Chairman 'get  their  feed under  the
table' and start introducing new board members commensurate with their vision.
Monitoring Finally, monitoring as a governance function has evolved significantly
between Periods 1 and 4.  In the initial period, monitoring was viewed as a 'natural'
ingredient  to  governance  and  a  consequence  of  the  strategy  and  financial  resource
function.  With the evolution of regulatory requirements between Periods 1 and 4, non-
executives  view  of  this  governance  function  changed  fundamentally.   In  the  latter
period, monitoring is seen as an inevitable but not well-liked activity: “almost like [a]
hygiene  thing”108.   This  is  not  to  say  that  directors  did  not  exercise  their  duty  to
challenge management assertions, however the regulatory requirements of monitoring
were very prominent during the interviews.  This is due to the legal repercussions for
non-executive directors  should it  be found that  they did not  perform their  duties  in
accordance with existing regulation.
In addition, it emerged that the increasing time commitment to perform monitoring
tasks was seen as detrimental to the quality and quantity of non-executive's involvement
in the other two governance functions of strategic advice and resource.  Without further
(interview)  evidence  from Periods  2  and 3,  it  is  not  possible  to  judge whether  the
increasing  reliance  on  complex  systems  of  internal  control  coupled  with  an  ever
increasing amount and complexity of regulation contributed to Bradford & Bingley's
demise,  though Rod Kent (Chairman) made a comment in this  regard in the annual
report 2004.  A further point of criticism raised during the interviews is the necessary
reliance  of  non-executive  directors  on  executive  directors  in  the  implementation,
running,  and verification  of  internal  controls.   Thus,  monitoring,  unlike  the  role  of
107 Director D
108 Director Y
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strategic advice, has changed significantly during the period under investigation and has
become more important on non-executive's minds due to the legal ramifications of non-
compliance.
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Chapter 6
6  Board Processes between 1996 – 2004 and 2008 – 2010
6.1  Introduction
Chapter  5 investigated  the  strategic,  financial,  and  knowledge  resource  need
changes between 1995 – 2010 using the organisational life-cycle to show how the firm
evolved during this period.  The focus was thus on structural issues and their effect on
various governance functions.  Building on Chapter 5, this chapter seeks to add to the
understanding of  organisational  change at  Bradford  & Bingley,  by  investigating  the
perception  of  board  processes  and  personalities  by  top  management  team members
using constructs of the upper echelons theory. In doing so, this chapter will focus on
Periods 1 and 4 for two reasons. First, both are periods of significant change, covering
demutualisation  and  nationalisation  respectively.  Furthermore,  each  period  is  very
different from each other in terms of personnel, strategy and context, and thus offers a
variety  of  scenarios  and  situations  to  be  analysed.  Second,  the  available  interview
evidence  is  primarily  situated  in  Period  1  and  4  and  thus  enables  a  more  detailed
discussion of board processes during these.
The  chapter  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  6.2 discusses  the  application  of  the
constructs of the upper echelons perspective in this research. Section  6.3 presents the
perception and experiences of board members during Period 1, that is, 1995 – 2004 and
Section  6.4 shows how the perceptions and experiences  of board members differ in
Period 4, that is, 2008 – 2010.  Section 6.5 discusses and concludes the findings of this
chapter.
6.2  Application of the Constructs of the Upper Echelons 
Perspective
Corporate  governance  research  is  often  founded  in  the  assumptions  of  agency
theory (Daily et al., 2003).  It is often based on archival data (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997),
or  limited  to  quantitative  research  counting  board  size,  or  how  often  a  particular
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subcommittee meets (Huse, 2000). However, this leaves unanswered many questions of
how the board actually works, such as how the board comes to a decision or which
dynamics contribute to reaching a certain decision.
There is a large amount of literature on what boards do (Daily et al., 2003; Forbes &
Milliken,  1999;  Huse,  2000),  however  as  Pye  &  Pettigrew  (2005) point  out,  this
literature tends to ignore that there is a large variety of types of firms and governance
arrangements  in  existence.   As  described  in  the  organisational  life-cycle,  firms  go
through a succession of stages, each stage having a unique set of circumstances that
influence their governance.  In addition to the organisational life-cycle, the corporate
governance life-cycle then exhibits a different set of requirements for the board during
each  life-cycle  stage.   Thus,  governance  in  the  context  of  this  framework is  rarely
studied (for example, Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003). 
Additionally, the increasing codification of corporate governance, not only in the
UK  but  also  elsewhere,  has  led  to  a  homogenisation  of  board  structures  and
composition, creating an impetus to study the substance of board processes (Nordberg
& McNulty, 2013). Furthermore, the recent financial crisis has shown that firms with
corporate  governance  arrangements  that  seem  objectively  sound,  still  fail,  and  that
corporate governance mechanisms cannot prevent unethical activity by top management
(Solomon, 2013).  Thus board structure and substance do not necessarily go hand in
hand (McNulty, Zattoni, & Douglas, 2013; Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005; Westphal
& Graebner, 2010).
One such approach to study how governance actually works is the upper echelons
perspective.  While  the  early  upper  echelons  research  focused  on  measurable
demographic factors in an attempt to explain organisational outcomes (see for example
Hambrick, Cho, & Ming-Jer, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), more recent research
has recognised that demographic factors, rather than affecting organisational outcomes
directly,  affect  outcomes  indirectly  through  formal  and  informal  decision-making
processes  (see  for  example  Carpenter  &  Reilly,  2006;  Carpenter,  2005;  Hambrick,
Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). Carpenter & Reilly (2006) propose a construct, linking
top management team characteristics, not demographics, with organisational outcomes
through a multi-stage process as summarised below.
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As seen in Figure  6.1, top management team characteristics are linked through a
multi-stage process to organisation outcomes.  Organisational Outcome is the dependent
variable  in  this  study.   The  main  aim  of  investigation  of  the  present  study  is  the
organisational outcome for Bradford & Bingley between 1995 and 2010: the strategic
and organisational change which took place in the building society/bank, in the context
of the factors influencing, moderating, or preceding strategic and organisational change.
Four factors of the upper echelons perspective are identified as influencing the change,
namely its Contextual Factors, TMT Characteristics, Mediating Strategy Processes and
Attributes of Decision-Making. These are defined below in general terms. 
Contextual Factors: The context of the firm is an important factor to consider as
external events and relationships can have substantial bearing on the internal working of
the board and the decisions it takes (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). In this study, and in line
with  Carpenter  & Reilly  (2006),  Context is  defined as  “variables  that  describe  the
organisational and environmental circumstances” of the firm. These circumstances can
act as moderators of effects between the other variables or as antecedents to a variable
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Adapted from: (Carpenter & Reilly, 2006)
Figure 6.1: Objects of Upper Echelons Perspective
or  construct.  Therefore  context  is  divided  into  organisation-level  characteristics and
environment-level characteristics.
Organisation-level  characteristics:  These  characteristics  are  internal  to  the
organisation. In this study three factors are considered.  First, internal stakeholders, in
particular  building  society  members  and  employees,  though  only  pertinent  prior  to
demutualisation, are considered to be an antecedent/moderator factor.   Members and
employees,  through  annual  general  meetings  or  branch  visits  are  able  to  relay
information to the top management team. Similarly, by voting at AGMs, members are
able to express their opinions regarding the firm and its strategy. These expressions,
when  taken  up  by  management,  thus  form  a  possible  moderator  or  antecedent  to
whichever decision it relates to.
Second, organisational culture, is a moderator to TMT Characteristics through board
composition and board chemistry,  as well  as a moderator  to  the Mediating Strategy
Process by defining the tone and desired level of engagement with the firm, especially
of NEDs.  Furthermore, organisational culture is also linked with Attributes of Decision-
Making Processes, again through the tone and common ethos of the board.
Third, demutualisation, is an antecedent factor.  Demutualisation is internal to the
firm as only its members have the power to vote on demutualisation.  It is an antecedent
factor  as this  event  marks a  turning point,  fundamentally  changing the purpose and
strategic opportunities of the firm.
Environment-level  Characteristics:  These  characteristics  are  external  to  the
organisation and out of its control. In particular three characteristics are considered in
this study.
The first characteristic is the wider economic environment and market conditions.
The economy, as well as the particular market in which the firm is active, are considered
moderators on the choices and decisions directors take. For example, as seen in Section
5.4.1, the competitive environment created very low margins in the prime mortgage
lending market, thus influencing the strategic considerations of the board.
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The  second  characteristic,  an  antecedent,  is  nationalisation  in  2008.  Again,  as
demutualisation  before,  nationalisation  fundamentally  changed  the  strategic  and
economic outlook and opportunities of the firm, without direct influence, at the point of
nationalisation, by the board.  It is thus an antecedent to decisions taken after the event.
The third and final characteristic is again demutualisation, however defined as the
demutualisation  environment,  that  is,  the  demutualisation  of  competitors  and  the
resulting  pressures  on  the  firm  to  follow  the  path  of  its  competitors.   Hence  the
'demutualisation environment' is considered to be a moderator on TMT Characteristic,
Attributes of TMT Decision-Making, and Organisational Outcome, mainly by creating a
less structured and pressured environment.  Hence, demutualisation plays a dual role
depending on whether demutualisation is an internal or external process.
TMT Characteristics: TMT Characteristics  are  the  attributes  of  individuals  or
groups that are influential in shaping firm outcomes. Thus this variable operates on two
levels, on an individual director-level and on a TMT-Group level. 
A few studies have attempted to investigate board processes using psychological
characteristics and thus opening the ‘black box’ of governance.  However, it has been
acknowledged that access to, and participation of, executives in psychometric studies
and experiments is rare, if not unheard of  (Hambrick, 2007; Lawrence, 1997; Rost &
Osterloh, 2010).  This is even more true when researching financial institutions.  These
studies  thus  focus  on  proxies  (MBA Students)  (Rost  &  Osterloh,  2010) or  use  of
archival data containing personality information  (Peterson et al., 2003).  Surveys (for
example,  Rutherford  & Buchholtz,  2007)  and  observation  (Maitlis,  2004) are  other
forms of data gathering methods used to glimpse inside the ‘black box’.
This study uses a combination of interview and archival data to generate insights
into  how board  composition  impacts  on  the  other  independent  (Mediating  Strategy
Processes,  Contextual  Factors,  TMT  Decision-Making)  and  dependent  variable
(Organisational Outcome).  Board composition as the overarching construct is broken
down into individual and group level characteristics, in particular skills and knowledge
of  individual  board  members  (the  Knowledge  Resource  discussed  in  Chapter  5)
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(Kaufman & Englander, 2005) as well as group level characteristics of board diversity,
chemistry and turnover. 
Note that these attributes are not demographic proxies. Though connections could
be made between Demographic Proxies and TMT Characteristics, it is not required for
the argument presented here, as the use of Demographic Proxies has been shown not to
yield robust results (Dalton & Dalton, 2005); hence their exclusion.
To see why these specific attributes are considered in this research, it is helpful to
reiterate the focus of Chapter  5.  In this chapter, the changes in the three governance
functions of strategy, resource, and monitoring over the different life-cycle stages are
considered.  Central to the execution of these governance functions, was the vision and
evaluation of the circumstances in which the firm was at the respective time.  Thus the
collective evaluation of the needs of the firm, or analysis of a particular situation, is core
to  decision-making.   In  addition,  the  composition  of  the  TMT in  terms  of  skills,
diversity and chemistry is central to how and what decisions were reached.
Finally, TMT Characteristics are not operating in a vacuum, but are moderated by
contextual factors.  As seen in Chapter 5 – Period 1, strategic considerations, influenced
by an evaluation of the competitive environment and economic conditions, drove the
choice of CEO in 1996.  Similarly events such as demutualisation and nationalisation
changed the required skills profile of board members.  Lastly, the culture of the firm and
board has the power to affect TMT Characteristics through the choice of board members
that either fit in with the existing culture or deliberate choice of board members, such as
the appointment of Christopher Rodrigues in 1996, which introduced a different culture
to  the  board,  with  implications  for  board  chemistry,  turnover  and  future  board
composition.
Mediating Strategy Processes: TMT Characteristics  do not  necessarily  directly
affect Attributes of Decision-Making Processes.  Decision-making may be mediated by
intervening Strategy Processes  instead.   As much as  board composition in  terms of
skills, diversity and chemistry affect decision-making directly, there are also intervening
processes that can amplify or moderate the effect of TMT Characteristics.  In particular,
participation in planning processes, especially strategic planning (Stiles, 2001), but also
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the general level of engagement of non-executive directors with the firm, as well as the
amount, speed, and complexity of presentation of data can all have a bearing on how
and what decisions are taken (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995).
In  addition,  Mediating  Strategy  Processes  are  affected  by  the  firm’s  prevalent
culture.  The culture could inhibit or encourage participation in planning processes or
general engagement with the firm and foster or discourage information sharing between
executives and non-executives.  The effect of culture is also felt indirectly through TMT
Characteristics, being transmitted through board composition and chemistry.
Attributes of Decision-Making Processes: The focus on Attributes of Decision-
Making Processes is on CEO and Chairman leadership styles. The leadership of the
board and executive team is very important in shaping firm outcomes (Maitlis, 2004).
The relationship between CEO and Chairman (Roberts & Stiles, 1999), as well as their
style  of  conducting  the  board are fundamental  to  success  (Gabrielsson et  al.,  2007;
Leblanc, 2005).
Leadership styles however do not operate in a vacuum but are moderated by and
moderate other variables.  For example, it is conceivable that the CEO’s leadership style
will  have a moderating impact on the board’s engagement  with the firm and in the
planning  process.   Similarly,  leadership  style  is  influenced  by  the  (non-)executive's
personality and chemistry with the board (TMT Characteristic) as well as Contextual
Factors.  Specifically company culture can set the tone of conduct on board level and as
such may moderate the leadership style of the (non-) executive director. Having defined
the  constructs  of  the  upper  echelons  perspective,  the  next  section  discusses  the
application of these constructs to the Period 1995 – 2004.
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6.3  Period 1: 1995 – 2004
This  section  will  present  the  perceptions  and experiences  of  board  members  of
Bradford  & Bingley  during  Period  1.   In  particular,  the  focus  is  on  reporting  and
analysing the information gathered through interviews and other sources; presenting it
within the framework of the upper echelons theory as discussed in Section 6.2.
6.3.1  Contextual Factors
The section focuses on two contextual factors that have not been explored in detail
in the previous chapter, namely company culture and external environmental pressures.
Culture, as an influential construct in governance, has hitherto not played a significant
role in corporate governance research.  However, during the interviews, the importance
of company culture was frequently mentioned.  Culture thus provided an underlying
basis defining norms of behaviour on the board, as well as providing a set of shared
values of what the company stands for.  In that, it was cited as an influential factor in
decision-making.   Hence,  first,  the  change  of  culture  between  1995  and  2004  is
discussed in detail,  focusing on two aspects in particular: cultural change after 1996
with the arrival  of  Rodrigues  and cultural  change in  the early 2000s as  a  result  of
demutualisation. Then external environmental pressures are discussed, in particular the
perception of these by directors and any felt impacts on the board.
Culture: As already discussed briefly in Chapter  5, in 1995 Bradford & Bingley
was a  “cosy Yorkshire” mutual which had “done the same things the same way for a
long long time” 1.  The culture of the board and company at the time was described as
club-like, where one had to be inducted into the Building Society’s ‘way of life’2.  Other
adjectives used by interviewees in this context were ‘old fashioned’, ‘sheltered from
competition’, ‘benevolent dictatorship’, and ‘traditional’, as well as more positive ones
such as ‘caring’, ‘strong ethics’ and ‘not hire-and-fire’.  Overall though this underlines
the static nature of the company and its structures.
1 Director X
2 Director Z
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Lindsay Mackinlay, Chairman since 1995, however understood that the culture of
the  firm  and  the  board  were  unsuitable  for  the  new  commercial  reality  facing  it.
Financial deregulation in 1986 had increased competition in the financial sector and
opened up the firm’s traditional domain of mortgage lending and savings to commercial
banks.   As  a  consequence,  Building  Societies  lost  their  predominance  in  attracting
savings, which, by statute, had to fund at least 75 percent of all their mortgage lending.
Bradford & Bingley was thus faced with increasing competition within its core markets
by  other  Building  Societies  as  well  as  commercial  banks  and  other  new mortgage
lenders such as Kensington.  The old culture of the firm, its static aspects and traditional
routines were thus no longer deemed suitable for the new commercial reality facing the
firm.
This transition to becoming a more commercial and professional organisation (the
organisational outcomes of Period 1) was not without difficulties though. While some of
the decision-making structures, for example the inclusion of chief decision makers on
the board apart  from the CEO, was already in the process of reform in 1996 when
Christopher Rodrigues arrived, the task of cultural and structural change fell to the new
CEO.   As  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  Period  1,  Rodrigues  sought  to  professionalise
structures and commercialise the firm to enhance overall performance in line with the
chairman’s goal.  Part of this performance enhancement was the strategic repositioning
of the Society away from selling prime mortgages into specialised lending areas such as
buy-to-let and self-certified mortgages through the purchase of Mortgage Express where
margins are higher, as well as expanding into independent financial advice and estate
agencies by purchasing John Charcol independent financial advisers and Black Horse
Estate Agents respectively.  However, expanding into new business areas beyond prime
mortgage lending did not only satisfy the strategic needs of the firm, but also served as a
catalyst to change the firm’s culture as exemplified in this quote:
“When you get people in place, a team in place, then you start to motor.  Why
did we buy John Charcol?  Because it changed the culture.  We were trying to
broker,  they were fantastic mortgage brokers, …, Charcol Management got
broking.  We did not have anyone who got broking, so … we were going to
change the culture and the Board, …, but if the culture was ‘we are going to
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be both a manufacturer and retailer’ and our retail positioning was a broking
position, you needed to inject cultural change.”
Director X
Thus,  changing  culture  was  central  to  changing  the  firm.   However,  during
interviews,  a  divergent  view  on  what  culture  is  and  its  role  emerged.   While
demutualisation,  according  to  one  interviewee,  did  not  play  a  significant  role  in
influencing or changing culture3, others disagreed with that assessment arguing instead
that demutualisation did have an impact on culture by enforcing the need to change
culture in a plc environment.
“on  the  day  about  a  week  after  the  vote  to  demutualise,  one  of  the  big
questions was the culture, you know the whole organisation was defending
mutuality.   And  we  lost.   And  so  we  had  to  get  the  organisation  to  turn
round…”
Director X
Similarly to the differences expressed on the impact of demutualisation on culture,
the role of acquisitions of businesses in changing company culture is also contested.  As
already discussed above, acquisitions of businesses were not only done for strategic
reasons, but also as catalysts to change company culture.  However, some interviewees
were not in agreement regarding the effect these acquisitions ultimately had on culture.
While  it  was  agreed  that  these  new  businesses  did  have  a  different  culture  and  a
different way of operating4, they were not perceived to change culture as they remained
largely independent organisations with their own offices.  Attempts at integration were
described as limited to common conferences and reward structures5. 
Thus, the only impact on culture that was generally agreed upon was through the
tone set by key decision-makers on the board.  Of particular importance seemed to be
3 Director A
4 Director D
5 Director A
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the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who were credited for setting the ethos of the firm.
During the late 1990s when Lindsay Mackinlay and Trevor Lewis were heading the
board, stewardship of the business was the guiding principle of governance and culture.
“The  culture  that  the  Chairman  brought  to  the  Board,  Trevor  Lewis  and
Lindsey McKinley, the Vice Chair and the Chair, absolutely set the tone of the
Mutual  that  it  was.  We were stewards of  the business  and becoming more
commercial  was  what  we  had to  do  as  stewards,  not  what  we  had to  do
because we were going to get big bonuses or profit, [or] share options.”
Director X
Furthermore, the same interviewee explained that this stewardship was not practised
in a vacuum, but for a purpose:
“You are governing on behalf of someone.  Boards are stewards of a business
- they don't own the business unless it is a private company, they are stewards
of the business”
While  this  discussion  raises  doubts  on  the  success  of  inducing  cultural  change
through acquisitions in Bradford & Bingley, culture is recognised as central to operating
a  financial  services  business,  as  the  importance  of  stewardship  and  ethics  to  top
management team members shows.  The last aspect of note is the impact of leadership
on culture and the role played by the Chairman and Chief Executive in setting the tone
and defining culture.  Thus the discussion turns to top management team composition
and leadership next.
External  Environment: In  addition  to  what  was  discussed  in  Section  5.3, this
section will look at the external pressures perceived by directors of Bradford & Bingley.
In particular, pressure from stakeholders in the City were repeatedly commented on. The
share price as well  as profits  and asset growth were the main items pushed by city
analysts. Prior to demutualisation, the society’s goal was to grow assets and its surplus
in relation to other societies, however the pressure to grow its assets were much less
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than they were post-demutualisation6.  Post-demutualisation, the share price as well as
dividends became a focal point of attention of shareholders.  A number of interviewees
commented in particular on the perceived constant comparison of Bradford & Bingley
to Northern Rock – then the star of the financial markets7. This focus on Northern Rock
directly influenced board discussion, as the success and means of success of Northern
Rock were frequently argued about8.  However,  the board during Period 1 was very
resistant to give in to the pressures of shareholders. In particular, the board was against
softening credit criteria as it was seen as unprofitable and involved excessive risk.
“I remember the Board meeting at which we had a discussion about why we
were being badmouthed in the market by the analysts because we weren't as
interesting and exciting as Northern Rock, and … I said 'I don't know how to
lend money at 125%', and … the Board said 'nor do we' … but we got a lot of
stick from the analysts … but certainly back then all they wanted was growth
… we believe the risk profile [of lending at 125%] is unsustainable.”
Director X
The  intense  focus  and  pressure  on  share  price  did  contribute  to  some  of  the
decisions the board took, such as the move into acquiring third party mortgages in order
to supplement organic growth9. Another interviewee also commented on the importance
of the share price to Rodrigues, perceiving some of the reactions to a changing share
price as “knee jerked” 10. 
Besides the importance of the share price to stakeholders and management, several
interviewees highlighted their  believe in the importance of protecting customers and
customer funds over the share price11. In particular, Director A argued that the customer
6 Director A
7 Director X
8 Director A
9 Director C
10 Director D
11 Director D
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has to be the focus, as only when management looks after its customers, it looks after its
shareholders12.
6.3.2  Board Composition
Cultural change is not only achieved through alterations of the tone from the top
and new business objectives, as discussed in Chapter 5 – Section 5.4.2, but also via an
accompanying change of personnel on board level.  Thus, just as there was cultural
change, the board experienced significant changes as well.  In Chapter  5 the general
changes on the board of directors during Period 1 were discussed, focusing on structural
changes of personnel and skill.  In contrast, this section concentrates on the impact of
these personnel changes on board chemistry and diversity and how these changes are
reflected in how the board worked as a team during this period.
Board change was necessary in 1995.  Until then only Lindsay Mackinlay had any
financial  expertise  on  the  board  and  it  was  not  until  that  time  that  a  second  non-
executive director with financial knowledge joined in the person of Mark Smith.  In
general,  board members were not experienced in financial  matters,  at  least  not  to a
degree expected of a financial institution.  Nevertheless they were described as being
financially  astute13 due  to  non-executive  directors  generally  being,  or  having  been,
executives elsewhere.  In addition, it could be argued that this lack of detailed financial
knowledge did not constitute a major disadvantage to small and medium-sized Building
Societies  due  to  the  limited  and  prescriptive  nature  of  legally  permitted  business
activities and their comparably small balance sheets.  Business activities were limited to
taking savings deposits and lending these as prime mortgages, additionally, until 1997,
savings had to cover at least 75 percent of outstanding mortgage balances.  Furthermore,
until  1983 the  Building  Societies  Association  ran  an  interest  rate  cartel,  effectively
eliminating competition in the mortgage market.  Given this historic background the
demand  on  the  financial  expertise  of  non-executive  board  members  is  limited  and
should be expected to be reflected in board composition.
12 Director A
13 Director Z
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With the demise of the interest rate cartel and legal changes permitting a greater
variety  of  activities,  demands  on  the  skills  and  expertise  of  directors  necessarily
increased.  In the case of Bradford & Bingley, business activities outside the traditional
domain  included  housing  association  finance,  commercial  lending,  and  an  ill-fated
attempt at diversification in entering the German mortgage market in the early 1990s.
Following this prelude, the demands on the board grew dramatically under the reign of
Christopher Rodrigues.  Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.4.1, the firm’s strategy
and business areas transformed significantly between 1996 and 2003 and consequently
so did the demands on the board.  Besides this expansion of business areas, another
driver  of  demand  on  board  skills  was  the  new CEO’s  drive  to  commercialise  and
professionalise the firm.  He deemed this step vital to the survival of the firm in the new
competitive environment.
Thus Rodrigues deliberately re-engineered the senior management team to form a
group of people which support him.  As one interviewee explained: “It is difficult for a
new CEO with new ideas to rely on the old executive team” 14.  Again, as already noted
in the previous chapter, board turnover happened in two phases.  The first phase saw
turnover on the executive side of the board with the CEO introducing new executives
that would support him in his vision.  The second phase, after conversion to plc status,
saw non-executive directors coming to the end of their tenure and being replaced by
experienced plc directors.
Executive Directors:  Besides  the appointment  of  Christopher  Rodrigues,  which
was described as a ‘change catalyst’, the second key appointment to the executive team
was Rosemary Thorne.  Thorne joined from Sainsbury’s Finance to replace John A W
Smith in 1999, due to her experience in retailing financial  services and Bradford &
Bingley’s  move  into  retailing  a  variety  of  financial  services  since  1997.   She  was
described  as  fitting  into  the  senior  executive  team,  in  particular,  she  was  seen  as
‘knowledgeable but not revolutionary’ and as a ‘good auditor who brought in her own
ideas’15.  Furthermore, she saw management controls as important and was not seen as
‘a spreads person’, hence being seen as ‘on top of treasury (function)’ 16.  Overall, the
14 Director D
15 Director D
16 Director X
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comments create the impression that she was someone who was steady, 'not rocking the
boat',  and  thus  not  only  fitting  in  with  the  existing  building  society  culture  but
additionally coming with plc experience.  She was the key appointment in the executive
team as the Financial Director is the key person the CEO needs in support of executing
his vision as well as acting as a counterweight to him17.  Other executives joining the
board in  the late  1990s were David Woodcock with the acquisition of  Black Horse
Estate Agency, who was described as ‘having a different way of working due to being
an estate agent’ 18, and Keith Greenough who joined Bradford & Bingley in 1997 with
the acquisition of Mortgage Express and promoted to the board in 2000, who was seen
as a ‘very able administrator who understood his business’ 19.  Keith Greenough, with
his experience in non-primary mortgage markets, occupied the position of Director of
Lending & Savings,  thus being responsible to implement the banks new strategy of
expanding in niche markets such as buy-to-let and self-certified lending.
Figure  6.2 below further underlines the nature of change on the executive side of
the board,  again, highlighting sentiments expressed by interviewees, namely that the
chief executive wants to form a team that he can trust and work with20, and that the
senior executive team was re-engineered deliberately to introduce ‘new blood’ and ‘new
thinking’ as it  is difficult to rely on the old executive team for new ideas21 -  which
Rodrigues  was  certainly  introducing.   The  turnover  on  key  senior  management
positions, particularly Finance and Operations, is thus a consequence of the need for
trust and support between key executives and the chief executive.  Telling in this context
is a comment made by one interviewee: “about six months in [after Rodrigues arrived]
… we had a [board] meeting and … [asked Rodrigues]: ‘what do you think after six
months in, what do you think?’ and … [he] said: ‘we have got a very good, broadly
speaking, we have got very good staff but the senior management needs to change’ and
it was a real moment of truth because some … thought that … [he] would say exactly
17 Director C
18 Director D
19 Director D
20 Director Z
21 Director D
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the opposite and … [the] issue was leadership not followership.” 22  Thus in changing
the  board  the  new  chief  executive  pursued  a  number  of  goals:  first,  to  introduce
executives that he could work with and would support his vision, second, to align the
skills  and  experiences  of  the  executive  team  with  the  requirements  of  his  desired
strategy, and, third, to introduce cultural change from the top.
However,  not all  hirings worked out and some directors left  voluntarily.   Kevin
McGuinness, long-running Company Secretary and working for the society since 1964,
was  promoted  to  the  board  during  demutualisation  and  left  the  firm  at  the  end  of
February 2002 as it was developing in a direction that he was not comfortable with23.
Instead he choose to remain in the mutual sector by joining Darlington Building Society
as  a  non-executive  director.  The  year  2002  was  also  a  turning  point  for  the  non-
executive side of the board with a large number of retirements.
Non-Executive Directors: As discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.4.2, board turnover
on the non-executive side of the board was driven by age and tenure with all directors
retiring in their mid-sixties after seven to thirteen years of service. Thus, having reached
retirement age as well as the maximum recommended length of service, a large amount
of turnover was inevitable. While demutualisation did not have as immediate an effect
on Non Executive Director (NED) board composition as it did on the executive team,
the recruitment of Nicholas Cosh and George Cox were already reflecting the change of
incorporation status. Nevertheless it was recognised that the board needed a refresh for
22 Director X
23 Director D
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Figure 6.2: Outgoing Executive Directors (1996 – 2003)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Geoffrey Lister Chief Executive, Age 60
Steven Spilsbury Financial Services Director, Age 53
Michael Pheasey Operations Director, Age 53
John A W Smith Finance Director, Age 53
David Woodcock Director Distribution, Age 62
Kevin McGuinness Company Secretary, Age 53
Keith Greenough Director Lending & Savings, Age 52
Note: Greenough joined B&B in 1997 with the acquisition of Mortgage Express and was promoted to the board in 2000
the plc environment and the year 2002/2003 provided the opportunity to do so with five
retirements24.
It is undisputed that the incoming non-executive directors were very experienced
and thus their contribution to decision-making should be significant.  However, despite
new NEDs putting up challenges to existing procedures and strategies, they did not
challenge the fundamental tenets of the firm’s strategy25.  Director C further remarked
that by 2003 “I remember looking to see who the Board was going to be and what parts
of the past they might represent and it was only Trevor Lewis who was still on the Board
… from the days  of  the Building Society”,  and the  inherent  loss  of  knowledge and
heritage of the firm:
“I do remember thinking, … is it right to give a completely new set of people
control  over  a  business  which  is  important  and  big,  with  lots  of
responsibilities as a business, or should there still be elements from the past
who can put up their hand and say, ‘look, you know, this is not how we would
have  done it  five  years  ago,  or  eight  years  ago’.  I  remember  having that
thought.” 
By that  time,  the  only  person  on  the  board  with  significant  tenure  during  the
building society’s years was Rodrigues, who was never seen as a building society man
and  indeed  was  questioned  about  his  commitment  to  mutuality26.   Others  who had
joined prior to demutualisation were Rosemary Thorne (joined in 1999) and Nicholas
Cosh  (1999),  however  they  only  spent  one  year  on  the  society’s  board  before  the
24 Director D
25 Director C
26 Heading for clear waters,  Mortgage Finance, Jan. 1997, pp. 18-19, Hugh Thompson
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Figure 6.3: Incoming Non-executive Directors (1995 – 2003)
1995 – 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Nicholas Cosh Former FD, professional NED, Age 53
George Cox Director General IoD, Age 57
Roderick Kent Chairman & former CEO Close Brothers, Age 55
Louise Patten Professional NED, well connected, Age 44
Ian Cheshire CEO B&Q/Kingfisher, Age 50
Stephen Webster Former Partner PWC, FD Wolseley, Age 51
conversion.  Interestingly, at the same time as the director expressed his doubts about
the  board  and  its  suitability  to  be  running  the  bank,  Director  C  welcomed  newer
members joining the board as they provided “a feeling of relief that there was someone
in their 50’s, or maybe even in their 40’s, … rather than somebody in their 60’s … with
a fresher more recent outlook”.
The ambivalence expressed in these quotes is of interest insofar as it demonstrates
the  opposing  forces  working  on  board  composition  leading  to  a  loss  of  existing
knowledge  of  the  firm,  while  introducing  new knowledge  and  experiences  that  are
important and relevant for future success.  All the same, the notion of having to let go
and pass  the  firm into  a  different  set  of  hands  is  very  strong and exposes  a  close
relationship, maybe even personal relationship, between the director and the firm.  It
also expresses doubt that the new leadership is as capable and respectful of the heritage
as the past leadership.
In summary, between 1997 and 2004, the board had been transformed dramatically,
transitioning from a board suited to a mutual organisation to a board suited to a plc
organisation.  One interviewee expressed this suitability in explaining that by 2004 the
board was equipped with the skills to be able to deal with technology issues, as well as
business  model  issues,  especially  the  move  into  retailing  financial  services.   The
following section will detail how board diversity changed as a result of changes to board
composition.
Diversity: The personnel turnover on the top management team led to a change of
experience and background, however this did not have impact on diversity in general.
Despite a trend to introduce younger directors in the early 2000s, the board consisted of
middle-aged  white  males  with,  at  most  two  women  (Rosemary  Thorne  and  Diana
Courtney/Louise  Patten)27.   Interestingly,  the  white  middle-aged  male  interviewees
perceived the board as  being diverse nevertheless,  and tied diversity  not  to  gender,
social class, or age, but to occupational background and geographical origin28.  By these
measures the board actually became less diverse in terms of occupational background
and more diverse in terms of geographical origin.  As already discussed in Section 5.4.2,
27 See Section 5.4.2 for discussion
28 Director A
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and  depicted  in  D.1 (Appendix  D,  page  251),  since  the  1990s  the  board  became
increasingly staffed by business experts, that is, directors with a background in financial
services.  The increasing number of business experts was driven by the need of the firm
to have a professional and competent management (though it still got into trouble) that
has  the  ability  to  understand  the  increasingly  complex  organisation  and  financial
markets and to satisfy FSA demands in terms of knowledge and expertise available on
the board.  The need to have more business experts on the board directly led to an
increase  in  geographical  diversity  in  that  the  desired  skills  and  experience  was  not
available locally in Bradford or Yorkshire29.  The geographical expansion of business
operations also played a role in the board becoming less populated by local directors,
but the skills requirements were the driving factor.
While  age  was  generally  not  a  concern  for  interviewees30,  the  top  management
team’s average age decreased significantly in the 2002/2003 turnover and even further
after that.  Figure  E.1 (Appendix, page  252) shows the decline in average age, which
was  especially  pronounced  for  executive  directors.   While  age  was  not  seen  as
important, interviewees acknowledged that there is an age-experience correlation and
that, by definition, there is an impact of age on experience and thus on the board and the
available expertise for decision-making31.
In summary, despite the changes on the board, it was striking that most interviewees
stated that the impact of board turnover on the dynamics on the board was negligible or
non-existent.  While for example Director C stated that “there was a feeling of relief of
younger members joining”  and Director X remarking that  “every time you change a
board member you change the dynamic on the board”,  others had a much different
view.  For example Director D thought that decision-making had been remarkably stable
throughout  the  years  and that  there  was  no  particular  impact  of  turnover,  with  the
exception of the arrival of Rodrigues.  That same director also saw board turnover as a
“double-edged sword” and that either too little or too much of it is a handicap.  What
remains  is  that  the  building  society  was  set  to  change  after  1996  and  that  with
demutualisation  in  2000 it  had  to  adapt  to  the  new realities  of  a  plc  environment,
29 Director A
30 Director Z
31 Director Z
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whether directors looked back at the ‘old days with sadness’ or not.  That decision-
making is at the very least impacted by key figures on the board will be seen in the
TMT Decision-Making section further down.
6.3.3  Mediating Strategy Processes
Engagement with the Firm:  A further component of decision-making and board
interaction,  as well as being affected by the overall  chemistry on the board,  is each
director’s  engagement  with the  firm as  well  as  their  access  to  vital  information for
decision-making.   In  terms  of  engagement  with  the  firm,  a  variety  of  levels  of
engagement can be observed, and indeed, differences of opinion about this engagement.
An interesting case is the evaluation of engagement of Lindsay Mackinlay.  Mackinlay,
being the chairman, spent time attending executive committee meetings.  This was in
order to stay informed of the ongoing discussions on the executive side of the board to
be in a better position to evaluate the proposals that are eventually put forward on full
board meetings.  Thus one could conclude that the director was well engaged with the
firm.  Director X however described Mackinlay as “being more arms length” and spoke
of  “having to reach out to him”.   Similarly Director D described some directors as
“remote” and “not people’s people”.  This further contrasts with Director A who stated
that  with  Lindsay  Mackinlay  becoming  chairman,  the  board  team  became  more
involved in  the firm and had a  closer  relationship to  the executive members  of  the
board.   The perception of  engagement  with  the  firm is  thus  very different  between
different members of the top management team and raises questions on what influences
these views or perceptions.
Trevor Lewis, vice-chairman 1995 – 2003, was seen to demonstrate a high level of
engagement with the firm.  He spent much time engaging with staff of all levels to
understand  the  dynamics  of  the  business.   It  was  said  that  he  spent  much  time
conducting  branch  visits  and  talking  to  staff.   The  information  gathered  on  these
occasions would then inform decision-making on the board as, on occasion, it emerged
that  some  policies  pursued  by  top  management  created  problems  and  were  not  as
effective as they were believed to be32.  Additionally, he would conduct regular 1-on-1
meetings with executive directors to discuss how the business was doing.  However, this
32 Director A
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level of involvement with the firm comes close to the fine line separating non-executive
and executive directors33, especially considering Lewis’ involvement with the Asset and
Liability Oversight Committee (ALCO) until demutualisation.
Board involvement with the business, besides the examples above, increased over
time, as evidenced by a number of interviewees specifically stating this, for example,
Director  A34.   Of  interest  here  is  how  directors  engage  with  the  firm  outside  the
framework of regular board meetings, that is, what happens between these events that
potentially shapes outcomes.  In addition, what strikes as important in the interviews is
the issue of time and engagement.  Non-executive directors thought that having the time
to immerse themselves in what is to be discussed at the board meeting is very important
to being able to contribute constructively35.  The pressure on time commitment did not
only relate to having the right information on time, but also pressures from external jobs
NEDs might hold, either through a number of directorships or by being in full time
employment elsewhere.  On Bradford & Bingley’s board, both cases are present.  For
example  Cheshire  and  Cox  had  significant  day  jobs  at  Kingfisher  and  Institute  of
Directors (IoD) respectively, while Patten and Kent had a number of other director- and
chairmanships. Lewis on the other hand primarily focused on Bradford & Bingley and
thus was able to commit more time to his job as vice-chairman.  Thus as Director D
pointed out, it was difficult to do the NED role well, that is, to commit the time and
intellect required to make good decision and contribute constructively.
Director A further remarked that getting involved in the business is very rewarding
as one’s contribution at board meetings can be related to what is happening on the front
line of the business. It also increases the quality of oversight as one has more first-hand
information than would otherwise be available through board papers alone.  Similarly,
Director X concluded that direct engagement with the firm through site visits provides
information on what is important to a variety of stakeholders, for example, customers
and staff, and thus on what management should be focusing its time and efforts.  On a
33 Director Z
34 “I think  on the  whole the  non-executive  team ...  probably  [had] a closer  relationship [with the
executive team], certainly in terms of how the business was being run between the non-execs and the
execs, … that changed from a very small close knit [executive] team.”
35 Director Z
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board level,  Director  X judged that  board engagement  had increased over  time and
moved away from being remote from the business.  Furthermore, until the mid-1990s,
the society was run by a small, close knit team headed by the managing director and
senior  managers.   The  managing director  was  the  only executive  on the  board  and
would control the flow of information to the board.  Lindsay Mackinlay first pushed for
other senior managers to be elevated to full executives on the board in order to reduce
the power of the managing director36.  Again, during the building society era strategy
was also not high on the agenda due to the rigid regulatory framework and thus the
focus was more on supervision of day-to-day operations, rather than engaging in long
term  planning  and  strategy.   With  the  arrival  of  Rodrigues  this  changed  as  non-
executives had to necessarily engage with the ideas proposed by the new CEO on how
to reform the society37.   The increased pressure of decision-making on strategy had
beneficial effects on board involvement in decisions.  The focus of NEDs thus shifted
from supervision to considering strategic and long term issues affecting the firm.  NEDs
were not the only ones increasing their time spent on strategic issues as Rodrigues also
spent substantial time on longer term issues.  According to Director X, Rodrigues spent
approximately a third of his time on these.
This involvement and time commitment is not limited to length and frequency of
attendance at board meetings, but includes time spent discussing issues informally with
colleagues.  On the executive side, the engagement of the Finance Director, Operations
Director and Head of Strategy by the CEO in discussing and deciding on the future
direction of the business is important38.  However, it was seen as equally important to
reach out to NEDs to build their understanding of and commitment to a strategy, and to
get a sense of their thinking of, and possible objections to, new ideas before they are
fully developed39.   In this  regard,  informal discussions outside board and committee
meetings formed an important building block of decision-making40.  A lot of discussion
36 Director Z
37 Director X
38 Director X
39 Director X
40 Director A
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also happened in private, especially concerning more radical ideas41.  A further forum of
discussion  outside  the  actual  board  meeting  was the  board  dinner  the  night  before.
While  not  necessarily  all  EDs  would  attend,  key  decision  makers  would  join  for
informal  discussions  in  a  relaxed atmosphere42.   Mackinlay’s  idea  was to  provide a
forum to raise issues informally prior to the meeting and to help other NEDs to get a full
understanding of the item to be discussed the next day.  It was however stressed that
discussions during board dinners would not pre-empt the board meeting43.
Finally, the decision in 2002 to divide head offices between Bradford and London is
also a mediating factor in decision-making processes.  Director A explained that it was
necessary to be closer to the city after demutualisation,  in particular for the finance
function.  However, this created a split in the executive team working from two different
locations and required more use of teleconferencing for board, committee and general
meetings  as  well  as  more  travel  between  London  and  Bradford  for  face-to-face
meetings.  The loss of ability to directly speak with colleagues was felt and made it
more challenging to  manage the division44.   This  was expressed in  the difficulty  of
splitting and allocating time and attention between the two locations and groups.  While
it was insisted that there were no effects on decision-making in formal settings, possibly
because board meetings were generally face-to-face, it would seem unlikely that this
division  did  not  have  any  impact  on  cohesion  and  decision-making  of  the  top
management team.
Management  Information  (Systems):  Another  factor  influencing  the  level  of
engagement and the board’s ability to make timely and good decisions is the quality and
quantity of management information.  Management information systems (MIS), their
correct functioning and timely output are crucial in contributing relevant information to
support board decisions.  While interviewees deemed MIS at Bradford & Bingley to be
generally acceptable45, there was indication that changes and improvements were made
41 Director Z
42 Director Z
43 Director Z
44 Director A
45 Director  A:  “Would  you  say  then  that  the  internal  management  information  systems  were
appropriate for running the business?”  “Yes I would.”
167
over the years46.  Yet, many interviewees expressed a sense of dissatisfaction with the
information provided47.
In the 1990s the focus of management information was on the written word, that is,
board papers and the board was reliant on these in its decision-making48.  In fact, during
the monthly board meetings, executives had additional information interlined in their
own packs in order to be prepared for possible questions by non-executive directors49.
As earlier indicated, Lindsay Mackinlay and Trevor Lewis were both members of the
ALCO and, additionally, Lewis spent a considerable amount of time ‘on the shop floor’;
the behaviour of executives of interlining their papers with additional information as
described above, coupled with Mackinlay’s and Lewis’ membership could be construed
as a way of non-executives gathering additional information that would otherwise not be
available to them through board papers.  This is supported by Director Z who was in
informal attendance at some of these meetings for the same reason. 
In those days the amount of information available through the board papers was
described as extensive50 and voluminous51.  Others looked at them differently and found
them to be comprehensive52 and varying over time with a peak during demutualisation53.
The size of board packs was also criticised as the sheer amount of information was not
always  helpful  in  finding  the  relevant  information  to  support  or  reject  a  specific
proposal54.  Furthermore, it was remarked that the large amount of available information
may  lead  to  a  lack  of  understanding  through  difficulties  in  sense  making55.   The
46 Director X: “There was a considerable improvement, … when Rosemary [Thorne] came on board …,
she and the people she had did a pretty good job at improving the MI ….”
47 Director A: “I think later [MIS timeliness] had become something of a problem, ... but I know in later
stages it was slightly behind the cuff. … I don't know to what extent that was remedied.”
48 Director Z
49 Director A
50 Director C
51 Director Z
52 Director A
53 Director D
54 Director Z
55 Director D
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increasing demands on the business, through expansion but also changes in financial
markets, put further pressure on management systems.  In terms of financial advances,
the introduction of cost centres and more statistical details about customers as well as
advances in  the treasury function,  for example,  hedging and interest  rate sensitivity,
forced improvements in MIS56.  The purchase of Mortgage Express, John Charcol and
Black Horse Estate Agents, as well as previous acquisitions of other building societies
increased  the  complexity  and geographic  dispersion  of  the  business,  contributing  to
making Management Information (MI) more time consuming and difficult to collate.
Nevertheless,  key business  areas  were reportedly able  to  generate  management  data
within 8-9 days after month end57.  The new business units such as Mortgage Express
were all simple P&L businesses and as such were not very complex to integrate with the
results of the main operations.
Not  every  director  shared  this  assessment  though,  with  both  Director  A and  Z
stating that  MIS became less  punctual.  Similarly Director  X explained that  Finance
Director (FD) Thorne, improved MIS and that end of year data was available within 10 -
12 working days.  Nevertheless, Director Z found that during his tenure business reports
of the previous week were generally available on a Monday morning and that, at least
for  these  reports,  the  issue  tended  not  to  be  timeliness  but  insufficient  filtering  of
information, especially once the business had expanded through acquisitions.  Arguing
against this assessment was Director D, who found MIS to be timely and sufficient and
that  any  delays  were  not  detrimental  to  decision-making.   Interestingly,  the  same
interviewee complained that MIS in non-core areas were weak, and that there were
particular problems with risk assessment. The weakness in risk assessment moved into
focus after demutualisation due to environmental pressures.  Moreover, the focus of risk
assessment procedures was blamed on the consultants of the Big 4 accounting firms
who were  interested  in  selling  their  expertise  in  this  area,  to  the  detriment  of  risk
identification58.  It is remarkable that at least some members of the top management
team were aware of this issue at the time, given that a distinct lack of risk identification
(and possible  understanding)  could  be seen  as  a  contributing  factor  to  the  strategic
56 Director D
57 Director D
58 Director D
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mistakes  made  by a  different  management  team in  Period  2  and  3  (2004 –  2008).
Director Z further added that he thought the interpretation of data to be more crucial to
the success of the business than the quality of available data.
In summary, despite improvements in generating management information, many
directors had reservations about the timeliness and volume of this data and consequently
found decision-making, if not impaired, doubtful as to whether the right data had been
used  in  support  of  business  decisions.  The  different  perceptions  of  MIS  by  top
management  team members  are  also  puzzling  as  all  were  speaking about  the  same
period of time.  This could possibly be explained by different personal expectations as
to the appropriate time it takes to generate MI data. The final section in Period 1 will
consider TMT Decision-Making and the influence board leader had as well as other
directors influence during board meetings.
6.3.4  TMT Decision-Making
This section on TMT decision-making first explores interviewee perceptions and
opinions about the personalities and styles of four key persons: Lindsay Mackinlay, Rod
Kent, Christopher Rodrigues and Steven Crawshaw.  In so doing, the differences in their
personal styles and priorities will become apparent and inform the way the company
developed under their tenure.  It then, in more detail, explores the role of executive and
non-executive directors on the board as well as within the committee structure of the
firm, including the views of the role of the Chairman and Chief Executive, and their
relationship with each other. Finally, the boardroom culture is discussed.
Leadership Styles
Lindsay Mackinlay:  Even though he was seen as engaged with the business, he
was  seen  as  less  interventionist  and  more  arm’s  length.   Indeed,  it  was  said  that
executive directors had to reach out to him to engage him in what was happening within
the firm, and further, that Mackinlay would only come to the office periodically.  This
does partially align with his desire to give the executive team space to implement the
board decisions59.   Specifically,  not  being  in  the  office  frequently,  or  being in  very
59 Director Z
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frequent contact with key executive decision-makers does fit this desire.  However, it
does seem to clash with his role on the ALCO.  Even though the role was described as
purely observational, the sheer presence of him (and VC Lewis), as well as their official
membership of the committee until 1999, got him involved in discussions ostensibly
“to  give  advice  and  feedback”  60 and  to  gather  information  for  the  board.
Understanding the  discussions  and reasoning underlying  the  board  papers,  and thus
having a  better  grasp  of  the  issues,  was  sought  in  order  to  improve the  quality  of
discussion on the board.  While there is an obvious element of engagement with the
firm, it is a fine line between engagement and intervention, supervision and co-option,
or to put in another context, between being a non-executive and executive chairman61.
In addition, it was said that Mackinlay and Rodrigues had a close relationship and spent
much time deliberating the future and strategy of the organisation.
Mackinlay  was  described  as  a  consensus  seeker  and  disliked  confrontations.
Occasional  disagreements  on  the  board  were  thus  not  welcomed  by  him and  were
expressed through his actions, specifically failing to shorten discussions by having a
more steering role62.   While  this  may have had a  negative impact  on the length of
deliberations  on  the  board,  his  approach  did  positively  impact  board  cohesion  and
chemistry.  In particular, it was reported that board members would call the chairman in
case they had any queries, which suggests a level of trust and openness on the board
resulting in  a  certain degree of cohesion.   Another  aspect  of  his  approach to board
leadership was the strong dislike for surprises during board meetings.  The chairman
saw it as important that everything that was to be discussed during a board meeting will
have  been  raised  before  informally,  with  a  view  to  creating  the  opportunity  for
meaningful discussion through preparation of participants.  In a similar vein Mackinlay
also sought to control the agenda of the board, thus reducing decision-making pressures,
by limiting what Rodrigues could present to  the board.   Rodrigues,  being an ‘ideas
man’63, did have many ideas and Mackinlay saw it as important to limit the number of
ideas coming to the board through bilateral discussions with Rodrigues to ensure that
60 Director Z
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ideas had been properly vetted and discussed in executive committees.  This again links
with the chairman’s presence on the ALCO in that it would provide him with advance
information regarding Rodrigues’ ideas and a sense of the discussion of these, and, in
particular, how advanced in the planning stage these ideas were.
The final element of Mackinlay’s approach that aligns with his overall style and
personality is caution and reflection.  In seeking to further the consensus on the board,
he valued reflection on failures to reach consensus as very important in advancing the
board agenda.  This introspective approach is also visible in his cautious treatment of
new financial  instruments.  His limited knowledge of new financial  instruments, for
example  securitisation,  and  knowledge  of  the  building  society  roots  of  the  firm
influenced his attitude.  During his tenure, Bradford & Bingley did not venture into
complex financial instruments, though a securitisation vehicle was set up with the view
to gaining experience in securitisation and to evaluate its future potential for the firm. 
Christopher Rodrigues: Rodrigues was hired by Mackinlay in 1996 to change the
Yorkshire mutual.  At first Rodrigues felt frustrated that the existing building societies
legislation  was  tying  his  hands  in  what  he  could  do  in  terms  of  strategy  and  new
business areas and hence found it difficult to adapt to the situation he found himself in.
He was very different from his predecessor in style and attitude and, as discussed above
in Section 5.4.2, some members of the executive team found it difficult to adapt to.  One
thing  that  stood  out  from  the  interviews  with  directors  was  their  admiration  of
Rodrigues as possessing a strong personality with one interviewee even describing him
as being a  ‘larger  than life  character’.   Hence it  is  not  surprising to  see him being
described as a good leader and motivator and being very charismatic.
Being a leader, Rodrigues fundamentally changed the way the executive decision-
making  structure  worked.   For  example,  he  continued  to  push  for  the  addition  of
executives to the board in their own right (for example the Company Secretary), thus
elevating them from senior manager status.  He also worked hard to get executives to
participate  in  discussions  on  committee  and  board  level  and  gave  them  more
responsibility for their own departments.  Part of the discussion culture was also the
ability and expectation that executives would express their  opinion and stand up for
their ideas, and, that in the end, all participants agreed on the best course of action.  This
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style was miles apart from the way the society had worked in the past, which was much
more the way Mackinlay operated, that is consensus based.  However, in contrast to
Rodrigues and Mackinlay, decision-making before the mid-1990s was monopolised by a
small group of managers around the general manager with non-executives only rubber-
stamping the manager’s proposals.
Rodrigues  did  not  only  ‘work  his  executives  hard’ but  also  demanded  more
engagement  from  non-executives.  In  the  very  beginning,  he  reportedly  did  not
appreciate  the  need  to  keep  ‘certain  people’ on  board,  as  one  interview  put  it64.
Subsequently though he spent considerable effort in engaging the board to convince
them of his ideas. One example of engaging the board and making it more open towards
his ideas was through the use of strategy days which functioned as a sort of retreat with
board dinners and consultants attending for presentation. The idea was to enable blue
sky thinking and to have non-executive board members actively engaged in strategising
and discussing the future of the firm65. In addition, Rodrigues spent considerable time
and effort to prepare the board in advance of new proposals and ideas, and in particular,
to gauge how receptive the chairman would be66. Given the strategic changes discussed
in Chapter 5 – Period 1, his approach did bear fruits in leading strategic change.
While  Rodrigues  was successful  in  this  regard,  a  number of  interviewees made
comments on a particular trait of his, being repeatedly called ‘an ideas man’67. As was
already discussed in Chapter 5 Section 5.4.2, one of the driving factors of the hiring of
Rodrigues was his reputation for strategy and ideas. However, his style did impact the
board, and in particular, non-executive directors. While generating a large number of
ideas may be beneficial to the business in transition, it did have the consequence of
overwhelming  directors.  In  particular,  Director  Z  stated  that  Rodrigues  had  to  be
‘reigned in’ at times in order for the board to have sufficient time to study and discuss
the  ideas  put  forward.  In  addition  to  the  concern  about  the  ability  to  discuss  any
proposals in sufficient nature, ideas were sometimes presented prematurely, that is, the
64 Director D
65 Director D
66 Director Z
67 For example, Director Z and Director D
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proposal  was  not  quite  ready  to  be  evaluated  by  the  full  board  and  consequently
rejected68. It further manifested itself in a tendency to be working close to a deadline,
and thus giving limited time to NEDs to consider the merit of the proposal prior to a
board meeting.  The quick flow of  ideas  within  a  short  time frame also meant  that,
besides having to be slowed down69, that ideas were not always followed through and he
moved on quickly to a new idea70, discarding the old, thus potentially creating a lack of
consistency  in  direction  and  shortness  of  attention  to  any  particular  proposal  or
initiative71. Reportedly, Rodrigues was not always happy not being allowed to present
his ideas to the board72. Overall, his style had the effect of increasing the work-load on
NEDs73 due to the need to be more engaged with the firm in order to evaluate the output
of the executive team.
Rod Kent and Steven Crawshaw had a relatively limited role in executive positions
during Period 1. Thus, the discussion is brief with a view of outlining the differences to
Mackinlay and Rodrigues respectively.
Rod Kent and Steven Crawshaw:  Kent joined Bradford & Bingley from Close
Bros  in  early  2003  to  replace  Lindsay  Mackinlay  as  Chairman.  Coming  from  a
commercial banking background his style and demeanour are very different compared
to his predecessor74. This background shaped his view of the business, in particular his
dislike for retailing financial services75. However, despite this dislike, he did not push
for a change of strategy while Rodrigues was chief executive; a sign, perhaps, of the
influence and power of Rodrigues76. Only with the elevation of Crawshaw to CEO in
68 Director A
69 Director D
70 Director D
71 The chief executive with a taste for the unpredictable, The Independent, November 1, 2000; Andrew
Garfield
72 Director Z
73 Director D
74 Director A
75 Director X
76  “With Christopher still there I would be surprised if that was going to happen unless the two of them
wanted to do it, if the two of them wanted to do it then there was a good chance that it was going to
happen if the rest of the Board agreed.” Director C
174
March  2004  a  comprehensive  change  of  strategy,  including  the  move  away  from
retailing financial services, was instituted. In the meantime, he was described as being
much more driving and interventionist in his interpretation of his role as Chairman, that
is, he would steer and drive board debate in the direction of his ideas to a much greater
extend than Mackinlay did. In particular “Rod … was more authoritative and … would
stop  discussion  …  for  different  reason  than  Lindsay  would  have  done”  77 and
“[thought] he could stop the board from discussing something if he thought this was the
right thing to do” 78.
In addition, Kent spent considerably more time in the London office of Bradford &
Bingley than his predecessor, as he was using the office as a base for his other director-
and chairmanships. This allowed him to be much more involved on a day-to-day basis,
and thus more interventionist; though Director X denied that his presence and greater
involvement was unpleasant in any way. However, his style and demeanour was not
well liked all round with Director C stating that: “Both of them [Rod Kent and George
Cox] seemed to be a little bit above the rest, or saw themselves as above other people.
… I don’t think of either of them as a friend, but as a board colleague, perfectly sound
and good.” Overall,  Kent would seem to be a more divisive figure than Mackinlay,
drawing a number of negative comments about his personality and style. He would be
joined by Crawshaw in 2004 to lead the firm until nationalisation in 2008.
Steven Crawshaw joined Bradford & Bingley in 1999 as Flotation Director and
subsequently  rose  through  the  ranks  as  Director  of  Strategy,  working  closely  with
Rodrigues,  and  finally  being  promoted  to  the  board  in  2002.  When  joining  B&B
Crawshaw had limited experience in executive positions79,  though through being the
personal assistant of Andrew Longhurst at Lloyd’s TSB he was exposed to the demands
and role  of  an  executive  director.  Interviewees  described  him as  ‘a  good all  round
guy’80,  ‘presentable,  articulate  and  nice  guy’81.  While  not  being  considered  chief
executive  material  when  joining,  he  had  the  background  and  experience  that  was
77 Director C
78 Director C
79 Director A
80 Director C
81 Director D
175
desirable  for  a  future  executive82.  His  rise  within Bradford  & Bingley  to  take on a
variety of roles in strategy, HR, IT, as well as lending and savings exposed him to key
business  areas  and  was  done so  deliberately  in  order  to  gain  more  experience  and
understanding of the B&B business in preparation of such a move83. Rodrigues’ move to
Visa in 2004 came as a surprise and, left Bradford & Bingley without a chief executive.
The board chose to promote Crawshaw to the post, perhaps prematurely84 considering
his limited executive experience. While Rodrigues drew many comments about his style
and generally was deemed to a demanding leader that received respect from fellow top
management  team  members,  Crawshaw  was  generally  seen  as  ‘a  nice  guy’;  no
comments were made labelling him as a leader or commanding respect.
Board Roles
Role of the Chairman: Interviewees rejected the notion that the chairman acted as
a mediator during board meetings85 in the sense that they did not see the need to mediate
any  disputes  as  they  were  non-existent.   However,  in  a  broader  sense  of  being  a
mediator, the chairman had to mediate and guide the decision-making process to come
to a timely decision.  Here the personality of the chairman is central to influencing this
process86.   Lindsay  Mackinlay  was  seen  as  being  more  consensual87 and  gentle88
compared to Rod Kent, his successor, who was more forceful and ready to guide the
discussion  in  the  direction  he  believed  it  should  go89.   Director  Z  described  the
chairman’s  job  as  knowing the  ‘board’s  opinion’ and thus  eliminating  the  need for
formal votes.  Knowing the board’s opinion and knowing and understanding the process
on the executive side that led to certain proposals was also seen as ‘a full time job, not
part time’.  Thus Mackinlay’s attendance at ALCO meetings supported him in being
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aware of the different opinions on the executive side, just as board dinners would offer
the  opportunity  to  gather  information  on opinions  on the  non-executive  side of  the
board.
Role of the Chief Executive: The key task of the chief executive is to lead the
company and be accountable for the outcome90.  In leading the company, the main task
is to develop the strategy with input and consent by the board91.  Communicating this
strategy  effectively,  and  having  the  organisation  share  it,  is  thus  key  to  the  chief
executive’s success.  An example of this is the strategic reorientation of Bradford &
Bingley after 1996 when Rodrigues formulated a new vision for the Society and then
had to communicate this strategy, first to the board for approval, and then to the Society
as a whole; to get employees to share the new direction.  It was already discussed earlier
in  Section  5.4.2 that not everyone was happy with the new direction and that many
people  left  the  company  as  a  result.   However,  as  was  explained  by  Director  X:
“leaders are leaders to make difficult decisions, one does not need a leader for the easy
decisions”.
The Role of Group Committees: Before any proposals would be put forward for
the  whole  board  to  consider,  the  General  Management  Board  (GMB)  or  Group
Executive  Committee  (ExCom)  would  discuss  and  vet  executives’ proposals.   This
‘inquisition’92 of executives championing their proposal was made in order to ensure
that the proposal put forward to the full board had sufficient substance to stand up to
scrutiny.  Besides deciding day-to-day management operations it also had formulation
of strategy within its remit93.  In addition to the GMB the Asset and Liability Oversight
Committee (ALCO) is the second powerful committee within the ‘executive branch’ of
the board.  The ALCO is responsible for pricing decisions, balancing the books, risk
assessment and identification and internal audit. 
Role of the Finance Director: Besides the chairman, the key players on the board
are the vice-chairman as well as the chief executive (CEO) and finance director.  The
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fifth  important  player  is  the  Remuneration  Committee  Chair.   In  developing  and
implementing strategy,  the  FD and CEO are the  driving force.   However,  the CEO
would  always  need  the  support  of  the  FD,  without  which  any  proposals  would  be
rejected94.  Thus the CEO would always seek to have the FD on his side.  As already
discussed in the board composition section (6.3.2, page 157), the FD is one of the key
posts on the board that the CEO seeks to fill with someone he can work with.  However,
the FD acts as a check on the CEO and has to stand up to him and be a counterweight.
This situation cannot be an easy one for the FD with the division of loyalties divided
between  the  person  who  hired  them  (the  CEO)  and  acting  as  a  counterweight.
Interviewees spoke highly of FD Thorne and there is no indication that she did not fulfil
her duties.  However, with a view to the events of Periods 2 and 3 the role of the FD in
these events has to be questioned, especially in light of the recent FCA enforcement
action against C Willford (FD 2005 – 2009)95.
Gatekeepers: Within the executive decision-making structure it does not come as a
surprise that the chief executive is the most powerful player, acting as a gatekeeper for
proposals to be put forward to the ALCO/GMB as well as full board.  This manifests
itself  in  self-censorship  of  executives  in  what  kind  of  proposals  are  made  to  the
committee.  Specifically, executives will not propose anything they ‘know’ the chief
executive will not like or approve of96.  Informal discussions prior to meetings were a
particularly effective way of ensuring that proposals that would likely be unsuccessful
never saw the light of the day97.  In addition, executives would meet with Rodrigues on
a one-to-one basis to discuss their ideas and convince the chief executive98.  However,
executives did not always agree with the chief executive’s proposals either.  The process
to  come  to  an  agreement  would  typically  be  a  robust  discussion  as  described  by
Directors X and D.
The role of gatekeeper occupied by the chief executive is mirrored by the chairman
on  the  non-executive  side.   Director  D  states  that  without  the  chairman’s  consent,
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nothing would go to the board – he is the key player to convince.  Thus, decisions that
needed approval from the board would be forwarded to the full board upon agreement
on the GMB, but not until the chairman had been sounded out.  The role of Rodrigues
was thus to assemble a team he could work with, and creating a strategy and direction
for the business.  NEDs were then tasked with reviewing the proposals put forward and
suggesting alterations and, in rare cases, rejecting them99.  This function of strategic
oversight required access to information; as discussed in the previous section on MIS.
Overall,  the  board  process  of  coming  to  an  agreement  was  variously  described  as
‘engaged’, ‘involved’100 or ‘an osmosis of opinion’101.  Time for discussion of issues was
also seen as important as it supports good decision-making, though some directors felt
that  there  was  not  always  sufficient  time,  blaming  it  on  external  pressures  from
stakeholders102.  Director C further explained that, even though directors were always
aiming to be thorough and careful, pressure on decision-making gave him a feeling of
constraint  and  unease,  which  he  then  perceived  to  be  a  limiting  factor  on  board
discussion.
The Relationship between Chairman and Chief Executive
 Of interest to this study are not only the styles and roles of the Chairman and Chief
Executive,  but  also  the  relationship  of  the  chief  executive  with  the  chairman.   The
chairman  is  leading  the  board  and,  with  the  other  non-executives  has  to  provide  a
suitable balance of guidance, oversight and giving the executive team sufficient space to
implement  that  guidance103.   For  the  guidance  and  oversight  to  be  effective  the
relationship between these two players is critical.  In this relationship the chairman acts
as  “shrink, father confessor, partner” 104 and in the end fires the chief executive, but
until then has to support him105.  In addition, the two leaders need to have a comfortable
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relationship  on  the  parameters  of  board  compensation,  which  is  where  the  fifth
important player comes in.  Should the chairman and chief executive not have a good
relationship, the remuneration committee chair is required to take up that responsibility
of  setting  the  parameters.   Interviewees  insisted  though  that  during  the  tenure  of
Mackinlay and Rodrigues’ Bradford & Bingley did not have any issues on this matter.
As part of the guidance, the chairman and vice-chairman are responsible for setting the
tone on the board and of the business.  This does encompass the governance and with
the Mackinlay-led board, stewardship was a guiding principle.  Director X expressed it
as: “stewardship is at the heart of being a leader”.  Being a steward of the business also
separated  the  ownership  of  this  business  from any specific  person when  he  further
explained: “[Bradford & Bingley] is not [our] company, [it belongs to the members]. …
We are only stewards.”  Linking this to the strategic changes described in Section 5.4.1,
the commercialisation and professionalisation of the society was seen as ‘stewardship in
action’, that is preserving the wealth of the owners (members) for the future, by making
the society more competitive.
Culture
Again,  within  the  decision-making  process  on  the  board,  in  parallel  with  the
executive  committees,  informal  discussions  before  board  meetings,  including  board
dinners, and presentations during the formal meetings were the main vehicles of this
process.  The differences in point of view were thus either cleared up and eliminated
prior to the meeting, or were talked through during the meetings.  While executives
described  the  board  discussions  as  “robust”106,  non-executives  preferred  the  word
“challenge”107, in that they would challenge and probe the proposals put forward until
they  were  satisfied,  or  not,  with  the  answers.   Very  rarely  was  the  process
confrontational, and according to Director Z, it only happened once that the Finance
Director (FD) opposed to an item being minuted, once again underlining the generally
consensual  decision-making  procedures.   Within  the  board  meeting  the  role  of  the
chairman was seen as him being “The Master of Ceremony”108 who had to ensure that
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the  board  would  come to  a  consensus109.   In  this  regard,  the  following  paragraphs
explores the role of the chairman within the formal structure as well as the relationship
with the chief executive.
Overall, the chemistry on the board was described as good and collegiate. While
there  were  naturally  “varying degrees  of  likeness”110 and  differences  in  opinion on
business111 and strategy112, all interviewees agreed that there were generally no problems
during their tenure and that the atmosphere was friendly and polite113. Nevertheless, it
was not all plain sailing as there was times of tension114 and discontent, especially in the
wake of Rodrigues reforming the executive team with senior managers not being happy
about being cast aside115. A certain degree of tension was seen as important to prevent
complacency on the board116; a further source of tension came from people’s personality.
In particular, certain members of the top management team, such as sales and marketing
directors, tended to be more optimistic in their assessment of the success of proposals,
compared to other more cautious or pessimistic team members, for example, FD Thorne
or  company  secretary  McGuinness117.  This  tension  between  directors  seeking  to
preserve what is versus those who focus on the future, created an atmosphere in which
some proposals were discussed robustly, though not in a hostile way118. Interestingly,
these same interviewees stated that there were no sub-groups or camps on the board that
would continually battle each other. While there certainly was potential for this scenario
with each executive having their own organisation and circle of supporters, cohesion
and collegiality did seem to win the day. An example of cohesion and collegiality is
when Rodrigues introduced the Myers-Briggs personality test to his executive directors
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in  order  to  improve  management  team  unity  and  cohesion,  chairman  Mackinlay
suggested that non-executives participate in the test to make it a team effort119. While
Director Z thought that nothing was gained from the exercise, it did demonstrate unity
and cohesion in the management team.
To briefly summarise Period 1,  culture and cultural  change were at  the heart  of
board board composition and interaction. Cultural change was induced with the hiring
of Rodrigues and the subsequent commercialisation and professionalisation of the firm.
To this end Rodrigues exchanged a number of executive directors, thus changing board
composition and TMT characteristics. Furthermore, the new chief executive was keen to
increase  the  engagement  of  non-executives  with  the  firm  and  with  board  decision-
making. Thus mediating strategy processes were impacted through board change. In
addition,  TMT decision-making was affected through the increase in  engagement of
non-executives  with  strategy,  as  well  as  through  changing  personnel  on  the  board.
Demutualisation did have a minor impact through changes in the rules and regulations
governing the board, increasing their responsibilities in ensuring that the firm is run
appropriately. Finally, the external environment, in particular the success of Northern
Rock, put pressure on the board and making the share price of high importance to key
decision-makers. The result of these factors are reflected in the organisational outcome
of Bradford & Bingley moving from prime mortgage lending into buy-to-let and self-
certified mortgages.
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6.4  Period 4: 2008 – 2010
This  section  will  present  the  perceptions  and experiences  of  board  members  of
Bradford & Bingley during Period 4 – Decline. Again, the focus is on reporting and
summarising  the  information  gathered  through  interviews  and  other  sources.
Furthermore, this section will also draw on the comparison between the two periods
under  discussion  in  this  chapter.  As  discussed  in  Section  5.7 Bradford  &  Bingley
changed significantly after nationalisation in 2008, becoming a state-owned enterprise
and ceasing all lending and savings business, with the latter being sold to Santander.
Hence, the goals and premises of the underlying business differ greatly from any period
in  the  past.  Naturally,  the  four  areas  of  investigation,  namely  context,  board
composition, mediating strategy processes, and TMT decision-making, are still relevant,
but changes in the external environment are strongly reflected in the interviews.
6.4.1  Contextual Factors
The  context  the  firm  operates  in  has  changed  significantly  since  2008  with
nationalisation,  the  financial  crisis  and  a  new set  of  stakeholders  providing  a  very
different set of circumstances in which the firm operates. The pressures of financial
markets and shareholders for financial results has been removed and replaced with the
goal of recouping as much value as possible for the new owners out of the remaining
assets  and  liabilities.  In  addition,  the  almost  complete  removal  of  the  former  top
management team further contributed to significant change within the firm, especially in
terms of culture.
Culture: In contrast to Period 1, culture did not figure prominently in any of the
interviews conducted in this period.  In addition, the view of culture was fundamentally
different.  Director  Y considered  culture  to  be  a  level  2  construct,  that  is,  on  an
individual level, culture was relevant insofar as employees with a ‘good culture’ are the
ones that need to be retained within the firm, employees with a ‘bad culture’ need to be
removed  to  maintain  a  good  working  culture  and  values.  Director  B  however  saw
culture to be a macro-level construct instead,  a fundamental difference to the views
expressed by interviewees of Period 1. In particular, the director viewed culture as an
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external object, that is,  culture is not determined by the board, but rather monitored
instead with the object of monitoring being employees:
“we get statistics on employee satisfaction surveys, you know, are they happy,
are they content, do they understand all those questions, we get statistics on
how people are leaving, sicknesses, leave of absences, that sort of thing.  So
we do monitor how good the culture is, yes.”
To recap on Period 1, culture was seen as being determined by the top management
team and thus could be changed if need be. The transition in that period from ‘cosy
mutual’ to commercial plc bank through actions of management did transform the firm,
and arguably had an influence on culture, as demonstrated by Director Y’s quote:
“before the government ownership [the focus] was on sales, so they came up
with all these schemes, backwards; there was no waste to fill  so there was
chaos operationally.”
Internal  Stakeholders: The  split  of  Bradford  & Bingley  into  two entities,  one
continuing as  UKAR, created  once  again  a  firm sheltered  from competition,  as  the
Society used to be until the mid-1980s. However, the operational context differs greatly.
With  nationalisation  and  the  firm being  in  run-off,  the  motivation  and  retention  of
internal stakeholders is a major concern and determinant of success. 
“You know, would you want to go into a cocktail party and say I am working
for a company where my objective is to turn the lights on one day.  I mean how
motivating is that?  We have to do everything now around … trying to give lots
of  training,  good  work  life  balance,  all  that  kind  of  stuff  …  we  do  debt
management; I am looking at resources not only as cash, but as expertise and
people.  If we do not have those debt managers, the arrears are going to go
through the roof and … we are not going to repay the government loan.  So I
… worry about keeping the staff actually.” 
Director Y
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In essence, with the firm necessitated to focus on the well-being and contentment of
its employees as a key success factor, it  has returned to its roots of being a ‘caring
organisation’, albeit with a much sharper focus on its own economic success. Thus, the
external environment is a major driving factor in transforming firm culture.
External Stakeholders: On an organisation level, pressures have settled after an
initial period of changes in the wake of nationalisation. The operational separation of
the lending and deposit-taking business units from mortgage and treasury assets in 2008
and the merger of the remnants of Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock to become
UKAR in  2010  created  operational  pressures  to  merge  systems  and  procedures  or
migrate to a single system. While both time periods were ‘intense’ and contained ‘a lot
of fire fighting’, all the key processes and procedures have been put in place and the
firm has entered “a steady state”120. Generally, with the firm being in run-off, outside
pressures on the board are reduced, in  particular,  as decisions are  mostly limited to
operational issues until government loans have been repaid, the pressure to make quick
decisions is much reduced121.
Nevertheless, the new owners, do exert some influence on the board, as exemplified
by the  decision  to  award  the  management  of  the  government’s  mortgage  guarantee
scheme to UKAR. The government, being the ultimate owner, approached UKAR to
take on the responsibility to manage the new government scheme. However, due to the
nature  of  the  relationship  between UKAR and  the  government,  the  management  of
UKAR felt that it had little choice but to agree as it “believe[s] in doing the right thing,
if they are appealed to by government to do [so]” 122. The executive management team
also saw it as a recognition of its work to date and was thus keen to please its owners123.
This keenness however contributed to tensions on the board, as the executive team
agreed to take on the management of the scheme without consent by the whole board,
not only because ‘they believed they were doing the right thing’, but also because of the
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time pressure imposed by its owners124. UKAR agreed in July to begin administering the
scheme in September, not having had the opportunity to prepare a business plan and to
receive the consent of the board. This shows that the influence of external stakeholders
has, in some sense, intensified as a relatively diffuse set of stakeholders, first society
members and later shareholders, has been replaced by a single stakeholder which, in
addition, supplies all of the firm’s financing and thus creating a very strong dependency
or power imbalance between firm and owner.
In summary, internal and external stakeholders have become the main focus of TMT
decision-making due to the firm being in run off. Internal stakeholders have become
important due to the firm needing to retain good staff to fulfil its objective of repaying
the  government  loan.  The  external  stakeholder  has  replaced  a  more  diffuse  set  of
stakeholders,  and,  by  also  supplying  vital  finance,  has  a  very  strong  position  to
influence  the  firm  to  reflect  the  owner’s  priorities.  Finally,  the  lack  of  a  clearly
formulated culture is interesting, which might be a reflection of the changed purpose
and size of the firm. In particular, the performance and sales driven culture in place
previously is unsuitable for the part of the business that has remained with UKAR; a
new culture to replace the previous one has seemingly not yet been established though.
6.4.2  Board Composition
Board  composition  changed  dramatically  between  nationalisation  and  the
amalgamation of Bradford & Bingley in  UKAR. The majority  of discussion in this
section will focus on the board at or after 2010, rather than 2008-2009. As previously
discussed in Section 5.7.2, the majority of the board retired on 14 November 2008, with
the exception of  two non-executive and three  executive  directors.  Figure  6.4 below
shows the changes on the board between the end of 2008 and October 2010.
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Overall,  interviewees  had  different  views  on  board  composition.  For  example,
Director B thought that the board was relatively static, with the exception of the merger
of NRAM and B&B under UKAR in October 2010, and that there was really no impact
of any changes on the board. The assessment of a static board is based on the fact that
key appointments were made early on in 2008 and 2009, in particular the chairman and
managing director, as well as the retention of two non-executive directors.
The board is, and was, generally dominated by career bankers, though there are a
few exceptions, in particular John Tattersall and Susan Langley, with backgrounds in
public accounting and operations respectively. In addition, board members are generally
middle-class, middle-aged of similar social background. Again diversity was expressed
in  terms  of  points  of  view,  rather  than  other  typical  measures  of  diversity.  This  is
underlined by quotes such as:
“I have to say in the eyes of the public I mean we are all … middle-class,
middle-aged  in  background  and  come  from  sort  of  a  similar  social
background, I mean that is almost always the case on these Boards, but we do
think differently, I mean we do quite well in terms of diversity.” 
Director B
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Figure 6.4: Board Composition 09/2008 – 12/2010
The fact that there are two women on the board during the period is highlighted by
interviewees and cited as an example of diversity. Director Y recognises that with the
merger two female directors were on the board and that this did affect board dynamics.
“when  [NRAM] came together  with  Bradford  & Bingley  … the  dynamics
around  the  [board]  table  changed,  …  in  that  it  became  slightly  more
collegiate, more open. In fact interestingly I noted in the last Board meeting
[that]  70%  of  the  questions  asked  were  by  Louise  [Patten]  and  Sue
[Langley] ... which was interesting.”
Director Y
Overall, both interviewees expressed strong satisfaction with their board colleagues.
The board is described as complementary and having a good rapport.125 In particular the
chairman was seen as instrumental in building and reinforcing this sentiment.126 The
board  consists,  besides  career  bankers,  of  Treasury/Government  officials  as
representatives of the owner. Overall though, Chairman Pym chose board members for
their complementarity of skills that are required by a firm in run off127. The advantage of
having a mix of skills is highlighted by Director Y stating that:  “I don’t go into the
Board feeling that I understand everything inside out, but that’s the whole point about
having a mixed Board, not everyone is going to understand everything.” 
Again, the chairman is the driver of the rapport on the board, and, as in Period 1,
board dinners are one tool of building such rapport. The result of the chair’s actions and
style is that tension on the board are very rare. Furthermore, the executive team was
described as very tight knit and working very well together, again, as a result of a mix of
different  personalities  and  skills.  For  example,  the  managing  director  and  finance
director are described as having different styles of thinking but are able to harness these
without being argumentative or frictional128. Similarly, there are different personal styles
on the non-executive side of the board as well. In this regard, Louise Patten is described
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as ‘a free thinker’;  however there are other non-executive directors which put more
emphasis  on  formality  and  convention  and  thus  see  her  as  “being  away  with  the
fairies”129. In these differences though lies the strength of the board as recognised by the
same director: “I think [this is] what makes a good Board, because, if you had everyone
that was methodical, or everyone like Louise [Patten], it would be a nightmare.” 
Finally, the board was earlier described as being relatively static in terms of board
composition. Nevertheless, changes in board composition did impact board atmosphere,
in line with comments made by Rodrigues in Period 1. Director Y exemplified this by
highlighting the differences between Keith Morgan and Jim O’Neil and how their style
and demeanour impacted on the atmosphere on the board. The introduction of O’Neil to
the board is said to have brought a degree of levity in dealing with problems, whereas
Morgan’s approach was seen as rather increasing tension. Nevertheless, the board was
seen  as  working  well  and  without  serious  problems,  which  is  best  summarised  by
Director Y:
“I mean, I have seen other boards where there are cliques which are really
destructive,  where  those  set  cliques  against  each other,  but  we don’t  have
that.”
6.4.3  Mediating Strategy Processes
This section will focus on two factors, first on director engagement with the firm,
and, second, on the state of management information systems at Bradford & Bingley. In
terms of engagement with the firm, a number of levels of engagement have emerged
during  the  interviews.  On  a  very  basic  level,  directors,  especially  non-executive
directors,  engage  with  the  firm  through  attendance  at  board  meetings.  However,  a
variety of other ways of engaging were brought up as well, specifically committee work
and site visits, with the latter including meeting junior levels of management. Indeed,
site  visits  were  deemed  to  be  encouraged  by  senior  management  and  seen  as  an
important  tool  to  immerse  oneself  in  what  is  happening within  the  firm130. Finally,
'Away Days' were mentioned as an important tool to engage with the firm and other
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board colleagues. As board dinners, these away days are useful in building rapport and
understanding on the board, and in particular, to discuss strategy in a more open and less
pressured atmosphere, for example, through strategy workshops or “blue sky papers”131.
On a personal  level,  the chairman is  encouraging non-executive directors to  get
involved. One example provided was that some non-executive directors were mentoring
the leadership team and thus supporting them with their knowledge and experience132.
These and other ways of engaging directors and building rapport have created a web of
trust  on  the  board  in  which  issues  are  discussed  openly,  during  meetings  ,but  also
informally, again something which is encouraged from the top. Richard Pym is said not
to be the type of chairman that 'wants to see non-executives only attend board meetings
and get out of the way otherwise' 133. Though the board does seem to work well, there
are  moments  of  tension  between  individuals.  These  can  often  be  diffused  during
meetings,  however  especially  tensions  between  non-executive  directors  are  often
resolved at the board dinner the night before the meeting. Thus, the chairman uses a
variety  of  tools  to  engage  and  build  rapport  between  directors.  This  is  especially
important  for  non-executive  directors,  which,  according  to  Director  B,  spend
approximately 30 days per year engaging with the firm.
Management information is separated into two specific sections, first, board packs,
and  second,  management  information  systems.  Board  packs,  before  the  operational
merger of B&B and NRAM were often around 800 to 1000 pages. In addition to the
voluminous  nature  of  the  board  packs,  the  information  therein  was  not  always
considered to be helpful or relevant in some situations. In particular, NRAM and B&B
had different styles of presenting information, with NRAM heavily focusing on ‘pretty
diagrams’134 while B&B was heavy on figures and tables. Both packs had information
that  was relevant  as well  as irrelevant  and thus the chief  risk officer was tasked to
develop a  new, consistent  approach to  presenting  information  for  the  now common
company using more graphical representations and heat maps. As a net effect the size of
131 Director B
132 Director Y
133 Director Y
134 Director B
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board  packs  has  come  down  to  approximately  250  pages  and  ‘have  become  a  lot
better’135,  though  some  directors  still  think  that  the  information  is  not  presented
concisely enough.
“Louise Patten for example, she thinks our Board packs are too short, I think
they  too  long  because  I  want  the  executive  team  to  encapsulate  what  is
keeping them awake at night in the top paragraph, I don’t want to read 20
pages or trying to guess what is keeping them awake at night.” 
Director Y
Even though board packs have become shorter and more concise, the information
that was contained in previous packs has not been completely removed; some of it has
been moved onto an electronic platform instead,  thus being available online136.  This
supplementary information is still voluminous and not every director finds it to be of
use, as illustrated by the following quote:
“I think the exec team here, and I have seen it with other exec teams, it’s
almost  like  'well  we have  given  you all  of  the  information,  if  you haven’t
spotted page 22, section 1.4.8, sub section 2, it is not our problem because we
put it in the 'iRoom' '.”
Director Y
Thus, the amount of information available to directors is of concern, as the correct
interpretation of such information is crucial to making the right decision. Even though
non-executives are highly experienced and are accustomed to reading large volumes of
information in a short span of time137, deciding which information is relevant as well as
135 Director Y
136 "They [the board packs] have got a lot better, but what I think happened is they got better because
they bunged most of it in the iRoom" Director Y
137 "I have done it all my life and I can do this because I can concentrate sometimes." Director B.
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digesting the information to be able to ask the relevant questions is not always easy138.
Indeed, “very occasionally we do tend to get bamboozled with detail.”139
Not only did board information packs improve in quality, but also the management
information systems which generate the underlying data had to be improved. Especially
the operational merger of B&B and NRAM enabled this opportunity. The old systems
inherited from Bradford & Bingley were described as being old-fashioned and very
much sales-driven, and because the systems were not designed to process all the sales-
schemes  appropriately,  there  was  a  degree  of  operational  chaos140.  The  merger  of
NRAM  and  B&B  enabled  UKAR  to  not  only  redesign  the  systems  to  work
appropriately, but also to amend them to provide new information on lending risk141.
Initially,  risk  analysis  of  borrowers  was  very  much  focused  on  the  borrower's
income.  However,  with  the  input  from Sue Langley  and her  operational  experience
gained with Lloyd’s Insurance, risk measurements were redesigned to be more rigorous
and take account of a wider range of information such as customer geography or age142.
The firm now has access to over 50 measures of customer risk143. In summary, even
though the redesigned management information systems added complexity in terms of
available  information,  overall  the  firm has  a  much  simpler  business  model  through
operational simplification after the sale of the deposit-taking business. These changes
have allowed for UKAR to become risk managers and open up possibilities of future
business, as discussed in Section 5.7.1.
6.4.4  TMT Decision-Making
Two key  terms  emerged  as  important  in  the  interviews:  challenge  and  support.
These terms were applied to  two forms of  interaction between executives and non-
138 "If you are not steeped in the business I might not necessarily pick up the right question to ask in 20
pages and it’s not 20 pages, I mean at one stage our Board packs were 800 pages." Director Y
139 Director Y
140 Director Y
141 Director B
142 Director Y
143 Director Y
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executives. Challenge was focused on the interaction between the two groups during
formal board meetings, whereas support was tied to working with executives between
board meetings or during committee meetings.
Director B for example thought that  “our role [as NED] is to challenge and to
monitor”, but was also very aware that “one doesn't come onto the Board to teach the
executive,  one  comes  on  the  Board  to  challenge  the  executive,  to  ask  the  right
questions.” In this vein, the director further explained that “the non-executive directors
are not introducing context, they are not saying this is where you should do business, or
how you should do business, it is challenging people when they really don't know what
they're doing or seem to be going off the rails.” Thus the role is very much framed in
terms  of  control  and  monitoring  to  ensure  that  executive  directors  are  acting
appropriately.
Director Y however, framed the role of the non-executive reflecting the duality of
the  role  of  challenging  and  supporting,  stating  that  “the  term they  use  is  ‘critical
friend’, so you have to support the exec team, but you also have to challenge them and
ask  the  difficult  questions”.  Generally,  non-executives  saw  themselves  supporting
executives during committee meetings or when meeting informally. Referring to the role
of committee member, Director B stated that committees are not there “[to] challenging
management, it is helping to steer management thinking, it is supporting for example,
the Chief Risk Officer,  the Chief  Compliance Officer,  making sure they are thinking
properly and structuring their department correctly.” A further example of supporting
executives  has  been discussed earlier,  when Director  Y explained how Sue Langley
supported the operational restructure B&B and NRAM to integrate both into one MI
system.
CEO Leadership:  Again,  as  was the case in  Period  1,  the chairman and chief
executive were instrumental in setting the tone on the board. Furthermore, as discussed
in the Mediating Strategy Processes section above, the chairman is keen on getting non-
executives involved in the firm, and as just presented, non-executives are supporting
executive  directors  on  the  committees.  The  behaviour  described  so  far  is  naturally
linked to how the chairman is leading the board and the tone he is setting. The view of
interviewees on the qualities and style of Richard Pym are very similar.
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In general, Pym is seen as a leader who listens to all opinions, but also actively asks
for opinions during board meetings. In particular, just like Mackinlay during Period 1,
he is hearing everyone out, not looking to impose his own view or coming with pre-
determined  opinions.  In  addition,  being  described  as  open  and  transparent  also
contributes to him being seen as very balanced and fair. 
“He is a very good Chairman who is very balanced, I mean you can tell …
when he doesn’t agree, his body language is very obvious, but I have worked
with Chairmen who cut you off, but he will still hear you out, make sure it is in
the Minutes and still  say ‘well what do the other directors think’, he won’t
push his view or the chief executives view over the board's wishes; he is very
good.”
Director Y
This very positive view of Pym as a leader does however contrast with some of the
comments made on UKAR agreeing to be administering the government’s mortgage
guarantee scheme, where the chairman and managing director agreed to UKAR taking
on  the  role  without  first  consulting  the  non-executive  directors.  While  the  board
expressed  its  unhappiness  about  the  situation,  steps  have  been  taken  to  avoid  such
occurrences in the future by introducing Strategy Days. Despite this event, interviewees
were still very positive about Pym as a leader.
General Decision-Making:  Building on the previous discussion, decision-making
was thus very much a team effort involving executives and non-executives at various
stages of plans and proposals being developed. Again, non-executives are supporting
executives in preparing proposals to the board, which will then get challenged by non-
executives during board meetings. Interviewees were positive about board meetings and
board climate.
For example, one reason why board meetings were generally non-contentious is that
most disagreements and problems will have been solved prior to the meeting, such as on
committee level. With the update of MI systems and the digitization of board packs, a
lot of board interaction is happening in online exchanges, for example through e-mail.
However,  “sometimes a few email exchanges get a bit static because emails are the
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worst things, you cannot have an argument,  a discussion, on email,  it  doesn’t  come
across right, it’s just a written word.  The Chairman will sometimes say 'let’s take this
offline think about it at the Board meeting'.” 144 Another venue to diffuse tensions is the
board dinner the night before the meeting. Thus, by the time of the board meeting, most
differences in opinion will be at least known, if not resolved.
Any remaining variances of opinion are only overridden after a lengthy discussion
and as such board members would not feel as if they were sidelined or ignored. For
example:
“[disagreements] tend to get resolved in the meeting. Richard Pym is very
good at saying ‘this, that, or the other’ and there was one [meeting] recently
where one of our non-executives disagreed with a decision we all made and he
said  ‘I  would  like  it  recorded’ and the  Chairman said,  and there  was  no
animosity, said to the Company Secretary for the Minutes ‘could you please
note that’.”
Director Y
Generally, no one was said to have ever walked out of a board meeting in anger and
that the examples of tension on the board are the exception:
“And I am making it sound bad.  It is very rare.  Compared to any Board I am
on, any tension is rare but we have had it a few times.”
Director Y
In summary, interviewees were very positive about the board process and decision-
making. Director Y “would say the decision making is, for any Board I have been on,
probably one of the most open and transparent.”, with Director B concurring to that
opinion stating that: “I think B&B is as good as it gets.  Bearing in mind we don't have
to decide on new products and things like that.”
144 Director Y
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To summarise Period 4, culture was noticeably less prominent during this period,
possibly as a result of the large organisational changes since nationalisation. The more
significant contextual factor was the external environment, which overall became less
pressured and fast-paced. The impact of nationalisation was most keenly felt through
the arrival of a new and major  stakeholder – the government.  The new stakeholder
redefined  the  goals  and  size  of  the  firm,  as  well  as  impacting  board  composition.
However, mediating strategy processes and TMT decision-making were more dependent
on the chairman and chief executive, than in Period 1 where culture played a significant
role  as  well.  Again,  engagement  with  the  firm and  participation  in  and  support  of
decision-making  is  driven  by  the  chairman's  style.  Overall  the  transformation  of
Bradford & Bingley into UKAR as an asset and risk management company is largely
driven by the needs and wishes of it's major stakeholder.
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6.5  Discussion and Conclusion
In this section, the evidence that has been presented in the previous sections 6.3 and
6.4 is discussed. In doing so, Period 1 and Period 4 will be contrasted, and, findings will
be situated in academic literature.  Again,  a similar structure as used in the previous
sections is employed. Roberts et al. (2005) observe that there is a lack of understanding
of  the  behavioural  processes  on  boards  of  directors  in  the  corporate  governance
literature. Hence this chapter seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate by examining the
processes on the board of Bradford & Bingley during different life-cycle stages using
the upper echelons theory as the analytical framework. Thus the focus is on individual
directors as much as it is on the board as a group.
In line with suggestions by Pye & Pettigrew (2005) this research considered the
context of TMT decision-making. In particular, the inner context of firm culture and
stakeholders  and  outer  context  of  external  stakeholders  and  wider  economic
environment  have  been  considered.  Starting  with  the  contextual  factors,  and  in
particular culture, it has been found that the importance of culture within the firm has
changed significantly.
During Period 1, culture was seen as a form of identity that defined the rules of
human interaction as well as the rules of how the firm and its upper echelon treated its
employees.  Rodrigues, with the support of Mackinlay, sought to transform the Society’s
culture from being a ‘cosy Yorkshire Mutual’ with strong ethics to a more competitive
and professional organisation. This change in culture was seen as central to changing
the economic outlook of the firm. One central way to achieve this transformation was
through acquisitions of Mortgage Express and a number of estate agents and financial
product brokers.  The impact of these acquisitions on company culture however  was
doubted  by  some  interviewees.  That  there  eventually  was  a  change  of  culture  was
evidenced a comment by Director Y, stating that prior to nationalisation the focus of the
firm was very much on sales, to the detriment of financial health.
In contrast to Period 1, after the break-up of Bradford & Bingley at the end of 2008,
the part  of the business  that  remained with the government  has  no specific  culture.
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Interviewees looked at culture as an individual-level construct that impacts on overall
firm performance. Thus during Period 4 ‘culture’ is monitored using surveys in order to
ascertain whether employees are content and have the right mind set. In particular, firm
culture was defined as something that could not be set by the board. Thus the view of
what firm culture is has changed dramatically between Period 1 and Period 4.
Common  between  both  periods  though  was  the  recognised  importance  of  the
chairman and vice-chairman in setting the tone of the board and firm. Stemming from
the very different circumstances of Periods 1 and 4 the tone of the business differed.
During  Period  1  stewardship  was  the  key  tenet  of  the  board,  that  is  the  board  of
directors saw themselves as the stewards of the business, safeguarding the surplus and
wealth  generated  from  past  and  current  members.  This  notion  of  stewardship  was
carried  over  after  demutualisation,  though  the  focus  shifted  more  towards  new
stakeholders such as shareholders.
Period 1 presents a picture of a high degree of informality in decision-making on
the board. What emerged from the interviews is a sense of the multitude of avenues of
information  exchange  and  decision-making  outside  the  boardroom  through  board
dinners, presentations, strategy days, but also one-to-one discussions in the office or via
the phone between all members of the top management team. Indeed, these informal
discussions were key to shaping executive and non-executive thinking, but also board
agenda. These informal discussions thus enabled control of the flow of information and
proposals to the board meetings.
The board agenda would be shaped by a multi-stage process through committee
meetings and above mentioned discussions, but would ultimately have to pass a number
of  gatekeepers,  such as  committees,  but  also  approval  by  the  chief  executive,  with
support of the finance director, and, the chairman. Mackinlay recognised the importance
of information and involvement in controlling the flow of information to the board,
which explains his membership of the ALCO committee. Thus, by the time of the actual
board meeting all participants would have been aware of the items on the agenda and
the views of other directors. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the board from having
robust discussions, challenging executive director’s proposals thoroughly. The meetings
and prior  discussions  showed a high  degree  of  openness,  mutual  trust  and likeness
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between board members, fostered through the chairman’s consensual and gentle style,
which also benefited the engagement of non-executive directors with the firm.
Furthermore,  the hierarchy of  gatekeepers  clearly recognises the primacy of  the
chairman at the apex of the organisation. Mackinlay, even though he was described has
arm’s length, nevertheless controlled the agenda. His approach to his chairmanship was
detached in seeking not to interfere with Rodrigues’ running the operations of the firm.
This detachment contrasts with Kent’s interpretation of the role, which was much more
involved and hands on, felt through his frequent presence in the office. The relationship
between Mackinlay and Rodrigues clearly distinguished between their roles, with both
sides working together to good effect with a high degree of trust.
The way board processes worked during Period 4 is remarkably similar to Period 1.
Again it is found that decision-making is characterised by a high degree of informality,
though perhaps a little less so than in Period 1. Also once more engagement with the
firm on multiple  levels  is  a  very  important  factor  in  informing and preparing  non-
executive  directors  for  the  decisions  they  have  to  take.  This  engagement  is,  again,
through site visits, strategy days, board dinners and committee work.
The committee work in particular is signifying the support non-executive directors
provide  to  executives.  Within  the  committees  non-executives  are  there  to  provide
support and feedback on executive thinking as well as advice and guidance. The duality
of challenging yet supporting is also reported here to gauge whether the proposals put
forward to the board hold water and have been thought through. The engagement with
the  firm  and  involvement  in  committee  work  provides  the  necessary  background
information  to  non-executives  to  evaluate  proposals  and  make  informed  decisions
(Roberts et al., 2005).
Thus,  committees  and  committee  chairs  are  gatekeepers  in  controlling  which
proposals will be put to the board. In contrast to Period 1, the chairman and managing
director were not particularly emphasized as being as much in control of the agenda as
Mackinlay  and  Rodrigues  were.  While  there  is  not  enough  evidence  to  suggest
otherwise, comments made regarding the leadership of Pym point at him being similar
to Mackinlay in many ways. For example, Pym as chairman is the one setting the tone
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of the board. The tone of the board was described as open, transparent and inclusive.
Participants would always be listened to and the chairman solicits the opinions of all
members, regardless of his own personal opinions, which he is not pushing onto the
board in any way, in contrast to Rod Kent.
An interesting aspect of Period 4 was the addition of information technology in
aiding board discussions outside meetings. Board packs and supplementary materials
have all been moved into cyberspace, thus making the information constantly available
and in a much shorter time frame than in the past when board packs had to be sent via
courier. The availability of this facility has also impacted discussions, as a lot of these
are being conducted online, which may contribute to board tension as stated by one
interviewee. However, the chairman would in cases of tension make sure they are taken
offline and discussed face to face prior to board meetings.
Another  source of tension is  board composition,  and in  particular,  personalities.
Whereas some directors were seen as having more levity or being free thinkers, others
were more formalistic and thus contributing to tension on the board. Overall though the
board was seen as being very cohesive and working very well. Despite the remarkable
similarities between the two periods, one notable difference was the higher emphasis on
control and monitoring by non-executives. This was expressed in relation to company
culture, but also when discussing the role of non-executives within the decision-making
structure of the firm. It is argued that this increased focus on control and monitoring is a
function of the changing regulation in corporate governance and an outcome of the
various governance reviews undertaken in the UK.
As argued by Nordberg & McNulty (2013) the shifting UK corporate governance
code  recognises  that  appropriate  board  structures  (Cadbury  Report  1992)  and  non-
executive director  independence (Higgs Review 2003) are  not  sufficient  to  have  an
effective board, but that board effectiveness depends on behaviour. In particular they
argue that excessive independence threatens board cohesiveness and supports unhealthy
detachment  and  “that  directors,  not  codes,  are  the  only  real  guarantors  of  board
effectiveness,  and  that  their  choices,  not  the  prescriptions  of  institutionalised
arrangements, make the difference” (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013, p. 366). Thus this
study supports  Nordberg & McNulty in their assessment, though it is suggested that
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appropriate  formal  structures  as  well  as  a  certain  degree  of  independence  are
preconditions for non-executive directors to be effective in their respective roles.
Roberts et al.'s (2005) contribution to the Higgs Review previously challenged the
importance  of  independence  of  non-executive  directors  and  provided  an  alternative
description of their role. In their study they identified three couplets describing the role
of  the  NED:  ‘engaged  but  non-executive’,  ‘challenging  but  supportive’,  and
‘independent but involved’, which are also reflected in these findings. Non-executives
at Bradford & Bingley exhibited these features in their behaviour, though there were
degrees of variance, especially in Period 1. For example, the degree of involvement of
Mackinlay and Kent was described very differently, with the former being seen as ‘more
hands off’ and ‘arms length’, while the latter was much more involved in the business.
Whether this involvement was beneficial, or whether it did impair the functioning of the
board  is  subject  to  speculation  as  there  is  insufficient  evidence  to  support  either
conclusion, though anecdotal evidence would suggest that there were issues. Based on
Parker's  (2007) findings  it  is  suggested  that  with  the  departure  of  Rodrigues  board
dynamics changed, where previously Rodrigues was the driving force on the board with
the chairman taking the role of mentor (taking a back seat), whereas later Kent became a
much more actively involved.
These three couplets of director behaviour are reflected in different aspects of the
upper echelons model used here. As such, involvement and engagement with the firm
are reflected in the mediating strategy processes, while challenging and supporting as
well  as  independence  are  part  of  TMT Decision-Making  processes.  However,  these
three couplets fail to recognise the importance of boardroom culture in providing non-
executives the opportunity to perform their roles effectively.
Furthermore,  Roberts  et  al.  (2005) focus  on the role  of  non-executive directors.
However, the boardroom is inhabited not only by non-executive directors, but also by
executive directors. The interaction between both types of directors, as well as the role
played by the chairman and chief  executive are  pivotal  in determining not  only the
effectiveness of non-executive directors, but the effectiveness of the whole board, and
thus the organisational outcomes of decisions made.
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In  this  context,  boardroom  culture  has  emerged  as  the  major  determinant  of
decision-making  in  this  case  study.  Parker  (2007) in  his  study  of  two  non-profit
organisations identified boardroom culture as a major factor in the decision-making.
Heeding the authors call for more research into this area, it was found that boardroom
culture  was  influential  in  the  perception  of  decision-making.  More  importantly,  it
revealed the importance of the role of the chairman, but also the chief executive in
fostering this culture and the perceptions of board members of decision-making.
In this chapter, board process were integrated with contextual and environmental
factors through combining the corporate governance life-cycle and the upper echelons
theory by exploring director perceptions and effectiveness in different organisational
contexts using a case study approach. Thus this study reflects different life-cycle stages,
ownership patters and regulatory environments in its exploration of board processes at
Bradford & Bingley.
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Chapter 7
7  Conclusion
7.1  Introduction
This chapter draws together the findings of the empirical chapters 5 and 6, into one
coherent framework, to illustrate how changes in the external and internal environment
led to Bradford & Bingley’s transition through different life-cycle stages and how board
processes contributed to, and influenced, these transitions. The thesis has examined not
only transitions between life-cycle stages, but also board processes and organisational
change  within  life-cycle  stages.  Examining  board  processes  and  interactions  across
time,  while  distinguishing  between  internal  and  external  influences  on  the  board,
developed a picture of how Bradford & Bingley changed between 1995 and 2010.
In addition,  the thesis  does not take a dogmatic view of each theory (corporate
governance  life-cycle,  upper  echelons  perspective)  as  a  set  of  strict  procedures  to
follow, but rather combines the two theories to use them as a guide to investigate the
processes and perceptions of organisational change. The corporate governance life-cycle
is employed to analyse the changes in strategy, resource and monitoring – the three
functions of governance – over a period of 15 years, thus adopting a macro view of the
organisation and its management. The upper echelons perspective is then used to study
the perceptions of change and board processes leading to change within two distinct
periods of Bradford & Bingley’s history, thus adopting a micro view of the organisation
and its management. By investigating the phenomenon of organisational change from
different perspectives, a richer, more detailed picture of how the firm evolved and what
influences were instrumental therein is created.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section,  7.2, a
summary of the two empirical chapters  5 and  6 are presented, showing how the key
findings of these chapters complement each other in illustrating the changes at Bradford
&  Bingley.  Section  7.3 discusses  the  contribution  to  knowledge,  followed  by  a
presentation  of  the  limitations  of  the  thesis  in  Section  7.4.  Then,  in  Section  7.5,
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suggestions for future research are given. Finally, Section 7.6, concludes with a personal
reflection of the entire research process.
7.2  Summary of Results
This  thesis  is  a  longitudinal  investigation  of  the  transformation  and  decline  of
Bradford & Bingley between 1995 and 2010.  Bradford & Bingley was chosen for this
case study as it has unique characteristics that distinguishes it from other demutualised
building societies.
First, it is the only building society to date, that has demutualised at the behest of its
members, against the expressed wishes of management.  Thus, in contrast to the TMT’s
of  other  demutualised  building  societies  (for  example  Abbey  National,  Halifax  and
Northern Rock) who favoured demutualisation, the management of B&B had to adapt to
the  new  reality  of  running  a  plc,  without  being  predisposed  to  it.   This  situation
addresses the problem of endogeneity in board decision-making in the upper echelons
perspective (Hambrick, 2007) with respect to demutualisation.
Second,  Bradford  &  Bingley  was  the  last  society  to  convert  to  plc  status.   It
demutualised three years after the majority did, and after most of the public pressure on
building societies to do so had already subsided.   In addition,  the firm experienced
significant  changes  over  a  relatively  short  period  of  time,  which  allowed  for  the
observation of the impact of a variety of contextual factors on changes on the board and
of the board’s decision-making.  Thus Bradford & Bingley is well suited for this study
as it demonstrates a number of corporate governance life-cycle changes.
The case of Bradford & Bingley is analysed using a combination of documentary
evidence and interviews with current and former directors, tracing the transformation
from building society to bank and nationalised institution. The corporate governance
life-cycle  provided  a  framework  for investigating  the  transformation,  enabling  the
identification  and  analysis  of  four  distinct  periods,  each  with  their  own  strategic,
resource  and  monitoring  needs.  In  investigating  the  transformation  of  Bradford  &
Bingley, the role of the board in directing change was examined, as the board is at the
apex of decision-making of the firm (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; Pugliese et al., 2009;
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Stiles,  2001).   Furthermore,  this  research rejected agency theory as  a  framework of
analysis  of organisational change in favour of investigating the phenomenon from a
theoretical perspective that recognises the importance of decision-making processes and
human interaction in the upper echelon of the firm (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; Zattoni
&  Cuomo,  2010;  Maitlis,  2004;  Roberts  et  al.,  2005).   Using  the  upper  echelons
perspective, the perceptions and roles of directors were analysed to explore how the
various actors on the board interacted and how the board as a whole worked in making
decisions. In doing so, this research emphasises the importance of human interaction on
the board over structural aspects of governance, treating them as distinct phenomena.
The thesis thus addresses a number of research questions, which are outlined below.
1. How did Bradford & Bingley adapt its governance structures during
the  different  corporate  governance  life-cycle  stages  in  the  Period
1995 – 2010?
In Chapter 5 the organisational life-cycle stages Bradford & Bingley went through
between 1995 and 2010 were identified, which established four distinct periods of time.
These  four  periods  were  then  grouped  into  life-cycle  stages  based  on  their
commonalities and differences, such that Periods 1 – 3 (1996 – 2008) were all of the
same life-cycle stage – Revival, and Period 4 – (2008 – 2010) – Decline .
What the analysis of changes in the corporate governance functions highlights is the
importance of the three governance functions of strategy, resource and monitoring in
determining whether  a  firm has  transitioned into a  new life-cycle  phase.  Hence the
corporate  governance  functions  are  central  to  describing  the  state  of  the  firm.
Significantly, it is found that the importance of each corporate governance function does
change  gradually  over  time  within  each  stage. For  example,  while  strategy  was
important during Period 1, the importance of strategy tapered off towards the end of the
period once the major changes to strategy had been implemented.  The same can be
observed in Period 3 and Period 4. Thus it is concluded that the transition from one life-
cycle stage to another is a fuzzy event in that it is often not possible to determine a
specific  date  as  the  cross-over  point,  but  rather  a  period  of  transition  in  which  the
governance functions gradually change. 
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In addition, it was not possible to determine a transition event ex ante. For example.
demutualisation is a fundamental change of the governance principles of the firm and a
change in  the  composition  of  stakeholders.  However,  despite  this  fundamental  shift
there was no new beginning of a life-cycle stage as the strategy and resource needs of
the firm did not change. In contrast, nationalisation did mark the beginning of a new
life-cycle  stage.  Again  this  event  marked  a  fundamental  change  in  the  governance
principles of the firm and also a change in the composition of stakeholders. This was
however  accompanied by an equally significant  change in the strategy and resource
needs of the firm.
It  further  emerged during  the  interviews that  directors  considered  there  to  be a
general hierarchy of governance functions, where determining strategy was considered
to be the prime responsibility of directors. Once strategy had been determined, financial
and knowledge resource could be adapted accordingly to serve the new strategy. This
situation could again be observed in Period 1 where Rodrigues set about to transform
Bradford & Bingley into a financial retailer. To do this he not only acquired a number of
firms to add to the product portfolio, but also changed the senior management team to
reflect the changed strategy. For example, Thorne joined as FD in 1999, bringing with
her experience in retailing financial services. The increased financial resource needs to
finance the expansion of the firm, is reflected in the increased levels of debt during the
same time.  Monitoring as  the third governance function had a different  importance.
Being  a  financial  retailer,  monitoring  and  safeguarding  of  customer  deposits  is
paramount and a critical function of the board. Nevertheless it was seen as arising from
the strategy of the firm. Monitoring was seen as the oversight of the implementation of
the strategy that was decided by the board and thus the aim of monitoring was to ensure
that executive directors properly implemented the boards will. 
2. What  differences  in  board  processes  can  be  identified  across  the
different life-cycle phases?
Focusing  on  two  very  distinct  and  different  stages  of  Bradford  &  Bingley’s
transformation,  Chapter  6 examined how the board  worked and which factors  were
influential in decision-making.  To do so, it used the upper echelons perspective (UEP)
to complement the analysis in Chapter 5. In analysing board processes during these two
206
periods (1 and 4), two sub-questions were of particular interest and are discussed in
detail below. First, the impact of contextual factors is considered and second, the impact
of board changes on decision-making processes is discussed.
a. How did contextual factors impact on decision-making processes?
Two contextual factors emerged as particularly important. Economic Context and
Firm Culture. Economic context, as discussed in Chapter 5, was very important in the
decision  to  hire  Christopher  Rodrigues.  By  hiring  Rodrigues,  a  building  society
outsider, and giving him the task of transforming the society, the society fundamentally
changed.  The impact  of  Rodrigues  as  a  catalyst  for  change on the  other  constructs
cannot  be  underestimated.  For  example,  the  turnover  in  directors,  together  with  a
sharper  focus  on  commercialisation  and  professionalisation  impacted  Mediating
Strategy  Processes  and,  most  importantly  TMT  Decision-Making,  as  discussed  in
Chapter 6. Consequently, board discussions were generally more robust and executives
were more demanding of non-executive directors in their engagement with the firm and
in their participation in the decision-making process.  Thus this demonstrates how the
economic environment can impact on decision-making through changes in the TMT
Characteristics.
Culture  emerged  as  the  second  important  contextual  factor  impacting  the  three
constructs of the upper echelons perspective that were considered. Boardroom culture
was seen differently in the two periods considered in Chapter 6. Generally, boardroom
culture was very important in how directors viewed the quality of decision-making on
the board. Culture is depended on the directors ‘living it’ and thus culture changed over
time. In the beginning of Period 1, Bradford & Bingley was a “cosy Yorkshire Mutual”
that was settled in its routines where decision-making was concentrated in the hands of
a few managers. The arrival of Rodrigues also meant a change of boardroom culture
fundamentally  transforming the way the board worked.  He integrated non-executive
directors  into the  decision-making processes,  with  a  focus  on vetting proposals  and
robustly discussing issues. This changed the culture on the board and was perceived to
be important in transforming the firm. Once the new culture had been established, TMT
Characteristics  and  composition  changed  in  accordance  with  the  new vision  of  the
board. Rodrigues thus hired executives which were able and willing to work in the new
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environment, replacing executives who did not agree with the new style or did not have
the required skills.
Culture is more than a context because it is lived and created by the directors on the
board, especially the chairman and chief executive. Because culture is dependent on
individuals and the team they form, it will change with changes in key board positions,
as has been demonstrated in Chapter 6. Within each chair – chief executive regime,
culture is path dependant and can only change with the support of both the chairman
and chief executive and is further dependent upon other directors accepting the change.
The  discussion  in  Section  5.4,  illustrates  a  case  in  which  some directors  were  not
willing to accept the new culture and thus elected to leave the board. Hence it can be
said that culture permeates all corporate governance processes. 
b. How did board changes impact on decision-making processes?
Previous research (for example, Roberts (2002)) has already investigated the role of
the chairman at the apex of the organisation. This research considered the impact of
changes in the upper echelon of the firm on board processes. In particular, board culture
has emerged as a major determinant of the perception of these board processes and the
quality of decision-making. 
As previously discussed above, the chairman and chief executive are at the apex of
the organisation and mutually set the tone of the board. In addition to board culture, the
agreement between them on the strategic direction of the firm, is important in shaping
organisational outcomes. In interviews it emerged that only a good quality and close
working relationship will facilitate constructive change. The relationship between the
chairman and chief executive is hence important and their general agreement on board
culture enables a productive working environment.
While  the  general  thrust  of  decision-making  was  seen  as  consensual,  open  and
collaborative, there were differences in how the boards operated. While the Mackinlay-
led board had a larger network of key directors, which were instrumental in decision-
making, the Pym-led board was signified by a duopoly of the chairman and managing
director. This duopoly was however challenged by the remaining NEDs, demonstrating
the strength and independence from the chairman.
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The  differences  between  the  Mackinlay-led,  Pym-led,  and  Kent-led  boards,
illustrates  how  the  tone  on  the  board  may  have  affected  decision-making.  The
Mackinlay-led and Pym-led boards were both seen as working exceptionally well and
were regarded  to be “as good as it gets” in terms of decision-making. In contrast the
Kent-led board was seen as more aggressive with Kent generally having a firm idea of
where he wanted the discussion to go. This led to directors not always being able to
express their opinion fully. An additional difference between Mackinlay and Kent was
the  degree  of  involvement  of  each  in  the  firm.  Whereas  Mackinlay,  despite  being
generally involved, was described as  “more arm’s length” and “hands off”, Kent was
seen  as  very  involved,  which  is  underlined  by  the  fact  that  he  used  Bradford  &
Bingley’s London headquarters as his main base of operation for a variety of his non-
executive roles. Pym, as discussed in Section 6.4.4 was also more involved in decision-
making. 
Thus,  these findings  add to  existing research by arguing that  the links  between
influence and power in decision-making are dependant on how the relationships of the
upper echelon concentrate or distribute power among its  members. Furthermore,  the
way the chairman manages the board, in particular how he engages and relates to board
members inside and outside the boardroom, is instrumental in shaping the perceptions
of  decision-making of  the  board.  This  goes  beyond the  quantity  of  engagement,  as
demonstrated by the Kent-led board, and highlights the importance of the quality of
engagement as demonstrated by the Mackinlay-led board. 
7.3  Contribution to Knowledge
This research contributes to knowledge in a number of ways. First, this study is
novel  in  combining  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle  theory  and  upper  echelons
perspective to investigate structural and behavioural changes during the transition of
Bradford & Bingley from building society to bank and nationalised institution.  As the
focus of this research is on the micro-processes of transition and change between and
within  life-cycle  stages,  the  combination  of  these  two  theories  allowed  a  better
explanation  of  board  processes  and  behaviours  in  the  different  stages  of  B&B’s
organisational life.  In doing so, the thesis did not take a narrow view of theory as a set
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of strict procedures to follow, but used both theories as a guide to shed light onto the
processes and perceptions of organisational change at Bradford & Bingley.
Second,  in  studying transitions  between different  life-cycle  stages,  this  research
addresses  a  gap  in  the  corporate  governance  life-cycle  literature.  In  particular,  in
Chapter  5,  the transition from the life-cycle stage of maturity to reinvention and from
reinvention to decline are investigated. By exploring the process of change between, but
also within stages, it  adds to the understanding of micro-processes and causalities in
life-cycle transitions. In addition, the thesis addresses another area of limited research in
the corporate governance life-cycle literature, by using a longitudinal, cross-temporal,
rather than cross-sectional approach.
Third, this research presents evidence of different approaches and attitudes towards
governance functions within the corporate governance life-cycle. During Period 1 non-
executive  directors  displayed  a  managerial  attitude  towards  governance,  ranking
strategy as most important and monitoring least. In contrast, during Period 4, the board
was much more constraint in its managerial influence and hence monitoring was its
primary function.
Fourth, within the corporate governance life-cycle, ‘Revival’ was added as a fifth
stage,  complementing the stages of Inception,  Growth, Maturity and Decline.  While
previous research has shown that life-cycle stages do not need to follow each other
chronologically,  this  research  further  stresses the  importance  of  not  interpreting  the
model as static.  In particular, it has been shown that life-cycle stages are overlapping
and their boundaries are fuzzy, hence the identification of transitions between stages can
only be made ex post. That there are periods of transition is also reflected in governance
functions changing gradually over time, rather than abruptly at the end or beginning of a
new stage;  hence this research refines understanding of the corporate governance life-
cycle.
Fifth, building on qualitative research in governance, and using the upper echelons
perspective as a framework, the governance processes and perceptions of directors have
been analysed in Chapter 6 with a focus on identifying the impact of board composition
and  context  on  board  decision-making  and  organisational  outcomes.  Organisational
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outcomes, though not explicitly studied in Chapter 6, have been discussed in Chapter 5
and provide the background on which to examine the board decision-making processes.
In doing so, this research contributes to knowledge by demonstrating how company and
boardroom culture is used and perceived differently by top management team members
across time.
7.4  Limitations of this Research
All research has limitations and this study has some limitations as a result of the
methodological choices made.  The choice of a single case study as the study format
limits  the  generalisability  of  the  findings  and  furthermore  limits  the  opportunity  to
compare findings to other cases.  However, the choice of the single case study method
was  made  deliberately,  considering  the  following  issues.   As  an  objective  of  this
research was to generate in-depth data that could identify nuances in board processes
over time, and explore decision-making within and across life-cycle stages, a single case
study is well suited to meet that objective.  Generalisability and breadth of data has thus
been traded for a detailed investigation of a particular, and interesting, case.
A related limitation arising from the case study is the, in some respects, limited
availability of data.  Attempts to access the Bradford & Bingley archives were denied,
thus  depriving this  research of  potentially  valuable information,  such as  minutes  of
board meetings.  This lack of internal information was ameliorated in two ways.  First, a
broad  collection  of  documentary  evidence  was  collected,  including  official  firm
publications,  as  well  as  newspapers,  magazines,  commentaries  or  reports  on  the
company.  Not all evidence is available online and consequently some journeys had to
be  made to  visit  the  Building  Societies  Association  archives  in  London.   It  is  thus
possible that some relevant documents have been missed during these visits.  Second,
interviews with key decision-makers were sought and conducted, thus giving an inside
view of the boardroom.
Finally, the setting of this study limits the choice of method.  As this research is
focusing on historic events, some methods which have been shown to yield interesting
results in board process research such as ethnography (Maitlis, 2004; Parker, 2007a) are
unavailable.  In addition, gaining access to the board of a financial institution to conduct
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research is very difficult due to board members’ concerns over future liability, and thus
very unlikely.  Hence, interviews are considered to be a suitable substitute (Roberts et
al.,  2005) in  lieu  of  direct  access.   The  combination  of  documentary  sources  and
interviews was thus deemed appropriate to address the research questions.
7.5  Directions for Future Research
There are a number of possible directions for future research arising from this study.
First, the evidence in the empirical chapters suggests that the concepts of board(room)
culture  and  firm  culture  need  to  be  explored  further;  in  particular  their  impact  on
constructs of the UEP and governance functions within the corporate governance life-
cycle and life-cycle transitions.
While there is literature on boardroom culture and board processes (for example
(Maitlis,  2004;  Parker,  2007b),  this  research  has  highlighted  that  there  is  scope  to
explore  the  link  between  boardroom culture  and  firm culture  in  new directions.  In
particular, cultural change was a prominent feature in Period 1 (1995 – 2004) and the
mechanisms and processes of cultural change from the top warrant further study.  In
addition, the possible obstacles and factors of failure of cultural change should also be
considered in future studies.  For example, the understanding of firm and board culture
by directors changed between Period 1 and 4 and investigating the how and why of this
change may contribute to the understanding of how firm and board culture are linked
and how they change over time.
Second, this study only investigated one actor – the Top Management Team.  While
the upper echelons perspective specifically considers only the 'upper echelon'  of the
firm,  that  is,  directors,  further  research  could include  a  number  of  other  significant
actors (for example building society members, debtors, investors, shareholders, analysts
and customers) that influence directors when making decisions.   In this  thesis  these
other actors are currently presented and discussed as one group (Contextual Factors –
Section  6.2) and are not considered independently.  Furthermore, future studies could
link these actors to the change in firm and boardroom culture.  For example, how was
cultural change induced from the top, perceived by other employees including senior
managers.  Similarly, these organisational changes would not have only impacted other
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stakeholders, such as building society members or, later, shareholders, but also other
interested  parties  such  as  financial  analysts  and  customers.   How  did  these  other
interested parties view the cultural changes, were they aware of them and how were
they impacted by the changes?
Third, this research traced the organisational development of Bradford & Bingley
over a period of 15 years using a combination of documentary sources and interviews.
Although every  attempt  was  made  to  provide  an  in-depth  examination  of  decision-
making on the board, further refinement could yield interesting results.  For example, in
forgoing a  longer  period  of  examination,  a  study focusing on decision-making in  a
particular case, such as securitisation or purchases of third party mortgages, could offer
a  different  perspective  on  board  processes.   This  might  call  for  an  ethnographic
approach, as employed by Maitlis (2004) and  (Parker, 2007a; Parker, 2007b; Parker,
2008); however it raises questions regarding the availability of access to boards.  Given
the sensitive nature of board decision-making, especially in financial institutions, access
is  expected  to  be  difficult.   Similarly,  studies  of  organisational  failure  do  not  lend
themselves to ethnography as failure can only be determined ex post.   However,  in
following the purpose of examining board decision-making, the study of gatekeepers
and agenda setting could yield further insight into how boards not only control, but are
also controlled by those in positions of defining the agenda or of being a gatekeeper.
The  paper  by  McNulty  &  Stewart  (2014) is  a  first  study  addressing  the  role  of
gatekeepers.
Fourth, and finally, this study could be extended to investigate (a) another failed
institution such as Alliance & Leicester, the Co-operative Bank, or the former Chelsea
Building  Society  to  confirm  and  contrast  the  findings  of  this  research,  or  (b)  an
institution that was exposed to similar challenges as Bradford & Bingley, yet remained
independent such an existing building society, for example the Nationwide.  Exploring
the topic of transformation and failure, or lack thereof, could provide further insights
into  the  processes  of  change  within  and  across  life-cycle  stages,  as  well  as  the
perceptions and motivations of key decision-makers, thus creating a richer picture of
organisational change in UK financial institutions.
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7.6  Personal Reflection on the Research Process
Writing this thesis was a long process with a steep learning curve. When I started
this project I was less familiar with about qualitative research and was not looking to do
a qualitative PhD, yet this is the end product of my efforts. Coming from a quantitative
background in economics, finance and accounting, learning qualitative methods proved
challenging  but  also  rewarding.  Having  been  immersed  in  both  types  of  research
methods helped me in understanding the advantages and disadvantages of each, as well
as a better understanding of when to use each method.
Having finished coding the interviews manually using text markers,  the thought
occurred  that  using  a  qualitative  analysis  software  might  have  been  useful  in
transferring the coding and quotations into my chapters. However, I made a conscious
choice of not using qualitative software to avoid sitting in front of a computer screen, as
it is not conducive to creative thinking for me. To reflect on the interviews, to code them
and to form a concept of the issues raised in these, a clear mind away from the computer
is essential and hence no qualitative software was used, notwithstanding its advantages
in retrieving information.  In  addition,  it  was  only  possible  to  do so because of  the
limited number of interviews conducted.
It took me the better part of the PhD to develop a workflow that is supportive of my
writing. Early on I experimented with a variety of different software packages, such as
MS Word, as well as Latex. However, I found neither conducive in writing due to their
linear structure. There is nothing worse than a white, empty page on the screen waiting
to be filled. The majority of my writing has therefore been completed using Scrivener, a
software developed for creative writing, that combines note-taking and writing in a non-
linear  fashion.  Using this  software was liberating in  writing effectively and quickly
while having my notes available. At the end of the process I only had to transfer the
written text into a word document and apply formatting styles and cross-references as
well as bibliographic entries.
Another challenge during my PhD was time and task management. Besides being a
full time PhD student, I was also a Teaching Assistant in the department with significant
seminar teaching responsibilities, as well as being a PhD Representative for two and a
half  years.  Combining  all  these  roles  required  a  lot  of  time and task  management,
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which,  again,  was  a  steep  learning curve  but  also  a  good preparation  for  being  an
academic. During my four years of study I thus learned to schedule and prioritise tasks
and to work to deadlines. It was not always easy.
Finally, dealing with stress and fatigue, especially in my final year was challenging.
At the end of the project, when the end is almost in sight, but not just yet, motivation to
write and finish is hard to come by. Besides the support of my supervisors and wife,
meditation proved to be particularly useful. By chance I found out about Raj Yoga, a
form of open eye meditation, which was immensely useful in maintaining inner calm
and thus  relieving stress.  Feeling less  stressed also improved my energy levels  and
reduced the feeling of fatigue. I am very lucky to have found this useful tool.
So, would I do the PhD all over again? Yes, I would and I would not want to miss
any of the experiences of the past four years. The experiences and lessons learned are
part of my life and shaped my future in ways I can not yet know. But I would do it
again.
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A.1  Time line: Building Societies History
Year Act Description
1775
Ketley's  Building  Society,  the  first  known  society  was
founded  in  Birmingham.  The  earliest  societies  were
'terminating', and wound up when all their members had
been housed.
1793 FriendlySocieties Act Recognises Aims and Objectives of Friendly Societies
1825 The  Jubilee  of  the  industry  –  over  250  societies  inexistence throughout the country.
1836 BuildingSocieties Act
The  Regulation  of  Benefit  Building  Societies  Act
officially recognised societies for the first time and was
the first legislation dealing specifically with the industry.
It  Offered  legal  recognition  in  their  own right  and  the
power for societies to deposit funds in savings banks.
1845 The  first  known  permanent  society  formed  –  TheMetropolitan Equitable.
1860 Over 750 societies in existence in London and 2,000 inthe provinces.
1869
The Building Societies Protection Association formed in
London by James Higham to act as the national body for
the industry.
1870
The  Royal  Commission  on  Friendly  Societies  included
building societies in its enquiries. Many had retained the
features  of  members  balloting  for  loans,  thus  attracting
gamblers as well as genuine house-buyers.
1874 BuildingSocieties Act
Based on the Royal Commissions Report the act offered
voluntary  Incorporation  and  limited  liability  for  new
societies only.
1892
The spectacular collapse of the largest building society in
the country – The Liberator Permanent Benefit – due to
the financial activities of its founder.
1894 BuildingSocieties Act
This year marked the first compulsory registration for all
societies. The act also closed loopholes in the 1874 act to
protect against a re-occurrence of the Liberator débâcle.
1910 1,723 societies in  existence with 626,000 members andtotal assets of over £76m.
1926 The  Building  Societies  Protection  Association  was
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Year Act Description
renamed as the Building Societies Association. It had 310
member-societies.
1939 BuildingSocieties Act
Established  legal  classes  of  collateral  security  which
societies could accept, and was passed with support of the
government and Building Societies Association.
1960 BuildingSocieties Act
The  Act  sought  to  ensure  that  liquid  funds  were  both
liquid and safe. It established that new societies must have
10 founder members with £500 each. It also increased the
power of  the  Registrar,  who was given powers  to  veto
advertising and the acceptance of funds. In addition, new
directors were barred from acting as valuers and members
received the right of proxy vote.
1962 BuildingSocieties Act
This Act merged provisions of the 1874, 1894, 1939 and
1960 Acts.
1981
The BSA mortgage rate cartel collapsed after the largest
Society, Abbey National, left the cartel in 1979. Societies
were now able to compete for retail deposits.
1983 Societies allowed access to wholesale funds and sterlingEurobond market.
1986 BuildingSocieties Act
This  Act  abolishes  all  previous  legislation,  enabling
societies to exercise a wider range of powers in the field
of housing and personal banking services. It established
the Building Societies Commission as societies' regulator,
and also had provisions for Societies to demutualise.
1989
Banks  and  societies  are  allowed  to  issue  sterling
commercial paper. Furthermore, Abbey National passes a
resolution enabling it to convert to plc status. From July
1989 the Abbey National is no longer a building society.
1991 Societies  are  permitted  to  issue  permanent  interest-bearing shares (PIBS).
1995
Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Society converted to
plc  status  and  became  immediately  part  of  the  Lloyds
Bank Group – the first society taken over by an existing
organisation.
1997 Building
Societies Act
The  1997  Act  was  enacted.  It  amended,  but  did  not
replace,  the  Building  Societies  Act  1986.  The  Act
introduced a more flexible operating regime for societies,
which  included  a  package  of  measures  to  increase  the
accountability  of  building  societies'  boards  to  their
members.
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Year Act Description
Several  of  the  largest  Building  Societies  including  the
Halifax, Alliance & Leicester, Northern Rock, Woolwich
and Bristol & West converted to plc status, with Bristol &
West being taken over by Bank of Ireland.
2000
Bradford  &  Bingley  Building  Society  converts  to  plc
status. It is the first and only demutualisation voted for by
members’  against  the  expressed  wishes  of  its
management.
2001
The Financial
Services and
Markets Act
2000
This  Act  disbanded  the  Building  Societies  Commission
and its regulatory powers were transferred to the newly
formed Financial Services Authority.
2005
Britannia Building Society buys the savings and branch
business of Bristol & West plc, the first remutualisation of
a  converted  institution.  The  Child  Trust  Fund  was
introduced.
2007
The Building
Societies
(Funding) and
Mutual Societies
(Transfers) Act
2007
Some  of  the  main  provisions  of  this  Act  included  an
increase of  the  current  non-member  funding limit  from
50%  to  a  maximum  of  75%;  ensuring  that  ordinary
shareholders would rank equally with ordinary creditors
by altering priorities on dissolution and winding-up, and
enabling the transfer of a building society to a subsidiary
of another mutual.
2008
The Banking
(Special
Provisions) Act
2008
Following the collapse of Northern Rock, this emergency
legislation  was  introduced,  enabling  the  government  to
nationalise  Northern  Rock  and  to  provide  temporary
powers to  intervene in future banking collapses.  It  was
subject to a 12 month sunset provision.
2009
The new
Banking Act
2009
Special Resolution Regime for deposit-takers introduced.
Dunfermline  Building  Society's  retail  and  wholesale
deposits, branches, head office and originated residential
mortgages  were  transferred  to  Nationwide  Building
Society using the new resolution regime.
In the same year Britannia Building Society merged with
the  mutual  Co-operative  Financial  Services  –  the  first
merger between a building society and a mutual bank.
2010 The three main political party manifestos recognised the
importance of mutuals, both within financial services and
wider public services. In May the Coalition Government
pledged in its Coalition Agreement to promote mutuals.
“We want the banking system to serve business, not the
other  way  round.  We  will  bring  forward  detailed
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Year Act Description
proposals to foster diversity in financial services, promote
mutuals and create a more competitive banking industry.”
2011 In November Northern Rock was sold to Virgin Money,disappointing those that wanted it to be remutualised.
Sources:  Adapted  from  Building  Societies  Association,  Ashworth  (1980),  Boddy
(1980), Boleat (1965), Cleary (1965), Schönenberg (1993)
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A.2  Building Societies Branches
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Figure A.2.1: Building Societies and Branches 1910 – 2010
A.3  Timeline of the Transformation of B&B (1995 
– 2005)
Year Event
1995 Joint Venture – Acquisition of mortgage book from Platform Home Loans
(Lehman Bros) for £78m.
1997 Purchase of Mortgage Express for £64m in May from Lloyds TSB.
1998 Acquisition of Blackhorse Estate Agency from Lloyds TSB.
2000 February –  Acquired John Charcol Holdings Limited, the UK's leading
mortgage broker, from Warburg, Pincus for £100m.
March – George Cox, Director-General of the Institute of Directors, joins
the Board of Bradford & Bingley as a non-executive director. 
March –  Bradford & Bingley Group in joint  venture with U.S. market
leader Alltel for UK and European mortgage processing.
July  –  Voting  members  overwhelmingly  endorse  a  proposal  from  the
Board of Directors to convert to a public limited company. 
September –  Bradford  &  Bingley  Relocation  Services,  the  building
society's  relocation  division,  sold  to  Cendant  Corporation,  the  leading
global provider of real estate, travel and direct marketing-related consumer
and business services. 
December –  Bradford & Bingley Building Society’s shares float on the
London Stock Exchange on December 4 at 240p. Bradford & Bingley plc
is formed.
2001 Partnership with Rightmove, cessation of Bradford & Bingley web page to
sell/list properties.
2002 November  –  Roderick  Kent  assumes  the  role  of  Chairman,  on  the
retirement of Lindsay Mackinlay.
2003 January – B&B purchases Alltel Mortgage Solutions Ltd on January 3rd.
April – Diana Courtney retires. Trevor Lewis and Mark Smith retire later
this  year.  Steve  Webster  joins  the  boards  as  Chairman  of  the  Audit
Committee.
Two acquisitions in Wealth Advice business: Holden Meehan Ltd (one of
the UK's  leading fee-based IFA businesses) and Aitchison & Colegrave
(financial advice to high net worth individuals).
December – Bradford & Bingley PLC urges former members of Bradford
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Year Event
& Bingley Building Society, who have so far failed to collect their 250
demutualisation shares, to claim their entitlement.
2004 March – The Board announces that it has appointed Steven Crawshaw as
Group  Chief  Executive,  following  the  resignation  of  Christopher
Rodrigues.
May – Bradford & Bingley announces the outcome of its strategic review.
The main conclusions are: Continue to develop strong specialist lending
business; Refocus and grow branch-based retail business; Reduce costs in
these two core businesses; Dispose of non-core businesses. 
August – Ian Darby resigns from the Board.
November –  Bradford  & Bingley  plc  and Legal  & General  Group plc
announce new business partnership. Under the arrangement, Bradford &
Bingley offers to its customers a range of Legal & General investment and
protection products.
December –  Bradford & Bingley plc receives notice from the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) that it is fining the company £650,000 in relation
to the sale of Structured Capital At Risk Products and With Profit Bonds.
The deficiencies occurred between January 2001 and December 2002 and
relate  to  a  failure  to  make  suitable  recommendations  and  a  failure  to
maintain adequate records of customers and sales. During the review of its
business the company acknowledged the failures in its recommendations
and  record  keeping  in  this  period  and  agrees  to  pay  compensation  in
respect of any customer losses. It is estimated this could total around £6m.
December –  B&B sells  its  Charcol  mortgage  broking business  and its
estate-agency business to focus on mortgages under its new chief executive
Steven Crawshaw. 
2005 September – Chris Gillespie joins the Board as Group Lending Director.
October –  Chris  Willford  appointed  to  the  Board  as  Group  Finance
Director.
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A.4  Timeline of the Decline of B&B (2006 – 2010)
Year Event
2006 May – Andy Wiggans joins Bradford & Bingley Group to the post of
director of mortgage products. 
June – Bradford & Bingley links with The Co-operative Bank to offer
loans.
November – Bradford & Bingley stops selling mortgages of other banks
and building societies and begins selling own-branded home loans in its
205 branches across the UK. 
2007 May – Two new executive Board Directors; Roger Hattam appointed as
Group Product and Marketing Director and Mark Stevens as Group Sales
Director. Both are internal appointments, Roger and Mark have sat on the
Group Executive Committee for the past  two years and between them
have  20  years  experience  at  Bradford  &  Bingley.  Chris  Gillespie  the
current Group Sales Director, has tendered his resignation from the Board
and will leave the Group after a short handover. 
April –  Bradford  &  Bingley  plc  announces  that  it  has  signed  an
agreement with Kensington Group plc, that enables the Group to acquire
up to £2 billion of prime residential mortgage portfolios in total over the
next two years.
November –  Bradford  &  Bingley  agrees  to  sell  its  entire  housing
association book to Dexia, following a review of the growth potential and
capital  utilisation  of  these  assets.  It  also  agreed  to  sell  a  portfolio  of
commercial property loans of £2bn to GE Real Estate, following a review
of the growth potential and capital utilisation of these assets.
2008 April –  B&B denies a rights issue in order to bolster its weak balance
sheet.
May –  B&B asks shareholders for £300 million via a rights issue. The
new shares are offered at 82p – a 48 per cent discount to the previous
evening's close.
June – Chief executive Steven Crawshaw steps down due to ill-health. 
June  –  Rod  Kent  becomes  executive  chairman.  B&B  issues  profit
warning and announces that the bank has agreed to sell a 23 per cent stake
to private  equity firm Texas  Pacific,  in  a  move to bolster  its  finances
alongside a rights issue, raising £400 million in total.
August –  The bank names former Alliance & Leicester  boss,  Richard
Pym as its  new chief executive.  The £400m emergency rights issue is
only 28 per cent subscribed.
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Year Event
August  –  B&B  announces  first  half  losses,  after  write  downs  on  its
investments  and  rising  bad  debts.  The  firm's  pre-tax  losses  are  £26.7
million – compared to £180m of profit in the same period in 2007. Shares
fall to 49p.
September –  Bradford  & Bingley  announces  a  series  of  initiatives  to
streamline its business operations and improve efficiency. Realignment of
operations  include:  Closure  of  the  mortgage  processing  centre  in
Borehamwood, Hertfordshire; Significant reduction in intermediary sales
team; Redundancy of all remaining branch based mortgage advisors. 
The bank axes 370 jobs under a cost-cutting drive but fails to boost the
share price. It is now effectively closed for new mortgage business. The
loss of 370 roles, has a targeted annualised cost savings of £15 million
and anticipated one-off costs of £14 million.
September  –  Bradford  &  Bingley  nationalised.  Santander  purchases
deposit-taking part of B&B.
November – Four Non-Executive Directors, Rod Kent (chairman), Nick
Cosh (deputy chairman), Ian Cheshire and Steve Webster step down from
the Board with effect from 14 November 2008. Richard Pym, the current
Chief Executive, has been appointed Executive Chairman. 
2009 April – Mr Richard Banks appointed as Managing Director.
June – Christopher Wilford (FD) and Roger Hattam (OD) resign.
2010 January  –  Bradford  &  Bingley  welcomes  announcement  by  the
European Commission approving its Business Plan and application for
State Aid.
October –  Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock Asset Management
are merged as UKAR.
UK  Asset  Resolution  is  established  by  UKFI  as  the  new  holding
company  for  Bradford  &  Bingley  plc  and  Northern  Rock  (Asset
Management)  plc.  UKAR has  been established to  manage the  closed
mortgage books of B&B and NRAM on an integrated basis.
December  –  The  Boards  of  UK  Asset  Resolution  Ltd,  Bradford  &
Bingley  plc  and  NR  (Asset  Management)  plc  announces  that  Bob
Davies, non-executive Director, will be resigning from the three Boards
with effect from 31 December 2010. Sue Langley becomes chairman of
the Remuneration Committees with effect from 1 January 2011.
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B  UK Code of Governance 1992 – 2010
Year Report/Review Description
1992 Cadbury
Report
- Cadbury Committee established Guide of Best Practice for
all UK-listed companies
- Code is not legally binding
- Introduced  ‘Comply or Explain’ principle;  firm’s that do
not comply with all aspects of the code have to explain in the
annual report the reasons why they are not in compliance
-  The  Report  covered  three  main  areas:  the  board  of
directors, auditing, and the role of shareholders
-  Key  recommendations  of  the  Committee  covered  the
following areas:
- Operation of the main board
-  The  establishment,  composition,  and  operation  of  key
board committees
-  The  importance  of,  and  contribute  by,  non-executive
directors
- The reporting and control mechanisms of the firm
1995 Greenbury
Report
-  Review  of  Directors  remuneration  and  disclosure  of
remuneration
-  Report  made  recommendation  about  the  disclosure  of
individual  directors’ remuneration  packages  and  company
remuneration policies
-  Also  recommended  firm’s  to  establish  Remuneration
Committees  staffed  with  independent  non-executive
directors
-  Recommended  linking  the  performance  of  the  company
and individual directors to directors’ rewards
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Year Report/Review Description
1998 Hampel Report
Combined
Code
- The Hampel Committee was set up in 1995 to review the
implementation of Cadbury and Greenbury
- It endorsed the overwhelming majority of findings of the
previous reports
- The Code however shifts the focus of corporate governance
to  primarily  shareholders,  and  away  from  a  more
stakeholder-centric  position  of  the  previous  two  reports.
Nevertheless  it  affirms  that  directors  are  responsible  to
maintain  good  relations  with  all  stakeholders,  not  only
shareholders
- The Combined Code unified the recommendations of the
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports.
-  It  establishes the requirement for directors to implement
and maintain a system of internal controls
1999 Turnbull
Report
-  The  Turnbull  Report  focused  on  the  internal  control
provisions of the Combined Code (1998)
-  It  provides  specific  guidance  on  best  practice  of
implementing a system of internal controls
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Year Report/Review Description
2003 Tyson Report
Higgs Report
Smith Report
Combined
Code (Revised)
-  Revised  Combined  Code  includes  all  prior  Governance
Reports
-  At  least  half  of  the  board  should  be  independent  non-
executive directors
- The chief  executive should not  become chairman of  the
same company
- The chairman should be independent on appointment
- A senior independent director should be appointed
- The board should undertake period performance reviews
-  Institutional  investors  should  avoid  box  ticking  when
evaluating the governance of their investees
-  Companies  should  adopt  rigorous  and  transparent
recruitment procedures
- Non-executive directors should only be reappointed after 6
years subject to a review of their performance
-  Non-executive  directors  are  no  longer  considered
independent after 9 years and must be reappointed annually
- Full  time executive directors should not have more than
one FTSE100 non-executive directorship/ chairmanship
2006 Combined
Code (Revised)
- The chairman may serve on the remuneration committee if
independent on appointment
-  Introduction  of  ‘vote  withheld’  option  on  proxy
appointment forms
-  Companies  should  publish  details  of  proxies  lodged  on
their website
2008 Combined
Code (Revised)
Revised
Guidance on
Audit
Committees
-  Individuals  may  now  chair  more  than  one  FTSE100
company
-  For  companies  outside  FTS350  chairman  may  serve  on
audit committee if independent on appointment
- Changes to the appointment process and considerations of
the audit committee
- Updated guidance to be in line with Audit Practice’s Board
(APB) Ethical Standards
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Year Report/Review Description
2009 Turner Review
Walker Review
- A review on the causes of the financial crisis
-  Aimed  to  make  recommendations  to  improve  regulation
and supervisory approaches to improve the robustness of the
UK financial system
- Remuneration that encouraged risk-taking was identified as
one of the major causes of the financial crisis
- Review concluded that more emphasis must be laid upon
risk, risk management and good internal controls
- Remuneration committees have a special role in aligning
compensation and risk
- Independent review of the governance of banks and other
financial institutions comprising of 39 recommendations:
-  5  recommendations  for  board  size,  composition  and
director qualification
-  8  recommendations  about  board  performance  evaluation
and the functioning of the board
-  9  recommendations  on  the  role  and  engagement  of
institutional shareholders
-  5  recommendation  on  risk  governance  (especially  risk
committees)
-  12  recommendations  regarding  board  remuneration
(including the remuneration committee)
-  Some of  the recommendations  were implemented in  the
UK Corporate Governance Code by the FRC, while others
were implemented through the FSA
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Year Report/Review Description
2010 UK Corporate
Governance
Code
- Following a consultation and progress report by the FRC,
the  UK  Corporate  Governance  Code  was  updated,
incorporating some of the recommendations of the Walker
Review. There were six significant changes:
- A company’s business model be explained
-  Performance-related  pay  should  align  with  long-term
interests of the firm as well as risk policy and systems
- All FTSE350 directors should be re-elected on an annual
basis to increase accountability
-  Principles  on  the  leadership  by  the  chairman,  the
responsibilities of NEDs to challenge executives, and time
commitment expected of directors to encourage substantive
debates in boardrooms
-  New  principles  on  the  appointment  and  selection  of
directors, in particular directors should be appointed on merit
based on objective criteria and should take account of board
diversity to avoid group think
-  The  chairman  should  hold  regular  development  reviews
with  each  director  and  board  effectiveness  should  be
reviewed at least every three years with external help
Source: (Solomon, 2013; Mallin, 2013)
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B.1  Upper Echelons Theory Framework
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Source: (Carpenter & Reilly, 2006)
Figure B.1.1: Upper Echelons Theory Framework
C  Participant Information Sheet
Participant Information
Sheet
Reference Number: «Ref_Number»
Bradford & Bingley: Board Composition and Decision-Making
Processes
You are invited to take part in a research study which is being conducted as
part  of  a  Doctoral  Research  degree  at  The  University  of  York  by  Mr
Matthias Hambach, Professor Josephine Maltby and Mr Philip Linsley.  We
appreciate your participation which we believe will  greatly enhance the
findings of this study.
Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to
understand why the research is being undertaken and what it will involve.
Please take time to read the following information carefully and do ask if
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Purpose of this Research
The executive and non-executive board are central to companies' internal
decision-making.  The composition of the board and interaction of board
members and,  in  particular  the underlying board processes  of  decision-
making  and  conflict  resolution,  are  important  factors  in  understanding
outcomes for the company.
Bradford & Bingley's transformation from building society to bank provides
a  case  study  setting  of  how  the  composition  of  the  board  of  directors
changes with economic need and how these changes impact on internal
decision-making and strategy.
The aim of this study is to explore the impact of these changes on the board
of  directors  and  its  impact  on  decision-making  processes  and  conflict
resolution procedures.
Your Involvement
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The York Management School
University of York
Freboys Lane
Heslington
YO10 5GD
Tel.: 01904 325 062
As  a  former  director/executive  of  Bradford  &  Bingley  you  have  been
identified as a potential participant in this study for your knowledge of top
management  decision-making  processes  and  your  extensive  working
experience at a senior level.
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be interviewed in a place
that is convenient for you. The interview will take approximately one hour,
and,  with  your  permission,  will  be  audio-taped.  Before  we  start  the
interview, you will be given an opportunity to ask questions and I will ask
you to sign a written consent form confirming that you are happy to take
part in the study.
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the
research at any time without giving a reason and without any detriment to
yourself or your organisation. 
Possible Benefits
This is an opportunity for you to share your professional knowledge and
experience  to  inform  research  into  corporate  governance,  adding  your
views to the debate.  The findings of this study will help to reach a better
understanding of board decision-making processes and may in the future
lead to better corporate governance guidelines being published.
Risks or Inconvenience
There are no risks attached to this study.  Your interview scripts will be
kept strictly confidential and are available only to the researchers.
The Information you Provide
Interview tapes will  be transcribed.  All  tapes and transcriptions will  be
locked in a safe place. All information collected during the course of the
study will  only be viewed by the research panel committee, and remain
strictly  confidential.  The  confidential  handling,  processing,  storage  and
disposal of data will be in accordance with Data Protection Guidelines.
At the end of the study,  this information may be used to write up a PhD
thesis, and may be used in publishing articles in professional and academic
journals and conference presentations. The names of the people, who have
taken part  in  the  research or  any  other  information that  could  identify
them, will not appear in the thesis or in other written forms when the study
is completed.
All who take part in the research will be sent a summary of the final report,
if they indicate so. When the study is completed, all the information will be
kept  in  a  locked filing cabinet  in  a storeroom of  the York Management
School, University of York for 5 years and will be destroyed after that time.
What is the next step?
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If you are willing to participate in the study, please complete the reply slip
and return in the provided envelope. We will contact you after receiving
your reply slip to arrange the date and time of the interview. A consent
form can be signed on the day of interview. The consent form will not be
used  to  identify  you.  It  will  be  filed  separately  from  all  the  other
information. However, you may keep this sheet for reference.
Further Information
If you have any concerns or questions about this study, please feel free to
contact the main researcher Mr Matthias Hambach, on 078 072 111 39 or
e-mail mh841@york.ac.uk.
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C.1  Reply Slip
Reply Slip The York Management 
School
University of York
Reference number: «Ref_Number» Freboys Lane
Heslington
YO10 5GD 
 
Tel  +44 (0) 1904 325062
Fax +44 (0) 1904 325021
Bradford & Bingley: Board Composition and Decision-Making
Processes
Name: «First_Name»«Last_Name»
Phone Number: «Phone_Number»
Email Address:«Email_address»
Address: «Address_Line_1»
       «Address_Line_2»
«City»
«Post_Code»
 I am interested in taking part in the above study and willing to be
contacted  by  phone  or  email  to  discuss  possible  participation.
(Please tick box)
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C.2  Consent Form
CONSENT FORM The York Management 
School
University of York
Reference number: «Ref_Number» Freboys Lane
Heslington
YO10 5GD 
 
Tel  +44 (0) 1904 325062
Fax +44 (0) 1904 325021
 
Bradford &  Bingley  : Board Composition and Decision-Making 
Processes
Researcher: Matthias Hambach
Please
tick each
box
1.I agree to participate in this study
2.
I understand that my participation in this study is 
voluntary and I am free to withdraw from the research at
any time without giving any reason and without any 
detriment to myself and my organisation
3.
I confirm that I have read and understand clearly the 
information sheet for this research and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the study. These 
questions have been answered satisfactorily by the 
researcher.
4.I understand that the interview will be audio-taped
5.I understand that only the members of the research teamhave access to the information collected during the study
6.
I am aware that the information collected during the 
interview will be used to write up a PhD thesis, and may 
be used in future research
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7.
I understand that information collected during the course
of the research project will be treated as confidential. 
This means that my name, or any other information that 
could identify me, will not be included in anything 
written as a result of the research
8.
I understand that when this research is completed the 
information obtained will be retained in locked filing 
cabinets in a storeroom in the York Management School, 
University of York, for 5 years and will be destroyed 
thereafter
9.
I would like to be informed of the outcome of the 
research via a report summary, and / or be informed of 
any future publications
Name of Participant Date Signature
Name of Researcher Date Signature
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C.3  Interview Topic Guide
Interview Topic Guide
Investigator: Matthias Hambach
Research Title: Bradford  &  Bingley:  Board  Composition  and
Decision-Making Processes
Introduction:
Research Background and Aim:
The executive  and  non-executive  board  are  central  to  companies'
internal  decision-making.   The  composition  of  the  board  and
interaction of board members and, in particular the underlying board
processes of decision-making and conflict resolution, are important
factors in understanding outcomes for the company.
Bradford & Bingley's transformation from building society to bank
provides a case study setting of how the composition of the board of
directors changes with economic need and how these changes im-
pact on internal decision-making and strategy.
The purpose of the interview will be to explore respondents’ views on
key issues associated with this transformation process.
Assurance of Ethical Conduct
 All information will be treated confidentially and no informa-
tion will be transmitted to any 3rd party, with the exception of a
trusted transcription service.
 Respondents’ names will not be revealed in any part of the re-
port and their identity obscured.
 The respondent may choose not to answer any particular ques-
tion.
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THEMES AND ISSUES FOR INTERVIEWS
Section 1: Background about respondent and the company 
 How long have you been working for the company?
 Please describe your main tasks/job functions. Which job func-
tion did you consider to be the most important?
 Were you involved in any executive  or non-executive commit-
tees?
 When you joined the board were you recruited through a form-
al process or did social connections play an important role?
Respondents’  perceived/experienced  monitoring  challenges
(Directors only)
 In your view, how important was the monitoring aspect of your
role?
 What  other  roles/functions  did  you  perform?  Which  of  your
roles, including monitoring, would you consider to be the most
important?
 What personal “resources” did you provide to the board, e.g.
knowledge, experience, contacts?
Section 2: Board composition
 Do you think that new board members, who were appointed to
the board whilst you were there, had skills, connections, etc
that  were  different  from  existing  members,  or  was  there  a
tendency to appoint people similar to current members?
 Would you say that the members of the board complemented
each other in terms of their skills/strengths?
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Section 3: Job Demands
(this section is to establish the participants experienced job demands)
Respondents’ perceived/experienced task challenges:
◦ Did the business environment become more/less fast changing
during your tenure, and, as a result of this, did the complexity
of the business operations change significantly?
Respondents’ perceived/experienced performance challenges
(executives differ in how much performance is required of them)
 Did  you  experience  any  performance  pressures,  e.g.  a  high
work load, pressure to perform, during your tenure, and how
did these affect you?
 If so, do you think pressures increased during your tenure?
Respondents’ ambitions
(influences level of perceived job demands)
 How would you describe your (job related) ambitions during
your time at Bradford & Bingley?
Section 4: Board Processes
Respondents’ concept of mediating decision-making processes
(mediating strategy processes:  characteristics of  top management team (TMT)
will affect characteristics of strategic plans, and strategic plans will affect the
nature of firm decision-making)
 How would you describe the advisory processes in place, i.e.
were they more CEO-centric or team-centric?
Respondents’  concept/experience  of  conflict  resolution
processes
 How was consensus usually achieved and how were 
conflicts/disagreements resolved?
 Did board turnover during your tenure affect these processes, 
and if so, how?
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 How would  you describe your  relationship  with  other  board
members?
Respondents’  view/experience  of  board  decision-making
processes:
 How did decision-making processes change as a result of board
turnover during your tenure?
 How  did  the  internal  management  information  systems  and
procedures develop, and did they provide relevant and timely
information for decision-making?
 Based on your experience, how would an ideal board decision-
making process work? Would it significantly resemble/differ 
from the process you experienced at Bradford & Bingley?
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D  Appendix Chapter 5
Tables
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Table D.1: Third Party Mortgage Transactions
GMAC-RFC Kensington
2002 £662.20 £0.00
2003 £1,431.60 £0.00
2004 £1,265.50 £0.00
2005 £1,199.70 £206.50
2006 £2,326.00 £214.60
2007 £3,495.10 £648.40
2008 £1,302.10 £550.40
2009 £248.70 £39.50
Sub-Total £11,930.90 £1,659.40
Total £13,590.30
in £m
Directors Out Directors In
1995
Name George Sykes Name Mr Peter Flesher
Position Director Position Director
Resource Resource Manufacturing, Utilities
Age 67 Age 60
1996
Name Christopher Rodrigues
Position Chief Executive
Resource Finance, Travel
Age 45
1997
Name Geoffrey Lister
Position Chief Executive
Resource Mortgage Banking
Age 60
Name Steven Spilsbury
Position Financial Services Director
Resource Finance, Banking
Age 53
1998
Name Michael Pheasey Name David Woodcock
Position Group Executive Director Position Director
Resource Operations (Banking) Resource Property
Age 53 Age 59
1999
Name Sir Neil McFarlane Name Kevin McGuinness
Position Non-Executive Director Position Non-Executive Director (Company Secretary
Resource Politics Resource Banking (Bradford & Bingley)
Age 63 Age 51
Name Ms Rosemary Thorne
Position Director (Group Finance)
Resource Retail Finance
Age 47
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Directors Out Directors In
Name Mr Nicholas Cosh
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Legal
Age 53
2000
Name Mr John A W Smith Name Mr Keith Greenough
Position Director Position Director (Lending/Savings)
Resource Finance Resource Banking
Age 53 Age 50
Name Sir George Cox
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Consulting (IT)
Age 57
2001
Name Mr David Woodcock
Position Director
Resource Property
Age 62
2002
Name Mr Lindsay MacKinlay Name Mr Roderick Kent
Position Chairman Position Chairman
Resource Manufacturing Resource Finance
Age 66 Age 55
Name Mr Peter Flesher Name Mr Steven Crawshaw
Position Director Position Director (Lending/Savings)
Resource Manufacturing, Utilities Resource Banking, Legal
Age 66 Age 40
Name Mr Kevin McGuinness Name Mr Alan Shankley
Position Non-Executive Director 
(Company Secretary)
Position Company Secretary
Resource Banking Resource Property Finance
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Directors Out Directors In
Age 53 Age 53
Name Mr Keith Greenough
Position Director (Lending/Savings)
Resource Banking
Age 52
2003
Name Ms Diana Courtney Name Mr Ian Darby
Position Non-Executive Director Position Director (Marketing)
Resource Legal Resource Mortgage Finance
Age 63 Age 40
Name Mr Mark A Smith Name Mr Robert Dickie
Position Non-Executive Director Position Director (Operations)
Resource Finance Resource Banking
Age 63 Age 44
Name Mr Derek Lewis Name Mr Ian Cheshire
Position Vice-Chairman Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Legal Resource Retail
Age 66 Age 44
Name Lady Louise Patten
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Financial Services, Consulting
Age 50
Name Mr Stephen Webster
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Accounting
Age 51
2004
Name Mr Christopher Rodrigues
Position Chief Executive
Resource Finance, Travel
Age 53
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Directors Out Directors In
Name Mr Ian Darby
Position Director (Marketing)
Resource Mortgage Finance
Age 40
2005
Name Ms Rosemary Thorne Name Mr Christopher Gillespie
Position Director (Group Finance) Position Director (Sales)
Resource Retail Finance Resource Banking
Age 53 Age 42
Name Mr Christopher Wilford
Position Director (Finance)
Resource Banking
Age 43
2006
Name Mr Alan Shankley
Position Company Secretary
Resource Property Finance
Age 57
2007
Name Mr Christopher Gillespie Name Mr Roger Hattam
Position Director (Sales) Position Director (Operations)
Resource Banking Resource Banking (Bradford & Bingley)
Age 44 Age 39
Name Sir George Cox Name Mr Mark Stevens
Position Non-Executive Director Position Director (Sales)
Resource Consulting Resource Private Equity
Age 66 Age 38
Name Mr Michael Buckley
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Banking
Age 62
2008
Name Mr Mark Stevens Name Mr Richard Pym
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Directors Out Directors In
Position Director (Sales) Position Chief Executive
Resource Private Equity Resource Banking
Age 39 Age
Name Mr Robert Dickie
Position Director (Operations)
Resource Banking
Age 49
Name Mr Stephen Webster
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Accounting
Age 56
Name Mr Ian Cheshire
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Retail
Age 49
Name Mr Roderick Kent
Position Chairman
Resource Finance
Age 62
Name Mr Steven Crawshaw
Position Chief Executive
Resource Banking, Legal
Age 46
2009
Name Mr Roger Hattam Name Mr Richard Banks
Position Director (Operations) Position Chief Executive
Resource Banking (Bradford & 
Bingley)
Resource Banking
Age 41 Age
Name Mr Christopher Wilford
Position Director (Finance)
247
Directors Out Directors In
Resource Banking
Age 47
2010
Name Mr Kent Atkinson
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Finance, Accounting
Age
Name Ms Sue Langley
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Insurance
Age
Name Mr Keith Morgan
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Banking
Age
Name Mr John Tattersall
Position Non-Executive Director
Resource Accounting
Age
Table D.2: Changes on Board of Directors 1995 – 2010
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Table D.3: Arrears by Source June 2007 – June 2009
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Table D.4: Residential Non-Performing Loans 2004 – 2009
Resident ial non-performing loans 
As at 
Arrears over 3 months 
Asset value £m 198.2 292.9 378.1 448.8 498.9 575.1 731.2 1185.8 2404 3007.5
% 0.84 1.23 1.45 1.58 1.6 1.62 1.85 2.87 5.87 7.63
31 Dec 
2004
30 Jun 
2005 
31 Dec 
2005 
30 Jun 
2006 
31 Dec 
2006 
30 Jun 
2007 
31 Dec 
2007 
30 Jun 
2008 
31 Dec 
2008 
30 Jun 
2009 
Proport ion of 
book 
Table D.5: B&B Product Mix 2005 – 2009
2006 2007 2008 2009
June 30 Dec. 31 June 30 Dec. 31 June 30 Dec. 31 June 30 Dec. 31
Residential 
Organic 
Buy-to-let 64 65 66 67 68 68 68 72
Self-cert 16 18 18 17 17 17 17 16
Other 20 17 16 16 15 15 15 12
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Acquired 
Buy-to-let 24 25 23 27 28 31 28 33
Self-cert 46 46 42 38 41 39 41 37
Other 30 29 35 35 31 30 31 30
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
All Mortgages
Residential 85 86 88 97 98 98 98 98
15 14 12 3 2 2 2 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Commercial & 
Housing Assoc.
Figures
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Figure D.1: Board Composition (NEDs) 1992 – 2012
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Figure D.2: B&B Annual Report 2006
E  Board Ages 1995 – 2010
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Figure E.1: Age of Directors: 1995 – 2010
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 Abbreviations
ALCO Asset and Liability Oversight Committee 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
B&B Bradford & Bingley
Big 4 The Big Four (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers)
BSA Building Societies Association
BSC Building Societies Commission
CE Chief Executive 
CEO Chief Executive Officer
EGM Extraordinary General Meeting
FCA Financial Conduct Authority 
FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme
FD Finance Director
FSA Financial Services Authority
GMB General Management Board 
HBOS Halifax Bank of Scotland
IoD Institute of Directors
MI Management Information
MIS Management Information Systems
NED Non-Executive Director
NRAM Northern Rock Asset Management 
P&L Profit and Loss
PRA Prudential Regulation Authority 
SID Senior Independent Director
TMT Top Management Team
UKAR The UK Asset Resolution Trust
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VC Vice-Chairman
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 Glossary
Asset & Liability Oversight Committee (ALCO)
The Asset-Liability Committee (ALCO) is responsible for assisting the Board in
fulfilling it’s responsibilities relating to the interest rate risk, capital adequacy, liquidity
and balance sheet growth strategies of the organisation. The committee monitors the
Bank’s  interest  rate  risk,  as  a  whole,  within  certain  tolerance  levels  while  ensuring
adequate liquidity and capital. It is the second powerful committee within the ‘executive
branch’ of the board and at all times, membership consists of the Chief Executive, the
Finance Director, the Director of Risk & Compliance, and the Director of Operations. 
'A spreads person'
A person with intimate knowledge of finance, in particular financial instruments.
Andrew Henry Longhurst
Andrew Longhurst,  was the director  of Lloyds TSB from June 1997 until  April
1998 and Chief Executive of Cheltenham and Gloucester plc. As Chief Executive of
Cheltenham and Gloucester, he was responsible for the development of the company
into the UK's third largest mortgage lender, leading to its acquisition by Lloyds Bank to
become the Group's specialist residential mortgage lender. 
Building Societies Commission
The  Building  Societies  Commission  (BSC)  was  introduced  as  the  supervisory
authority of building societies in the 1986 Building Societies Act.  The BSC remained
the supervisory authority until the creation of the Financial Services Authority through
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  The act consolidated the supervision and
regulation  of  banks,  building  societies,  insurance  companies,  friendly  societies  and
investment firms into a single body.
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Black Horse Estate Agents
Black  Horse  Agencies  (one  of  the  UK’s  leading  estate  agents  with  a  national
network of 370 offices), was acquired by the Bradford and Bingley Group on 1 April
1998. It was previously owned by Lloyds TSB, and the Black Horse name belonged to
them. This move was part of Bradford & Bingley's shifting focus from lending to retail
operations.  Furthermore,  to  align  the  new business  with  its  long-standing values  of
mutuality, the financial services group chose to rebrand the company as Bradford and
Bingley  Estate  Agents.  This  meant  a  change  of  look,  logo  and  name  –  except  in
Scotland,  where the company elected  to  retain the  goodwill  of  its  Slater  Hogg and
Howison banner. 
Close Bros
Close Brothers is a leading merchant banking group and specialist financial services
group, providing lending, deposit taking, wealth management services, and securities
trading.  The  company  makes  loans,  trades  securities  and  provides  advice  and
investment management solutions to a wide range of clients. It is one of the largest 250
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.
Institute of Directors
The Institute  of Directors (IoD) is  a  Professional Institute with Members  which
promotes directors, develops corporate governance, represents members and business to
government, enhances the climate for entrepreneurial activity and provides services to
members. There are 34,500 members through 48 regional branches across the UK.
John Charcol
John Charcol  is  a  mortgage  broker  providing mortgages  from the  whole  of  the
market. It began operations in 1974 and grew to become one of the biggest players in
the market. It was owned by Bradford and Bingley Building Society between 2000 and
2004. 
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Kensington plc
Kensington is  an intermediary only lender and in  1995 was the first  centralised
lender to re-enter the market for subprime mortgages. It focuses on specialist lending for
home buyers and landlords and have done so since 1995.
Leadership team
A leadership team operates in two ways: as a staff group handling the variety of
issues involved in running a business unit and as a strategic group dealing with the
longer term issues of survival, growth, and continuous improvement. As a ‘staff’ the
leadership  group  meets  regularly  to  share  information,  coordinate  efforts  across
departments, and make the decisions needed to keep the organization running. In its
‘strategic’ capacity, the leadership group spends time working on issues of long-term
importance,  including  common  policies,  common  direction,  and  organizational
development and improvement initiatives. 
Management Information Systems (MIS)
MIS  refers  to  the  system  providing  technology-based  information  and
communication services in an organisation as well as the organisational function that
manages  the  system.  It  not  only  encompasses  applications  for  transactions  and
operations, but also applications that support administrative and management functions,
support organizational communications and coordination, and adds value to products
and services. MIS, their correct functioning, and timely output are therefore crucial in
contributing relevant information to support board decisions. 
Myers Briggs Personality Test
The  Myers–Briggs  Type  Indicator  (MBTI)  assessment  is  a  psychometric
questionnaire designed to measure psychological preferences in how people perceive
the  world  and  make  decisions.  It  is  based  on  four  preferences,  namely  E  or  I
(Extraversion  or  Introversion);  S  or  N (Sensing  or  iNtuition);  T or  F  (Thinking  or
Feeling) and J or P (Judgment or Perception). 
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Top Management Team
Consists of the board of directors (including non-executive directors and executive
directors), managing director, president, vice-president, CEOs, chairman/chairwoman,
etc. They are responsible for controlling and overseeing the entire organisation. The top
management team also translates the policies into goals, objectives and strategies, and is
entirely responsible for the success or failure of the organisation.
Senior Independent Director (SID)
The role of Senior Independent Director was proposed in the Higgs Review (2003)
and incorporated into the Combined Code (2003).  The senior independent director is
appointment from amongst the independent non-executive directors on the board.  As
stated in the Higgs Review the role of the SID is to  “be available to shareholders, if
they have reason for concern that contact through the normal channels of chairman or
chief executive has failed to resolve.”  Furthermore, they provide a sounding board for
the  chairman  and  have  the  responsibility  of  holding  annual  performance  appraisal
meetings with non-executive directors of the chairman's performance.
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